As I have written on Twitter, the present political turmoil in Pakistan is part of:1) A genuine push for the rule of law and 2) A complex power struggle involving at least half a dozen major actors, each of which is pursuing multiple, contradictory strategies at the same time.

One of these actors is Nawaz Sharif, who has learned the power of saying no.  In doing so, he presents a challenge to the status quo, which another actor, Washington, wants to preserve.  As a result, the administration has had to make a marked shift in its policy toward the PML-N.  It’s now more conciliatory.

This is not to the liking of some hawks in the PPP, whose political fortunes are tied to Asif Ali Zardari.  Zardari loses as Sharif gains.

Sharif has had to overcome negative reputation of him in Washington that emerged during the Bush administration. Those challenges remain.  To further them and stifle any compromise by Washington in Sharif’s favor, a Pakistani insider informed me that elements in the PPP are working to present Sharif as a religious fundamentalist, in order to discredit him among the DC Beltway crowd.

We see the fruits of this aggressive tactic of the PPP hawks in Mort Kondracke’s column today in Roll Call.

Kondracke writes:

Sharif, often identified as a “religious nationalist,” was a protege of Islamist military dictator Zia Ul Haq. He accused former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of being a “Zionist-Hindu traitor” and, as prime minister, pushed a law to establish Sharia.

The irony is that the unelected PPP figure who fed this story to Kondracke was himself an adviser to Sharif during this phase of his career.  He is now a self-described liberal.

The reality is that Sharif, like the preponderance of Pakistan’s politicians, is a pragmatist.  He is a center-right politician.  He often makes coalitions with the hard right and Islamists and panders to them.  But he is as pragmatic/opportunistic as Zardari and the former Sharif adviser now affiliated with the PPP.

Politicians are politicians.  They remake themselves according to changing contexts and Sharif has done that since 2006.  If political actors were static, then the individual who fed this story to Kondracke would remain a violent Islamist as he was during his student days.

Some characteristics, however, do not change.  This unelected PPP official likely fed the story on the alleged George Clooney-Fatima Bhutto relationship to the National Enquirer.  He’s the only PPP official with that much of an awareness of the broad U.S. media scene.  In an example of continuity, this man is believed to have fed ‘scandalous’ photos of the late Benazir Bhutto and her mother, Nusrat, during an election campaign.  He was a Sharif adviser at the time and would, several defections later, become a Bhutto adviser.  As progressive as he claims to be, he seems to routinely use sexuality to defame female politicians.

PS: The end result of all this political turmoil is that Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani is involved in the political process now more than ever.

Maulvi Iqbal Haider makes a living by filing court petitions that benefit whoever is in power in Islamabad.

Today, he filed a petition to charge Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif with treason.

In May 2007, he filed a petition against Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

In December 2007, he submitted a petition to the Islamabad High Court which sought to pre-empt the restoration of the deposed judges by parliament. He was once head of a tiny political party, the Awami Himayat Tehreek, which was previously named the Pervez Musharraf Himayat Tehreek (Movement for the Support of Pervez Musharraf). (See: Who is Maulvi Iqbal Haider?)

Class act this guy.  He must share an office with “Ambassador Dr.” Shahid Amin Khan.

Riaz Haq, in an excellent profile of Pakistan’s private UAV industry, informs us that the Border Eagle, a UAV produced by the Karachi-based Integrated Dynamics, is used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, presumably to surveil the U.S.-Mexico border.  That’s pretty ironic.

Terrorists affiliated with the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan likely kidnapped John Solecki, the senior UNHCR official in Balochistan, and murdered his Pakistani driver, Syed Hashim Raza.

Solecki dedicated his life to helping the world’s dispossessed.  Compare that to “Maulana” Fazlullah of Swat who, after dropping out from school and becoming a chairlift operator, is now on a campaign to destroy schools and murder.  The contrast is clear: one person builds, the other destroys;  one came from thousands of miles away to aid people not his own, the other has made his own vicinity (the Switzerland of Pakistan) hell on earth.

Columbia Univeristy Professor Richard Bulliet writes on Solecki, his former student, in the International Herald Tribune. A key passage:

“When he was in New York City recently he told me a bit about his job in Quetta. He said that the Baluch nationalists that sometimes agitate for autonomy from Pakistan are not suspicious of him and his work. The Afghan Taliban, too, did not strike him as threatening. He said they were everywhere in Quetta. They set off from there on raids into Afghanistan. But for them Quetta is a quiet rear area, not a place to stage an international incident.

