On Monday, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani visited Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest battlefield. It was his second publicized visit to the line of control since assuming leadership of Pakistan’s army.

KAYANI: A “NATIONAL CONSENSUS” ON KASHMIR

Both visits occurred after controversial statements from President Asif Ali Zardari regarding the Kashmir conflict.  On both occasions, Gen. Kayani asserted the existence of a “national consensus” in Pakistan on Kashmir.

The national consensus on Kashmir Gen. Kayani refers to can be seen as a euphemism for the military-intelligence establishment’s viewpoint.  But this also converges with a broad spectrum of public opinion in Pakistan.

There is strong public support in Pakistan for a just resolution to the 61 year conflict over the disputed region.  Pakistanis share historic, cultural, and blood linkages with the people of Kashmir, particularly with those in the currently restive valley.

Strategically, water, road, and trade linkages with Kashmir are essential to Pakistan’s future.  Their importance will increase radically in the coming decades when climate change and resource scarcity are expected to hit South Asia hard. Kashmir is the source of all of the region’s major waterways.

In recent years, Pakistanis have demonstrated their ability to be pragmatic and flexible regarding the Kashmir dispute.  But their concessions were not reciprocated by the Indians, who never fail to miss an opportunity to resolve the conflict.

India has had the luxury to defer final status discussions — only until recently.  Kashmir has gained little traction as an international issue.  But this is of little concern to the Muslim Kashmiris.  In their massive rallies — protesters number in the hundreds of thousands — they have made their voice clear.  They have asked for azaadi or freedom.   While some protesters have called for independence, others have called for a union with Pakistan.  Regardless, their desire to be free of India is clear.  Meanwhile, the rise of Hindu chauvinism in India has moved India’s center to the right and pushed Indians further away from compromise with Muslim Kashmiris.  Last month, a leading right wing Times of India columnist called for the permanent settling of Indian troops in Kashmir, tilting the demographic balance.  Conversely, many leading Indian commentators have called for letting the Kashmir valley go.  This is the cost of taking Musharraf for granted.

THE LIMITS OF COMPROMISE

That, combined with what is seen as the strategic encirclement of Pakistan, has made Pakistanis realize that former President Pervez Musharraf made one concession too many in respect to core security issues.  His compromises, in the eyes of the Pakistani public, have yielded little of permanent value.  Whatever benefits they produced are quickly vanishing after his departure.

Neither the Pakistani public nor its security establishment will accept compromise on Kashmir in a context of weakness.  Gen. Kayani has spoken of “peace through strength.”

TARGETING ISI WILL BACKFIRE ON ZARDARI

In this context, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher’s calls for the “reform” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence will hit a brick wall.  The civilian government is, in effect, being thrown at this wall, i.e. the army, and will bear the direct consequences of such action.  This is something Zardari must consider out of both self and national interest.

Moreover, the idea of reform presupposes the existence of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in this realm.  Intelligence agencies by nature operate in an amoral universe.  They are tasked with doing the government’s dirty work clandestinely and non-conventionally.  Their sole task is to serve the national interest, unconstrained not by conventional bounds but simply by capability and risk.  Criticizing one agency on moral grounds makes little sense — they all play the same game by the same (lack of) rules.  There is not a conflict of morals, but of interests.  These can only be dealt with by clandestine competition or dialogue and compromise at a conventional level.  The latter is the more prudent path.

The first target of ISI “reform” would seemingly be the organization’s director general, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj.  Indeed, some in Washington are pressing for civilian control of the ISI.  This is a recipe for disaster.  Zardari’s earlier attempt to bring the ISI under civilian control failed.  After another attempt, he’ll find himself sitting out on the pavement outside of the presidential palace.  Zardari lacks the legitimacy and power with which to assert himself over the military.  While the Pakistani public supports the cessation of the ISI’s political role, there is no support for tying the organization’s hands in other matters.  If pressed by Zardari, Gen. Kayani would be forced to enter the political realm, against his will, because of civilian excess.  Zardari should be wiser and focus on his self-proclaimed mandate of roti (bread), kapra (clothing), and makan (a home).

