Ron Suskind, author of The One Percent Doctrine, claims in a new book that Pervez Musharraf gave an ominous warning to the late Benazir Bhutto in a September 2007 phone conversation, telling her: “You should understand something…Your security is based on the state of our relationship.”  [Benazir spoke to Musharraf on her cell phone, while in the late Congressman Tom Lantos' office.]

Suskind’s book, The Way of the World, was released today.  Particularly compelling portions have been reported on CNN.  Suskind’s reporting is controversial, though his sourcing is seen as meticulous.  He’s a Pullitzer Prize winner.

Update: 1:59AM (08/06) –

• I purchased the book last night, wrote a brief summary, and provided a lengthy set of Pakistani-related excerpts.  Unfortunately, all that was lost and I’m not sure how.  So what follows is a crude reconstruction of what I originally produced.  In the end, you should read Suskind’s book yourself.  It weaves a beautiful narrative of the microcosmic struggles of real ‘characters’ to be human (who include Benazir and a young Pakistani working in DC) and with the more macrocosmic challenges of extremism/terrorism and U.S. hegemony.

Some Pakistan-related claims in the book:

• The Bush administration’s Pakistan policy is the product of a rivalry between Vice President Cheney’s office and the State Department team of Condoleeza Rice, John Negroponte, and Richard Boucher.  Rice’s team came up with the Bhutto-Musharraf deal idea.  Cheney’s office refused to own it, describing Bhutto as “complicated and unpredictable.”
• Bhutto’s aides proposed her return to Pakistan to the State Department in spring of 2006.
• In the summer of 2006, Washington threatened to “constrain” or freeze (perhaps partially?) Benazir Bhutto’s assets.  Yet a year later, it showed no interest Bhutto’s request to do so to Musharraf’s cronies, including Ejaz Shah.
• The State Department bought onto the idea of a Bhutto-Musharraf deal in the spring of 2007, with the rise of lawyers’ movement.
• The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had been spying on Benazir Bhutto for months prior to her return. It listened to her phone conversation with son Bilawal in which “she told him about the secret bank accounts that hold the family’s fortunes.”
• The NSA “has harvested a number of portentous conversations of Benazir Bhutto’s.”  This would let the Bush administration take a “carrots and sticks” approach to Benazir.  I would add this data likely serves as a restraint upon Asif Zardari.
• Prior to Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, Asif Zardari believed that she could be best secured by surrounding her with bodies; her American advisers thought otherwise–but Bhutto turned down a $400,000/month proposal from Blackwater.
• Musharraf called Benazir after the first assassination attempt on her.  After offering his sympathies, he tells her, “I’m not the enemy, Bibi.”
• After the Karachi blasts, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson asked Bhutto to “tone down” her criticism of Musharraf.
• Bhutto found out through sources days in advance that Musharraf would be imposing emergency rule/martial law.
• Bhutto was “evolving” during “the last months of her life.”  This was not only due to Karachi assassination attempt and house arrests,  but also because she saw herself as not simply returning to the throne, but also playing a “wider historic role.”

Suskind presents a nuanced version of Benazir — her strengths and weaknesses.  But, interestingly, he concludes somewhat hagiographically.  Benazir, he seems to suggest, evolved into a messianic figure of sorts after she returned to Pakistan.  Flawed, humane, and a source of hope she was.  Her “evolution,” he writes, could have helped her “turn into the next great narrative of this period, capturing the imagination far and wide and turning it away from destructive certainty.”

He then cautions the reader with a reminder of Benazir’s past.  But still, Benazir at her death, for Suskind, internalized the hopes of her nation.  Meanwhile, Zardari (at least the Zardari he met on the Hill in September ’07) is disinterested, misplaced, and uninspiring.

Bhutto, during her return to Pakistan, alternated between populism and a Musharraf-accomodating pragmatism.  She was murdered at a moment in which she was tilted toward the former.  Whether she would subsequently re-tilt toward the latter or stay with the Pakistani public had she survived is unclear.  But myths can be an effective instrument of change.  The potential positive narrative that Suskind writes died with Bhutto remains alive in Pakistan.  Irrespective of its accuracy, it can serve as a means to manipulate elite activity, channeling it toward greater nobility.