On the other hand, he spoke warily of the Pakistani Taliban. These, he explained, are Pakistanis who share the religious dedication and militant determination of their Afghan counterparts. But their objective is undermining Pakistan’s government, not Afghanistan’s.”

Our prayers are with Solecki, Hashim Raza, and their families.

Interesting footnote to the Khyber Agency raid that netted an alleged al Qaeda figure. 

BBC Urdu reports that locals claim two American commandos arrived on the scene in a tinted window vehicle to observe the operation.  Also, a U.S. Predator/Reaper drone flew over the area.  Pakistani government sources did not confirm or deny the reports.

The U.S. presence in Pakistan is both sensitive and, at times, underestimated.  

After September 11, Islamabad permitted a small, but significant U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and military presence inside the country.  

Joint raids were conducted with the Federal Bureau of Investigations.  United States Special Forces were embedded with Pakistani troops on raids inside North and South Waziristan.  The U.S. military was given access to airbases in Jacobabad and a couple in Balochistan.  Then there is the phenomenon of the missing persons. 

Pakistan also permitted “agents from the CIA, FBI and National Security Agency…to eavesdrop and conduct wiretaps on terrorism suspects” in the country.  This surveillance network has, perhaps, metastasized with or without the consent of Rawalpindi/Islamabad.  The United States has a “network of electronic data collection in Afghanistan and Pakistan [that] allows US experts to monitor hundreds of thousands of telephones and electronic mails every day.” 

It also has “set up a network of human intelligence collectors, which employs hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen.”  I would venture to speculate that officers of the Afghan National Army/Police often play such as role as well.

Her opinions likely coincide with someone’s at the GHQ or ISI HQ.  That is, probably, where her information comes from.  

So, I think a pertinent question is who in Pakistan’s military supports the granting of greater access to United States inside Pakistan and who’s against it?  Furthermore, how will these sentiments impact Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Asif Zardari?  

Neither have the consolidated power (and de-facto legitimacy) of pre-2004 Musharraf.  While former President Pervez Musharraf faced stiff opposition, resulting in several assassination attempts, there was no real threat to his hold on power till early 2007 (2003 was a bit dicey).  Disgruntled generals were ushered out; many were paid off with cushy civilian jobs and real estate.  Access to the same resources is likely more limited now.  As for the general public, resentment toward U.S. involvement inside Pakistan has become deeply embedded inside the Pakistani middle class now more than ever.

Prudence and the law of unintended consqeuences call for a small footprint and treading lightly.

In his first display of real authority, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has sacked National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani.  The move will improve Gilani’s public opinion standing, but it will be a fleeting show of strength.  The prime minister is unlikely to be politically empowered.  In fact, his relationship with President Asif Ali Zardari is expected to deteriorate further.  This and other parallel trends will accelerate Pakistan’s descent into a massive leadership crisis precipitated by the collective delegitimization of its major leaders, both civil and military.  I’ll deal with this subject at the end of the post.  Let’s first discuss Durrani.

WHY WAS DURRANI FIRED?

Earlier in the day, Durrani tacitly admitted to CNN that Ajmal Kasab, one of the Mumbai attackers,”had Pakistani connections.”  He added: “So one cannot deny there was zero link with Pakistan. How much, who all was involved, that we have to investigate.”  Late in the evening, the prime minister’s office announced the firing of Durrani “for his irresponsible behavior for not taking the prime minister and other stakeholders into confidence, and a lack of coordination on matters of national security.”

Durrani’s admission on CNN, however, was not as blatant as has been suggested elsewhere in the media.  And so it is difficult to believe that this interview was the sole factor behind his dismissal.  

More inflammatory were the damaging leaks he made off the record to Zahid Hussain of the Wall Street Journal in late December on the interrogation of Zarar Shah.  Durrani’s dismissal was likely caused by a pattern of behavior on his part.  

But rightists in Pakistan also question Durrani’s loyalty to the Pakistani state.  Gen. (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Beg, formerly chief of army staff, labeled Durrani today an “American agent.”  Whether these allegations played any role in Gilani’s decision is unclear.  The Beg-Durrani dispute is also interesting because each has been alleged to have been part of the assassination of President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 (for separate reasons).  Durrani is said to have loaded crates of mangoes upon Gen. Zia’s plane, which some claim contained a poison gas that incapacitated the pilots.  So Beg could be saving his own skin or genuinely believe Durrani acts on the behalf of a state other than his own.