And so, Gen. Kayani is delineating the parameters of acceptable discourse on Kashmir, and at a broader level, Pakistan’s national security issues. Gen. Kayani has given the civilians free reign over non-security matters.  He has, however, drawn a line in the sand.  The civilians cannot pass the line of control into his own domain.  Given Zardari’s consolidation of power and the absence of checks and balances upon him, a foolish press against the military would compel that institution to intervene, making his presidency the shortest in Pakistan’s history.

FYI: Zardari’s visit to Britain — described in the Pakistani press as a “summoning” — resulted in the indefinite postponement of his scheduled visit to China, which is seen as Pakistan’s staunchest ally.  Pakistani rightists and even those in the center believe that Zardari’s closest advisors are trying to push Pakistan away from China.  Interestingly, Gen. Kayani will embark on a 5-day visit of China next week.  The smoking man speaks.

GEO News is currently covering three independence celebrations in Pakistan:the Army’s in Kakul, and the prime minister and president’s in Islamabad (held separately).

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani gave his first truly public address.  He said:

“I would like to reiterate that Pakistan desires to co-exist in peace with its neighbors and beyond.  A peace with honor and dignity, and azaadi (freedom) with grace.  This can only be guaranteed from a position of strength. Remember eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.”

As the Musharraf era comes to a close, it seems as if Gen. Kayani realizes he must fill the void to some degree — especially in a time in which he and his colleagues feel strategically encircled.  Gen. Kayani, I think, is telling Afghanistan and India — and even the United States — that he’ll play hardball if he has to.

The smoking man isn’t so cryptic afterall.

In an address to army officers at the General Headquarters (GHQ), Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani said, “Every nation has the right to secure its national interests.”

He also emphasized on the importance of national consensus to adequately address the nation’s security threats, describing it as being of the “utmost importance.” He added that all elements of government need to be on the same page. Kayani said that the securing Pakistan requires a comprehensive appreciation of the country’s threats and a similarly multifaceted solution.

Kayani’s public statements have often been somewhat general and susceptible to multiple interpretations. But it appears as if he is responding to international pressure, particularly from Washington, against talks with militants in Pakistan’s frontier. He seems to also be biding for some time. Kayani is not diminishing the importance of the military component to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign, but he is possibly indicating that any policy, whether it is new or a continuation of the old, requires bringing Pakistan’s influentials and general public on board.

It will be difficult for such a national dialogue to proceed successfully as time simply won’t stand still. The snow has melted and the region is entering a critical spring.
Militants have held off from attacking Pakistan’s large cities since the new government has come into power. They’re trying to see in which direction the government will go. But it is unclear as to whether the government itself is moving along in a singular direction. The political intrigue certainly does not help.

Furthermore, Washington remains committed to hitting al-Qaeda and Haqqani targets in North Waziristan. But it also seems to be targeting Maulvi Nazir, a Pakistani Taliban figure who has acted against al-Qaeda and other foreign militants. If true, Washington could be sending a message to Islamabad: there is no such thing as ‘good Taliban’. (Alternatively, Islamabad could have consented to the attacks, based on a belief that Nazir was renegging on his opposition to foreign militants). The Taliban are also heating things up in the Khyber Agency along major transit route for U.S. and ISAF supplies.

To a large degree, the new coalition government finds itself between the militants and pressure from Washington and other Western capitals. It’s an unenviable position. Decisive movement in either direction will have a serious cost. And vacillation is not an option.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani paid a visit to the Line of Control in Kashmir today. An Inter-Services Public Relations press release states that Kayani “highlighted the national consensus that exists on Kashmir issue” and “reaffirmed [the] commitment of Pakistan Army to the Kashmir cause, in line with [the] aspirations of Pakistani nation.”

Kayani’s trip comes after People’s Party Co-Chairman Asif Zardari’s controversial interview with CNN-IBN on March 1 in which he suggested that Pakistan and India can prioritize economic and social cooperation and defer the thorny Kashmir issue till the two countries develop greater trust.