Asif Ali Zardari, so it seems, has regained a backbone and responsiveness to public opinion this week. He’s publicly spoken out against Pervez Musharraf, terming him a barrier to democracy. Zardari also spoke of the immense popular pressure on him to oust the dubiously elected president. Meanwhile, Musharraf’s office said today that it will no longer hold backchannel talks with Zardari.

The present situation is unlikely to last into next week, when Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte will come to Islamabad. The house should be set in order by then.

Negroponte has been highly critical of Pakistan’s talks with militants in the tribal areas and North-West Frontier Province. But he will also probably patch things between Zardari and Musharraf and press for an 18th amendment consistant with what his administration sees as U.S. national interests.

The public image of Zardari-Musharraf tensions is misleading.   Indeed, Husain Haqqani–a long-time critic of Musharraf, Zardari’s senior strategic advisor, and the new ambassador to Washington–met with the Pakistani president today.

So what’s more probable is that both sides are toughening their bargaining positions in the final stages of drafting the 18th amendment.  Zardari is also keen on reversing the public image of him as being too close to Musharraf.  But it will be difficult for his efforts to have much of an impact as they are late and will, most probably, be reversed soon.

Pervez Musharraf was in Jacobabad earlier today to inaugurate a new potable water supply project. His comments, however, ventured out of the territory of drinkable water and into the recent dubious reports that he was being pushed out by Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. An assertive Musharraf said: “This is my Army. This Army will never leave me.”

He also said the next parliament will convene within two weeks.  A senior government official had said earlier that the body would convene by this coming Wednesday. Looks like someone’s not going to “behave like a fatherly figure.” Deals are to be made.

Roughly two weeks have passed since Pakistan’s elections, but parliament and the provincial assemblies have yet to convene, governing coalitions haven’t been finalized, and Pakistan’s largest party hasn’t chosen its prime ministerial nominee. The sluggish pace of the transition was expected, though if the status quo prevails into the weekend or next week, those interested in Pakistan’s stability and political reform should be concerned.

The political situation in Pakistan remains quite fluid.

Two days after the elections, the People’s Party (PPP) and Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) agreed to form a government “in principle.” But since then, the two parties haven’t really addressed the major sticking points between the two publicly, and the PPP has continued in direct and back channel talks with Pervez Musharraf and his domestic and foreign allies. At the same time, the Supreme Court has dismissed petitions against Musharraf’s National Reconciliation Ordiance, which enabled political re-entry for Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari, but not Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif.

Though the PPP is positioned for accommodation with Musharraf, the basis for a PPP, PML-N, and Awami National Party (ANP) coalition government in the center remains intact. Both can occur, but they are more likely to be mutually exclusive.

Last week, it appeared that the PPP was putting forward a prime ministerial nominee from Punjab, not Amin Fahim from Sindh. But now there are reports that Fahim is back in the good graces of Zardari — or, at the very least, a majority of the party’s central executive committee.

What is clear is that the PPP is positioning itself for a measured opposition to Pervez Musharraf that will enable it to either extract maximal concessions from him or go for the jugular–impeachment–when ready (or both).

In contrast, the PML-N would like to keep a safe distance from the president, consistent with its anti-Musharraf election campaign, so as to reap full rewards from his eventual downfall.

More to come.

The Sunday Telegraph quotes an unnamed “close confidante” of Pervez Musharraf as saying that Musharraf’s resignation could (not definitely, as its headline states) be imminent:

“He has already started discussing the exit strategy for himself…I think it is now just a matter of days and not months because he would like to make a graceful exit on a high.”

I would take this quote with a grain of salt. While its outlook is highly plausible, the statement could be designed to create fear among Western diplomats, who have been actively ‘lobbying’ Asif Zardari, and to a lesser extent Nawaz Sharif, to keep Musharraf on board. Amin Fahim, the People’s Party’s selected prime ministerial candidate, has told CNN of his party’s aversion to “rock the boat at this time” and said that he thinks “there’s no need at the moment” to impeach Musharraf. The pressure on Musharraf is not full-fledged.