PERSONALIZATION AND FACTIONALIZATION

Durrani’s statements were reiterated in more blunt terms by Information Minister Sherry Rehman — via text message  – and Foreign Office Spokesman Muhammad Sadiq.  They have not been replaced.

Now why did Sherry and Sadiq make such claims about Kassab?  For Sherry, I think there are two potential explanations.  

One, she could have been given the green light by Zardari.  If this is the case, then it indicates the absence of a formal policy making structure inside the coalition government.  For all of its talk of democracy and institution building, the present government in Islamabad — like all Pakistani governments — is dominated by personalities and factions, not institutions.  Zardari’s arbitrary decision making (remember from last summer, “I am the expert!”) has been at Gilani’s expense.  And this has caused the deterioration of their relationship.  The firing of Durrani could very well be a salvo directed at Zardari.

Two, Sherry could have wrongly assumed that Zardari had given the green light to admit Kasab is a Pakistani.  More specifically, her answer could have been shaped by the question she was asked.  It’s plausible that Durrani’s statement was referred to in the question posed to her, and that she replied as she did on the assumption that Durrani was articulating the government line.  But still, this would indicate the absence of discipline and organization in the PPP-led coalition government.

The Sadiq factor is more interesting.  He is close to Durrani.  When Durrani was ambassador to the United States, Sadiq served at the embassy as deputy chief of mission.  His concurrence with Durrani seems to contradict the consensus at Pakistan’s Foreign Office (and the words of Pakistan’s foreign secretary uttered not too earlier), which has assumed a very defensive posture.  

At the same time, Pakistan’s foreign policy is being disproportionately shaped by its ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, whose appointment was not well received in the Foreign Office.  He shares a similar worldview (and in the eyes of some rightists, paymaster) as Durrani.  Various reports suggest he is at odds with Pakistan’s defensive posture post-Mumbai and is effectively running his own game in Washington.  

Sadiq’s behavior could point to a convergence of efforts by Durrani and Haqqani (who, along with his counterpart at the UN, has rushed back to Islamabad).   And it is not without coincidence that Sadiq is the ambassador-designate to Afghanistan — a very sensitive posting.  Let’s see if Pakistan’s High Commissioner in New Delhi Shahid Malik will stay in place. 

COLLECTIVE DELEGITMIZATION

Today’s events come a day after two key developments: another U.S. ground incursion inside Pakistani territory (this time in North Waziristan); and the Inter-Services Intelligence Director General’s dovish interview with Der Spiegel.  Both further the perception that the Pakistan Army is not adequately playing its role in defending the Pakistani state.  This will add to the mounting stress inside the army on both Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and DG ISI Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

There are significant civil-military, intra-civil government, and intra-military tensions.  They will intensify.  There are no easy fixes; each actor is constrained by a poverty of choices, intellect, and good sense.  Having gamed out a set of scenarios, I believe Pakistan is headed toward a dangerous deadlock by late spring.  

All is not well between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani.  

In resisting the complete domination of Zardari, the man from Multan has signalled that he is a vertebrate.  That surprised Zardari, who for prime minister simply sought a backboneless ball of fat with a mustached face.  

Tensions between the two have metastasized so much that Zardari, according to Islamabad chatter, is considering replacing Gilani with another pir, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, presently foreign minister.  

A more deserving but less likely candidate would be Sherry Rehman.  Presently information minister, Rehman is far more diligent and intelligent than her Peoples Party peers (and pirs).  Making her PM would, however, spark further gossip regarding Zardari’s closeness to Rehman, notwithstanding its baselessness.

Qureshi is the more probable candidate to succeed Gilani should the latter’s relationship with Zardari deteriorate further.  He is certainly an upgrade.  Qureshi is more articulate and urbane than the present PM.  He exudes confidence and competence (just don’t ask him what’s the price of compressed natural gas).  And he is ambitious.  These traits put him on the radar of the ‘kingmakers’ abroad.  Then add the fact that his primary job is to deal with these parties.  

But Qureshi’s strengths are also, vis-a-vis Zardari, his weaknesses.  Zardari seeks a compliant PM, not a competent one.  His misplaced priorities have created tensions with the present PM and will likely do the same with the next.  That, combined with his neglect of governance and prioritization of power politics, will create serious trouble for him and Pakistan.  As a result, I am inclined to believe that Zardari’s presidency and the PPP-led coalition government are near the beginning of their end.