Zardari told the Indian news channel:

“The idea is that we feel for Kashmir, the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) has always felt for Kashmir. We have a strong Kashmir policy. We have always had one. But having said that, we don’t want to be hostage to that situation. That is a situation we can agree to disagree (on). Countries do, we have positions, you have positions. We can agree to disagree on everything. [We can] agree to disagree on (the UN resolutions)…We can wait. We can be patient till everybody grows up further. Maybe the coming generation grows up even further and then let’s interact as human beings and come to a position of love….Today, there are fixed notions. When dependency increases (and) we have matured enough (and) we’ve got trust between us, then nobody has fixed issues….As it is, it’s going to be a no-border world in the end.”

 

Zardari’s statement seemed to counter the prevailing consensus in Pakistan referred to by Kayani, namely that Pakistan should not fully normalize ties with India till the Kashmir issue is resolved. Pakistan’s security establishment and Kashmiri dissidents, with good reason, fear normalization prior to a Kashmir resolution would render the dispute irrelevant.

After a bit of an uproar, Zardari claimed his statements were mischaracterized, with the venerable PPP spokesman Farhatullah Babar coming in to do the mop work. Zardari has since described Kashmir as an “integral part” of Pakistan and the conflict as a “core dispute” with India. The statement was “hailed” by All Parties Hurriyet Conference Chairman Syed Ali Shah Gilani.

So what do Kayani’s Kashmir visit and statements there mean? At the very least, he would like to re-affirm Pakistan’s commitment to the Kashmir cause before interested parties. The timing of his visit, eleven days after Zardari’s statement, suggests that he did not want his remarks to be seen as a direct retort to Zardari. Kayani, perhaps would like to make his opinion on key national security issues known–maybe even set the discursive parameters–but also would like to avoid involvement in a tit-for-tat with politicians.

Let’s Continue Our Conversation…in London
Shahbaz Sharif, president of the Muslim League-Nawaz, tells BBC Urdu that “If Musharraf becomes neutral and promises to hold the polls in a free and fair manner, talks can be held with him.” This is a major break with precedent. Previously the Sharif brothers have publicly ruled out any compromise with Musharraf.

It’s unclear whether Shahbaz’s statement has his brother’s endorsement, though this is highly likely. It could be that Shahbaz is playing good cop, while Nawaz plays bad cop. Additionally, Shahbaz is seen as more conciliatory than his older brother, which would provide Nawaz with some cover (i.e. creating the impression that his brother talked him down from the ledge). A less likely alternative is that Musharraf could be successfully playing one Sharif brother off of the other by offering Shahbaz, not Nawaz, a major position in the national unity government (perhaps prime minister).

Shahbaz has extended his stay in London, where he’ll meet with retired Brigadier Niaz Ahmed (they met in Islamabad over a week ago) and could meet with Pervez Musharraf, who has begun a four nation tour of Europe.

Musharraf will eventually make his way to London, but there are no meetings with government officials slated. Gordon Brown is currently in India, where he called for New Delhi’s addition to the UN Security Council. Musharraf could be avoiding Brown’s snub of Pakistan, but his trip is also designed to temper European opposition. Musharraf will also meet Niaz Ahmed. Prior to leaving Pakistan, Musharraf met with the emir of Abu Dhabi on Saturday. The emirate played host to a Bhutto-Musharraf meeting in July.

Zardari and Malik Qayyum Meet in Dubai
National reconciliation talks must, apparently, occur outside of Pakistan, and so Attorney General Malik Qayyum met with Asif Ali Zardari in Dubai on Saturday. Both left Pakistan in a curiously furtive fashion. The PPP has publicly remained open to dealing with Musharraf after the elections and strongly resist the idea of a national reconciliation government prior to the elections, as they’d delay the polls.

It’s a positive development if Musharraf is negotiating with both the Sharifs and Zardari in earnest. If he’s playing them off of each other, then Musharraf is playing with fire.

Opposition Tours the U.S.
Several opposition figures are on a tour of the United States. Sherry Rehman and Javaid Laghari, both of the People’s Party, will be speaking at the Brookings Institution tomorrow. Imran Khan will be on a multi-city tour, speaking at organizations such as Amnesty International and CSIS and in Pakistani community events, which seem to be fund raisers for his Tehreek-e Insaaf Party.