A non-violent exit for Musharraf? Most likely. Graceful? Yes, if you think Nixon’s resignation was. On a high? No way. Musharraf needs to ask himself: Why after almost eight and a half years in power has he reversed roles with Mr. 10 Percent and Amir ul Mumineen (now Amir ul Wukalaa)? Why is it that he could very well be subletting Nawaz’s villa in Jeddah, while Sher Sahib has returned with both hairline and legitimacy restored?

The same official above also tells the Telegraph:

“[Musharraf] may have made many mistakes, but he genuinely tried to build the country and he doesn’t want to destroy it just for the sake of his personal office.”

Musharraf failed to recognize the necessity of constitutional constraints, political competition, and a free and active public discourse in curbing the weaknesses inherent in all political actors. And good intentions can only take one so far. In the end, an executive must be judged by actions–especially when given close to a decade to perform. The freak show that is Pakistan’s constitution, in its present form, will perhaps be Musharraf’s greatest legacy. His amendments and extra-constitutional acts demonstrated his utter failure as a politician and as a ruler who failed to become a leader.

Prior to last year, Musharraf was keen to make his case before the Pakistani people. Though he certainly wasn’t always right, he did lay out his arguments in a straightforward and deliberated fashion in national addresses. But an increasing insularity began. And his last ditch effort–a Friday op-ed in the Washington Post, probably written by an account director at Ogilvy PR–typifies his failure over the past 11 months. Instead of making his case to the people of Pakistan (and also internalizing their feedback), Musharraf was busy making his case to policymakers in Washington.

Saturday’s Guardian quotes an unnamed PML-Q official (Tariq Azim or Mushahid Hussain?) describing Musharraf as worn down and isolated:

“He’s been sulking…He’s retreated into a mental bunker, which is not healthy. He thinks everyone is out to get him and only listens to a small circle. It’s a dangerous mindset to be in at this point in time. He could decide to hit back.”

PEMRA’s actions against Aaj Television suggest Musharraf could have one more fight in him. But it remains difficult to see him being allowed to punch below the belt. Without that advantage, Musharraf might decide it’s not even worth taking a swing.

UPDATE – Sunday 02:48PM New York/Monday 12:48AM Islamabad: Pervez Musharraf’s spokesman Rashid Qureshi denied suggestions in the Telegraph article that the president was considering an imminent resignation.   He said, “Frankly if President wants to talk about such matters, he will have to talk to the people of Pakistan…I discard the authenticity of [the] news story as the newspaper does not identify its source. It seems that someone is planting such rumors.”

Let’s Continue Our Conversation…in London
Shahbaz Sharif, president of the Muslim League-Nawaz, tells BBC Urdu that “If Musharraf becomes neutral and promises to hold the polls in a free and fair manner, talks can be held with him.” This is a major break with precedent. Previously the Sharif brothers have publicly ruled out any compromise with Musharraf.

It’s unclear whether Shahbaz’s statement has his brother’s endorsement, though this is highly likely. It could be that Shahbaz is playing good cop, while Nawaz plays bad cop. Additionally, Shahbaz is seen as more conciliatory than his older brother, which would provide Nawaz with some cover (i.e. creating the impression that his brother talked him down from the ledge). A less likely alternative is that Musharraf could be successfully playing one Sharif brother off of the other by offering Shahbaz, not Nawaz, a major position in the national unity government (perhaps prime minister).

Shahbaz has extended his stay in London, where he’ll meet with retired Brigadier Niaz Ahmed (they met in Islamabad over a week ago) and could meet with Pervez Musharraf, who has begun a four nation tour of Europe.

Musharraf will eventually make his way to London, but there are no meetings with government officials slated. Gordon Brown is currently in India, where he called for New Delhi’s addition to the UN Security Council. Musharraf could be avoiding Brown’s snub of Pakistan, but his trip is also designed to temper European opposition. Musharraf will also meet Niaz Ahmed. Prior to leaving Pakistan, Musharraf met with the emir of Abu Dhabi on Saturday. The emirate played host to a Bhutto-Musharraf meeting in July.

Zardari and Malik Qayyum Meet in Dubai
National reconciliation talks must, apparently, occur outside of Pakistan, and so Attorney General Malik Qayyum met with Asif Ali Zardari in Dubai on Saturday. Both left Pakistan in a curiously furtive fashion. The PPP has publicly remained open to dealing with Musharraf after the elections and strongly resist the idea of a national reconciliation government prior to the elections, as they’d delay the polls.