Zardari’s political opponents, in fact, seem to be mobilizing their forces for a campaign to check or remove him.  

Recent opinion articles in the Pakistani press, one of which was by an old Zardari friend, have catalogued Zardari’s failings since the February elections.  On the first anniversary of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, Today with Kamran Khan, a major Pakistani public affairs program, devoted its entire program to argue that Zardari has neither taken real steps to pursue his wife’s killers (such as lodging an FIR), nor sought to implement her agenda.  The attempts by the normally cynical Khan to paint Benazir as a genuine supporter of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry seemed fairly contrived.  

These arguments further the idea that Zardari not only killed the Bhutto political dynasty, which I believe, but that he also killed the Bhuttos (Mir Murtaza and Benazir).  There is no evidence he was involved in his wife’s murder.  But it doesn’t help Zardari that his government recently arrested critic Mumtaz Bhutto, Benazir’s uncle and eldest surving patrilineal relative.  Nor does it help that Sanam Bhutto, Benazir’s sister, seems to cry profusely every time she’s within Zardari’s proximity.

The two parallel cases being made in the public discourse against Zardari — one alleging misgovernance and the other malice — build as he becomes the locus of public and elite ire.  Zardari is the new Musharraf, but without the latter’s strengths, including army backing.  

And so Zardari’s winter of discontent will lead to a stormy spring.  Nawaz Sharif is steadedly shifting toward full-fledged opposition.  The lawyers will go on another long march in March and the PML-N will join.  Violent protests against loadshedding suggest public anger is rising, or some would like to make it seem that way.  Senate elections will take place in March.  Zardari will be expected to reduce his constitutional powers soon after, but few believe he will.  And then there’s Zardari’s relationship with the Army, which is dysfunctional at best.  Even Peoples Party workers are increasingly fed up with Zardari.  Pakistan will follow the world into a deepening recession.  Violence in the Pashtun belt will certainly intensify.  

A perfect storm is brewing, set to hit Zardari this spring.  But he can weather the onslaught.  To mitigate the political pressure against him, Zardari will need to accomodate the demands of his opposition and improve his government’s performance.  

More specifically, this would entail: restoring the presidency to its nominal status; empowering a new, competent prime minister; bringing back Iftikhar Chaudhry as chief justice; keeping the peace in Punjab with the PML-N by replacing Salmaan Taseer as governor; halting U.S. drone attacks; ending unannounced elecricity loadshedding; and making bold displays of merit-based appointments and good governance.

Above all, this government bereft of achievement, must show Pakistan it has a detailed policy agenda and political vision.  And it must begin immediately to implement it, rather than deferring and delaying as it has done for almost a year.

Below is an excerpt from my latest external piece, published at the World Policy Review.

——

Asia Triangle: Pakistan’s Search for Security

Arif Rafiq | 01 Dec 2008

Pakistan’s Perpetual Precariousness

On Nov. 26, terrorists laid siege to Mumbai, making the poshest area of India’s commercial capital a war zone for several days. The attacks once again raised the specter of an Indo-Pak war. Yet, earlier in the day, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi had arrived in New Delhi to continue recently renewed peace talks with his Indian counterpart. The two South Asian states, playing to a script performed before, had in a short period of time taken two steps forward and 10 steps back.
Relations between India and Pakistan are clearly fragile and volatile. They have been so since the bloody birth of both states in August 1947. The two countries are linked by culture, history, and geography, but these very elements also contribute to their divide. 

Complete article

Update: 5/7/2001 — In the years since the Mumbai terrorist attacks, I have thought as to whether I should delete this post or amend it.  I have decided is it better to own up to my glaring mistake, to amend the post, and maintain its original text struck out.

In hindsight, I can see that I was incorrect in my assessment that Indian-based Muslims conducted the Mumbai attacks.  My opinion was shaped by the recent attacks by the Indian Mujahideen, which appeared to be a purely local outfit.

In reality, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked Indian civilians and others on that day.  Much of what I had originally written about India’s internal challenges is true. But it is equally, if not more applicable to Pakistan, which is corroding from within due to militancy and terrorism.

My apologies for any offense caused.

Mumbai is a war zone. Dozens of innocents have been butchered by cold, depraved young men.

But rather than blaming Pakistan, India must look at itself.