Fazlur Rahman: Saudi Challo
Maulana Fazlur Rahman was noticeably absent from the public since the news reporting serious threats against him. And he’s done what he seems to do often in challenging moments, go to Saudi Arabia.

Geo Back
Earlier last week, Talat Hussain returned to AAJ television to host his weeknightly public affairs program. In his first show back on air, Talat said he’s back with no strings attached. But it seems as if the show (Live with Talat) is now taped, not live (in accordance with the new media control rules). There is also little mention of the judiciary issue. Nonetheless, the show remains engaging and informative.

GEO News also returned to the air waves today sans their most popular political talk show hosts, Hamid Mir and Shahid Masood. Kashif Abbasi, another prominent television journalist, remains off of ARY One World.

Back to the Barracks
Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has recalled a number of active military officers from cushy positions within the civilian bureaucracy. This follows his earlier move barring senior officers from meeting with politicians.

Pakistan continues along a mixed, though largely negative trajectory as the spate of urban suicide bombing continues and insurgents make bold moves in South Waziristan, while the army strengthens its control over Swat and leaders flinch toward national reconciliation. The army’s immediate workload increases, but Gen. Ashfaq Kayani takes clear steps to depoliticize the institution. In both Pakistan and Afghanistan, efforts toward dividing and containing the Taliban continue. Election campaigning proceeds, though in a less spirited fashion prior to Benazir Bhutto’s assassination.

Terrorist Strikes Shi’a Gathering in Peshawar
A teenage suicide bomber clad in black struck an imambargah, a site for ritualistic mourning for Shi’a Muslims, in Peshawar today, the seventh day of the month of Muharram. This month is significant for all Muslims, but it holds a particular importance for the Shi’a. Their commemoration crescendos on the tenth day, Ash’ura, as they mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussain. Ash’ura falls on Sunday; the army, local police, and private mosque security squads are under high alert. However, that will not preclude attacks such as today’s from occurring. The bomber that struck the imambargah today detonated his device after being stopped by police, killing ten individuals. Targeting the Shi’a is a major point of convergence for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and various southern Punjabi Sunni militant groups.

Swat and Getting Swatted
Pakistan’s army continues to make gains in Swat, a settled, scenic valley in the North-West Frontier Province. According to Director General Military Operations Maj. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Operation Rah-e Haq has been successfully completed. The army, he says, established its hold over the area in late December, killing or apprehending major militants associated with Maulana Fazlullah, who remains holed up in a mountainous area packed in by recent heavy snowfall. It is now making steps toward issuing a compensation and development package for the area and has replaced Fazlullah’s FM radio station with several of its own. The speed and effectiveness of the government’s resettlement of internally displaced people and restoring the civil administration and political parties remains significant. Half-hearted measures will only result in local discontent that Fazlullah or a subsequent variant can feed off of.

In a marked contrast to the government’s military success in Swat, it continues to struggle in South Waziristan. This week, two forts were taken over by insurgents, who had little trouble combating the undertrained and ill-equipped paramilitary Frontier Corps. Their Wednesday night attack on a fort, which they held and then withdrew from, was made by a group of 200-1,000 men, overwhelming the 40 FC troops stationed there.

This large scale attack by neo-Taliban affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud is the first of its kind as guerrilla tactics are normally used. If this marks a strategic shift for Mehsud, it is both an alarming development for Pakistan’s military as well as a potential source of opportunity. Its success in Swat was partially precipitated by the overstretching of Maulana Fazlullah’s forces, though Fazlullah’s group is vastly smaller and less sophisticated and armed than Mehsud’s. And so if Mehsud’s forces press toward Pakistani military installations in large numbers, they provide an opportunity to be eliminated in larger numbers of them in a short amount of time with an aerial assault. That is why Mehsud group did not hold on to the fort in Wednesday night’s attack.

U.S. Special Forces’ counterinsurgency training of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps accelerates this year, but there’s no indication that any substantive progress will be achieved before the spring. In the interim, Pakistan could benefit by goading Mehsud into adopting more conventional and exposing tactics.