It’s a positive development if Musharraf is negotiating with both the Sharifs and Zardari in earnest. If he’s playing them off of each other, then Musharraf is playing with fire.

Opposition Tours the U.S.
Several opposition figures are on a tour of the United States. Sherry Rehman and Javaid Laghari, both of the People’s Party, will be speaking at the Brookings Institution tomorrow. Imran Khan will be on a multi-city tour, speaking at organizations such as Amnesty International and CSIS and in Pakistani community events, which seem to be fund raisers for his Tehreek-e Insaaf Party.

Fazlur Rahman: Saudi Challo
Maulana Fazlur Rahman was noticeably absent from the public since the news reporting serious threats against him. And he’s done what he seems to do often in challenging moments, go to Saudi Arabia.

Geo Back
Earlier last week, Talat Hussain returned to AAJ television to host his weeknightly public affairs program. In his first show back on air, Talat said he’s back with no strings attached. But it seems as if the show (Live with Talat) is now taped, not live (in accordance with the new media control rules). There is also little mention of the judiciary issue. Nonetheless, the show remains engaging and informative.

GEO News also returned to the air waves today sans their most popular political talk show hosts, Hamid Mir and Shahid Masood. Kashif Abbasi, another prominent television journalist, remains off of ARY One World.

Back to the Barracks
Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has recalled a number of active military officers from cushy positions within the civilian bureaucracy. This follows his earlier move barring senior officers from meeting with politicians.

Pakistan has moved forward in the two weeks since the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but toward what exactly remains unclear. The country has displayed a capacity to sustain high-levels of violence, but with economic pressures and social divisions rising, one wonders what is the tipping point.

Musharraf Hangs in the Balance
Stuck in a gray zone, Pervez Musharraf has neither increased nor decreased in power. That is not to say that the political dynamics surrounding him have changed. They have been vastly altered with the murder of Benazir Bhutto.

Bhutto would have served both as an asset for Musharraf as well as a source of consternation. In the short to midterm, her electoral participation would have effectively validated his presidency; her ascendancy to the premiership would be even more of a plus, especially in the eyes of Washington.

Conceivably, Bhutto could have provided Musharraf with the capacity to mobilize public support for campaigns against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In reality, their partnership, if it ever took hold, would have been exclusive and those left out–namely Nawaz Sharif–would logically make the anti-terror campaign a wedge issue, especially with its American origins.

Furthermore, in the mid to long-term (or even sooner), Bhutto would have pressed for a reduction of Musharraf’s presidential powers and, at the opportune moment, his ouster. For much of 2007, Bhutto was maneuvering for a third shot at the premiership. The assumption that she would remain content with a neutered office is naive.

Musharraf remains in power, in a sense, by default. There is a lack of a capable and willing alternative. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, as explained below, has other priorities at the moment. Interested and influential parties are waiting for the elections to produce a new government. Afterwards, evaluations could be made as to whether the new premier constitutes a working partner for Musharraf or a viable and willing alternative to him.

Things are not getting better for Musharraf. His achievements–sustained economic growth, a vibrant and free media, and managing of foreign pressure–are crumbling before his eyes, or better put, in his hands. Should there be any improvement in the security situation in the Frontier Province and FATA, Gen. Kayani–not Musharraf–would likely get the credit. Elections roundly seen as free and fair, while improving his standing, would give his political opponents perhaps overwhelming leverage.

Perhaps Musharraf is sensing the tide. For the second time, Musharraf said yesterday that he would resign from the presidency if the new parliament sought to impeach him. Is this a sign of a weary Musharraf or a threat to external forces pressing for democracy?

Shortly after Musharraf’s coup, his brother told the New York Times that he’d give him the following advice: ”Look, don’t overstay and end up like previous martial law governments. They were thrown out by the people….If he becomes corrupted by power, I’ll be uncomfortable. I hope he does his job, holds elections and gets out.”

His brother, whose wise advice was not heeded, must be uncomfortable now.