Earlier in the week, Indians boasted of the alleged sinking of a pirate vessel by their navy.   An Indian columnist proclaimed that the Indian navy had come of age.

Days later, U.S. officials revealed that the Indians sunk the pirated vessel — not the pirates’.

And last night, terrorists stormed the seaside Taj Hotel, coming into Mumbai via boats.

Clearly the Indian navy has not come of age.

Presumptuousness has plagued India. ‘India shining’ belied the plight of its darkened masses. Nine hundred million there live on less than $2 a day.

Incompetence has also plagued India. After failing to prevent this sophisticated attack and bungling the subsequent operations, New Delhi has magically found out the origin of the terrorists’ vessel and even their hometown!

In blaming Pakistan, Indian officials are masking their own incompetence. India’s security establishment has, much like Pakistan’s, failed to protect its citizenry. States are reluctant to acknowledge that non-state threats are purely that; it is humiliating.

The 800 pound gorilla in the room is the rising threat of homegrown Muslim militancy in India. Muslims are an underclass in India and increasingly plagued by a Hindu chauvinism that has come from the periphery to India’s center. Yesterday’s events are the natural outgrowth of Hindu fascism, which belies the spirit of Hinduism in burning Muslims alive and raping Christian nuns.

India must confront its inner demons. But it is clearly proving resistant to do so, given that elections are not too far.

Terrorism is politics of the most morally decrepit sort. It can involve religion, but only by removing its ethical constraints. It is also imprecise. As I write, a family friend and his father — both Muslim — are holed up in the Taj, uncertain of their fate.

ISLAMABAD ‘LIQUIDATES’ ITS ‘ASSETS’…

Earlier this month, David Ignatius revealed that Islamabad and Washington have a “secret deal” that permits the latter to freely take out previously off-limit insurgent leaders inside Pakistan.  The list related to Ignatius by an anonymous Pakistani source, likely Ambassador Husain Haqqani, was big stuff.  Islamabad had consented to the liquidation of its major ‘assets’ in the tribal areas and nearby: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Mullah Muhammad Omar. Presumably Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir (militants favorable to Islamabad, opposed to the U.S., and hostile to Baitullah Mehsud) were also on the list, as they have since threatened Islamabad after U.S. drone attacks in their vicinity.  Also on the list were figures who, unlike the aforementioned, have declared war on the Pakistani state: various al-Qaeda leaders and operatives as well as Mehsud.

Strangely, the report received scant coverage in the boisterous Pakistani media.  A week and a half later, a Washington Post news report reasserted the claims made in Ignatius’ column, albeit without mentioning specific approved targets.  This piece received immediate attention in Pakistan and even more days later when U.S. drones hit ‘mainland’ Pakistan for the first time.  The Peoples Party-led government played according to script; it and the Foreign Office condemned the attacks and denied the existence of a deal.

Conspicuous was the relative silence of the Pakistan Army.  In September, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani promptly and vigorously denied claims that he agreed on the USS Abraham Lincoln to U.S. ground operations inside Pakistan.  He vowed to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty “at all costs.”

In contrast, this month his press office did not respond to the Ignatius piece (Kayani was out of the country at the time).  Inter-Services Public Relations spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas did speak with the media to deny claims made in the subsequent Post news article.  But there was no strongly worded press release or reaction from Kayani himself.

The reality is that none of the latest U.S. drone attacks could have occurred without the provision of intelligence by Pakistan’s military.  This is why the targeting seems to be more precise — in clear contrast to the Angor Ada raid that yielded no high value targets and killed mainly innocent Pakistani civilians.  In fact, most of the good U.S. intelligence on the tribal areas and al-Qaeda comes from the ISI.  And this is why Nazir and Gul Bahadur smell change in the air.

…BECAUSE IT IS FACING BANKRUPTCY?

What occurred in between now and September that would alter the perspective of the Pakistan Army leadership?  A change of heart?  No.  Too quick.  Most likely: a change in ground realities.

One, Pakistan’s economy has deteriorated. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) and possibly even aid packages have been held back to induce cooperative behavior from Islamabad.  In October, Pakistan’s outgoing Defense Secretary Kamran Rasool told a Senate committee that the country was nearing bankruptcy and could not afford a confrontation with the United States.