Kayani’s Campaign
Since his rise to public notoriety late last year, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has remained both mysterious and a recipient of fairly unguarded praise. Kayani reportedly has no aspirations to political power, but then again the same was said of Pakistan’s last two general-presidents as well as former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Aslam Beg. A “soldier’s soldier,” his priority is revamping Pakistan’s army. He’d like to win the multiple insurgencies and restore the military’s morale and good name in the country.

Toward this, Kayani declared 2008 the “year of the soldier” and announced various measures to improve services for low-mid level and non-commissioned officers. Additionally, he asserted in a meeting of the corps commanders last week that victory in the nation’s various security challenges requires “will of the people and their support.” Since Pakistan’s elections are a month away, Kayani is likely publicly expressing his insistence that elections largely be free and fair.

Interestingly, the portrayals of Kayani in the Pakistani discourse are almost, if not completely, highly positive. Additionally, there is also a gradually rising call (both direct and indirect) for Kayani to ‘relieve’ Pakistan of Pervez Musharraf (à la the Pakistan National Alliance vs. Bhutto in 1977) . Even if Kayani has ruled out such an option, as it would distract him from his military priorities, he could be compelled to make such a move. But Pakistan’s opposition could have unreasonable expectations of Kayani–specifically in terms of the pace he’d reduce the military’s political role. Its economic role is another story.

Plan C in the Making?
Pervez Musharraf was Washington’s Plan A for Pakistan. As Musharraf’s hold on power began to deteriorate this year, the Bush administration devised a Plan B, pairing him with Benazir Bhutto and having Gen. Kayani in the background. That plan effectively died with the late Benazir Bhutto. But Washington’s made no indication of a reversion to Plan A, a Musharraf-only policy. Instead, it has begun courting the PPP’s Amin Fahim and the PML-N’s Nawaz Sharif. Engagement of Asif Ali Zardari seems to be not so vigorous.

After supporting Nawaz Sharif’s deportation from Pakistan in September 2007, the U.S. is now slowly building ties with him. Washington reportedly convinced Sharif not to boycott the elections after Bhutto’s assassination, but the PPP’s decision to continue on with participation was clearly also a factor. As to how far Washington will go with Nawaz is unclear. The highest U.S. official he’s met with has been the ambassador, but it seems as if visiting congressmen and senators haven’t made even a phone call. Senator Joe Lieberman did meet with Sharif’s deputy Raja Zafarul Haq.

Rumblings in Waziristan and the NWFP
Retired Lt. Gen. Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai resigned as governor of the North-West Frontier Province. Orakzai, who hails from the Tribal Areas and favored dialogue with the neo-Taliban, has been replaced by Owais Ghani, who was governor of the restive Balochistan province prior to his appointment. Ghani’s appointment is yet another instance in which Musharraf has recirculated a loyalist to a critical position. Previously, he appointed Senate Chairman Muhammad Mian Soomro (first in line in presidential succession) as caretaker prime minister.

Orakzai reportedly had wide latitude over efforts to stabilize the Tribal Areas, even supplanting the military there. His replacement is seen by some as an indication of heightened military operations in the area. After all, Ghani presided over the aggressive counterinsurgency campaign in Balochistan which crescendoed with the assassination of its leader Akbar Bugti.

These developments, however, need not mean the end of dialogue with the neo-Taliban. Pakistan’s central government is taking advantage of, and perhaps encouraging, divisions among the tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It will be dividing South Waziristan into two divisions, one for the Ahmedzai Wazirs and the other for the Mehsuds. Fissures between the Ahmedzai Wazirs and Mehsuds are growing, with Maulvi Nazir (an Ahmedzai Wazir) accusing Mehsuds (one of whom is Baitullah Mehsud) of being behind the murder of nine of his supporters. He claims they are under the influence of Uzbeks.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz claimed on Tuesday that a major operation to apprehend Baitullah Mehsud was in the works. Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the addition of 3,000 marines to Afghanistan.

The Ethnic Card and Dirty Politics
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi, has rekindled ethnic divisions in Pakistan to some degree. Both Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, and her son, Bilawal, have made repeated calls for national unity and the preservation of Pakistan’s federation. In fact, Zardari will be moving to Lahore–Punjab’s capital–and seek to reinforce the PPP’s national reach.