Two, if the above was not the single factor, then there has to have been something operational.  Perhaps the Pakistani army is coming to recognize its limitations, at least in the short term.  Presently, it is operating in Bajaur, Swat, and more recently, Mohmand. There has been some success in Bajaur and Swat, but the militants are proving to be formidable.  Only until recently have U.S. forces complemented operations in neighboring Kunar (on the flip side, Pakistani peace agreements in FATA increased attacks on the other side of the border).  Prior to that, insurgents were pouring into Pakistan from Afghanistan.  An additional American brigade will be heading to Regional Command East in January.  But it will get worse before it gets better.  South Waziristan is a long time away for the Pakistan Army.  It will host the mother of all battles in this brutal counterinsurgency.

Three, though Kayani is difficult to decipher — poker face and all — he seems to have developed a healthy, working relationship with senior U.S. and NATO commanders.  The Tripartite Commission now meets regularly and Kayani recently went to Brussels to attend a NATO summit.  Whether or not his colleagues on the other side have fully embraced his major recommendations is unclear.  But Kayani is smiling a lot more than he did in September.

It is possible that the Pakistan Army will remain extremely reluctant to share intelligence on its major ‘assets’ (e.g. Mullah Omar).  There is also the possibility that the Army has a different understanding/terms of the agreement than the civilian government.  Or, Ignatius’ list could be partially inaccurate.  After all, is it really possible to take out Mullah Omar with a missile strike or even a helicopter/ground raid in the middle of Quetta (if that’s where he is)?

Recent comments from the Pakistani civilian and military leadership seem to suggest that they are hoping for a new deal with the incoming Obama administration.  That could just be for public consumption.  Anyway, Gen. David Petraeus is said to have told them during his latest visit that the next government will not change policy toward the region.

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES: DEFEATING TRANSNATIONAL TERROR, SPURRING ETHNIC AND TRIBAL WARFARE, AND WITHERING THE PAKISTANI STATE

The expansion of the U.S. military role inside Pakistan and other parallel changes (ongoing Pakistan Army operations) have the potential to vastly change dynamics on the ground.

The Good

Eliminating or neutralizing al-Qaeda, if it is possible, has its obvious advantages for all state actors.  Rooting it out from Pakistan’s Pashtun belt is somewhat like taking gum out of one’s hair.  Peanut butter is better than a scissor.  If you have to cut, leave as much hair as possible.

The Bad

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), currently between 100,000 and 150,000 will likely grow in the coming year.  Pakistani officials have indicated the IDPs will remain in camps for at least a year.  Within that time period, they could be joined by Pakistanis from other tribal (or even settled) areas, which would double or triple the number.

The IDPs have left their property at home, which, more likely than not is destroyed.  Having lost family members who remained behind or died in transit, they are likely bitter and conflicted.

There is no reason to believe that Islamabad and others vested in its counterinsurgency have and will adequately address the issue of IDPs.  The anger of these displaced persons, particularly the youth, will fester, replacing, to some degree, the militants being killed back in Bajaur, Swat, and Mohmand.

The IDP camps do provide an opportunity to engage tribals in an environment less threatening than their home areas.  Providing IDPs with basic services, respectable amenities, literacy and job training, as well as primary and secondary education can give Islamabad a head start on the last leg of a clear, hold, build strategy for FATA.

The Ugly

Putting all of the militants in the same box, as the Ignatius article claims is being done, could result in the consolidation of militant entities.  Presently, Pakistan is being targeted by the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi, al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda-like freelancers, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and other outfits.

Now, if the Ignatius column is correct, add to the above: Mullah Omar-led Taliban, Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami Afghanistan, the Haqqani group, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur.  Note that Nazir and his fellow Wazirs are a natural rival to Mehsud.  Gul Bahadur split from the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan.  Haqqani provides Pakistani intelligence with information on Mehsud & Co.  And he is well rooted in the tribal structure in North Waziristan and neighboring areas of Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Army, in adopting the adversaries of coalition forces in Afghanistan, gains new enemies and loses old assets. Playing the militants off of one another has been a key part of of Islamabad’s strategy toward the militants.  It has not been perfect, but U.S. officials seem to have endorsed a similar approach in Afghanistan.  If the militants in Pakistan bridge their differences, induced by a one-two punch from Islamabad and Washington, then Pakistan could face a brunt of urban violence the likes of which it has never seen before.

Not only will militants pressed in the tribal areas will push deeper into the North-West Frontier Province’s settled areas, but they will also hit Pakistan’s urban centers — most important of which is Karachi, whose port brings in a majority of U.S. and NATO supplies in Afghanistan.  The potential number of civilian casualties, on venues such as M.A. Jinnah Road, which runs from the Karachi Port through the heart of Karachi to a Peshawar/Torkham-bound national highway.  Terrorists could, for example, attack oil tankers crossing through the city.  Or they could spread things out and lay IEDs anywhere along the stretch of highways N5 (Karachi-Torkham) and N25 (Karachi-Chaman).

In expanding the war theater, militants could ignite ethnic tensions, the seeds of which are already rooted in Pakistan’s soil. Altaf Hussain, the London-based head of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a party that represents a segment of Pakistanis who migranted from India and their descendants, has once again called for young men in his city to acquire arms and training to use them.  He has repeatedly warned of Talibanization in the city.  Combating a violent non-state actor with another non-state actor provides a recipe for uncontrolable urban warfare.  And while Karachi is a likely terrorist target, many fear Altaf is conflating the militant infiltration with the inflow of Pashtun migrants from war afflicted areas of Pakistan.  Altaf has called for new entrants into Karachi to register themselves, precipitating a harsh denunciation from the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP).  The ANP and MQM have had a difficult relationship over the years.  The latter’s hold on Karachi is challenged by the growth in the Pashtun population.

In recent weeks, the Pakhtunistan bogeyman has also reappeared.  Somehow posters in Pashto calling for the creation of an independent Pashtun state appeared in the NWFP.  Combine that with the opposition of the two major Muslim League factions to renaming NWFP Pakhtunkhwa (Hazaras, non-Pashtuns in the NWFP who oppose the renaming, vote for the two parties), and the current national dynamic (PPP & the rest vs. PML-N, i.e. urban Punjab) and you have a strong potential for balkanization.  [Add to that sectarian violence that has been rising in Dera Ismail Khan and continues to plague the Kurram Agency.]

Mission creep on the part of the United States could break open the levies.  Consider the recent comments of former CIA Islamabad station chief, Robert Grenier:

“… as we work out with [the Pakistanis] a rough division of labor, the U.S., I believe, ought to be taking the lead in addressing the issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”

The excerpt is from an otherwise very reasonable set of comments.  Grenier’s proposal would further dilute whatever waning influence Pakistan has in the region.  Local actors would either become loyal to the new power broker in the area, the United States, or to a third party, rendering the Pakistani state irrelevant or an enemy.

The logic seems to be that if Islamabad has no writ in territory X, it has effectively lost sovereignty, giving a free hand to other parties to take action in the area.  That, however, serves to reify or exacerbate Islamabad’s distance from the region.  And the authority vacuum, a source of instability, can only truly be filled by Islamabad.

The loss of local assets, the weakening (at least) of the malik system, and the alienation of locals (via drone attacks), makes that impossible. FATA, in fact, could fall permanently out of the hands of Islamabad.

That, combined for the spread of violence into Pakistan’s cities (particularly Karachi) could accelerate the breakdown of the Pakistani state.  Indeed, there is the potential for a 1,001 separate wars to go on simultaneously (given the ethnic and tribal differences, the proliferation of criminal networks,  and the role of badal, or revenge, in Pashtunwali).  Like Iraq, Pakistan would witness the flight of capital abroad (Amman certainly benefited from Iraqi expats); the departure of the haves (doctors, bankers, and other professionals) to safer shores, such as Dubai, London, and Canada; and leaving the country to the have nots.  Middle class and poorer Karachiites would be left to fend off militants and criminal gangs (not entirely different from today!).  Karachi, I fear, would burn incessantly.

There is no alternative to strengthening the Pakistani state.  Pakistan must be the predominant agent on the ground; a big part of that is the requisite training and equipment (e.g. nightvision goggles, jammers, and secure radio systems).  Establishing the rule of civil law, from Karachi to Khyber, is also essential.  The use of drones should be limited.  Consider that the cost of a Hellfire missile shot from Predator/Reaper drones is roughly the same as that of building a school in a Pakistani village.  Given the danger posed to Westerners, development aid might be better routed through more expressly Pakistani entities/persons.

Finally, the fundamental contradictions in the U.S.-Pakistan partnership must be ironed out.  This requires the Pakistan Army to redouble efforts to root out al-Qaeda and other transnational takfiri terrorists.  It also requires the United States to come to terms with the fact that a great number of important Pashtun actors quite simply oppose its presence in their lands.  Washington should let them know it is ready, in a phased and conditionalized fashion, to say goodbye.