However, the Chaudhry cousins (Shujaat Hussain and Pervaiz Elahi), leading figures in Musharraf’s faction of the Muslim League (PML-Q), have sought to play the ethnic card and push for a greater bloc of the Punjabi vote. The PML-Q in Punjab briefly posted advertisements calling for compensation only for non-Sindhis (i.e. Muhajirs, Punjabis, and perhaps Pathans) in the damage from riots ensuing after Bhutto’s murder.

Pervaiz Elahi accused Zardari of being behind his wife’s murder, saying: “Who has benefited from the tragedy? Zardari, and only Zardari. Check the authenticity of her will. Find out the amount for which she was insured.” He also accused Zardari and Sharif of being behind the post-assassination riots.

Granted, Zardari did label the PML-Q the Qatil League (Killer League). But the divisiveness of the Chaudhry cousins, and most importantly its ethnic bent, is dangerous could contribute to Pakistan’s destabilization.

Shortages and Outages
Pakistan’s economic woes have exacerbated in recent weeks. Energy shortages have resulted in nation-wide blackouts (for a few hours) and the closure of factories for several weeks. Wheat, already priced astronomically for Pakistani wages, is now in immensely short supply. The caretaker government was to have issued a relief package for Pakistan’s textile industry–the country’s major source of exports–but it has balked at doing so. In the interim, the industry has continued to decline as a result of non-competitive pricing and sustained violence and instability in Karachi, Pakistan’s major port city. The United States is the largest importer of Pakistani textiles; a decline in U.S. consumption in 2008 would constitute yet another blow to troubled exporters.

In a national address this evening in Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf sought to legitimize the delay in elections announced earlier in the day. He attributed the polls delay–now slated for February 18–to the infrastructural damage in Sindh as a result of the violence following Bhutto’s murder. The election commission’s offices in the province, for example, were attacked and voters rolls were allegedly destroyed.

Musharraf announced the formation of a commission that would investigate the causes of and actors behind the post-assassination violence. The elections, he said, would be not only “free and fair,” but also “peaceful.” Toward this, the army and rangers will remain deployed in Sindh into and after the elections. Musharraf defended his use of the army for internal security, stating that he initially did not wish to add to its heavy burden, but was compelled to do so.

Clearly, Musharraf is most moved by the deterioration of law and order, which he sees ultimately as an attack on his power. The murder of a two-time prime minister near the seat of the army, in his view, is now a peripheral matter. If it was truly primary, he would announce an independent commission, formed in concert with the opposition, to supervise the investigation.

Moreover, if he truly believes that Baitullah Mehsud is responsible for the murder of a former Pakistani prime minister, shouldn’t he have announced that the army would make a renewed, aggressive attempt to apprehend Mehsud, try him before a court of law, and–if convicted–execute him? Is not the murder of a former prime minister, in effect, an act of treason?

Emergency rule will likely end tomorrow and so Pervez Musharraf has been busy utilizing his soon-to-be-gone self-given powers to amend the constitution by decree.

Last night, he issued an ordinance formally institutionalizing the National Command Authority (NCA)– established in February 2000. The ten-member body “exercise[s] complete command and control over all nuclear and space related technologies, systems and matters.”

The president chairs the NCA with the prime minister as vice chairman. Its remaining members are the foreign, defense, and interior ministers; chiefs of the army, naval, air force staff; the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee; and the director general of the Strategic Plans Division, who also serves as secretary general of the group.

Musharraf will also issue five other ordinances, one of which will reportedly satiate Benazir Bhutto (and indirectly Nawaz Sharif) by lifting the bar on a third prime ministerial term.

The Nawaz Sharif-led All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) — with the exception of Fazlur Rahman’s JUI-F — will boycott the upcoming elections.

Bhutto’s People’s Party will take part in the polls. She has also deferred the restoration of the judiciary to once the new parliament comes in.

Earlier today, Pervez Musharraf took the oath for the presidency in civilian garb. He said, “I think we are coming out of the storm” and that “come hell or high water, elections will be held on January 8.  Nobody [will] derail [them].”

The storm, in fact, appears to be coming back onshore.