Tea with the Taliban
As the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan sat and drank chai with former Taliban leader and now Musa Qala governor Abdul Salaam, the strategy of dividing and containing (or incorporating) the Taliban continues in Pakistan. The federal government is exploiting the traditional and on-going rivalries between the Ahmedzai Wazirs and the Mehsuds in Southern Waziristan. It could be imposing a blockade of sorts on the Mehsuds, to the advantage of the Ahmedzais. Curbing the flow of drugs and other illicit contrabands will weaken the Mehsuds, but it’s unclear as to whether the Pakistani military is effectively declaring war on the Mehsud tribe or whether it’s trying to make them see Baitullah Mehsud as a source of their problems.

Eurotrip: The National Reconciliation Tour
On Saturday, Muslim League-Nawaz President Shahbaz Sharif met in Islamabad with Niaz Ahmed, a retired military officer who serves as an intermediary between the Sharif brothers and Pervez Musharraf. The octogenarian retired brigadier was an army instructor to Pervez Musharraf and is well-respected by the Sharif brothers due to past favors. He reportedly presented Shahbaz, the younger Sharif, with an offer straight from Musharraf to take part in a national unity government before the elections and have a considerable role thereafter. The Sharifs were also requested to tone down their criticism of Musharraf.

Shahbaz reportedly replied that he’d have to have discuss any offer with his elder brother, Nawaz, who was nearby in the resort town of Murree. After being caught leaving Ahmed’s Islamabad home by spunky Pakistani journalists, Shahbaz described his meeting with Ahmed as a “courtesy call.” Coincidentally, he also met the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Ali Awadh Asseri. The Saudis have a keen interest in seeing the return of the Sharifs to power and have for years played a role in managing Sharif-Musharraf relations.

And in yet another coincidence, Shahbaz Sharif, Pervez Musharraf, and Niaz Ahmed will all be in London this Friday. Shahbaz claims he’s going to London for medical treatment, but there’s no sign his hair plugs need re-alignment.

As of now, Nawaz Sharif, who is seen by some as less compromising than his brother, has continued his call for a national unity government without Pervez Musharraf. But he has called for a re-scheduling of elections so that new election commission could be formed, headed by deposed Supreme Court Justice Rana Baghwandas, enabling the participation of Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e Insaaf and the Jamaat-e Islami. The PPP strongly rejected Sharif’s proposal.

The elections delay serves the interest of all parties save the PPP, which will lose the sympathy vote as we get further away from Benazir Bhutto’s death. This brings up some significant questions in regard to the national reconciliation talk.

Is it an attempt by Musharraf to divide and control the opposition? Until now, the PML-N has been following the lead of the PPP. Is that changing? Does the PML-N share an interest with Musharraf in checking the PPP, particularly in Punjab? We’ll probably get a good sense this weekend as to the status of the Sharif-Musharraf talks.

Where’s the PPP in all this? Earlier this week, there was a rumored meeting between Musharraf and Asif Zardari, which the PPP denied. But Amin Fahim, the PPP vice chairman, likely met Musharraf around a week ago. PPP spokesman Farhatullah Babar said that “all options are open” in regard to cooperation with Musharraf after the elections.

And what about the PML-Q? Earlier this week, Pervaiz Elahi, always on the attack, said that “all those parties after smelling their defeat in the upcoming general elections are giving suggestions for formation of the national government which has no constitutional, ethical and democratic reasons.” But then Chaudhry Shujaat, his cousin, stated yesterday that his party will form a national unity government after the elections and will invite the PPP and PML-N.

Pakistan will likely see some form of a national unity government. But it remains to be seen as to whether it will be formed before or after the elections, with or without Pervez Musharraf, and all the parties, including the PML-Q.

Kayani’s De-Politicization of the Army
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani issued an order prohibiting army officers from meeting with politicians. When the directive was first reported, it was unclear as to whether Pervez Musharraf, now a civilian president, was included in the category of politicians. After all, he still lives in the military’s headquarters. Retired Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, a former chief of army staff, tells the Daily Times that meeting with Musharraf is also prohibited, but there was no confirmation from government sources. New Inter-Services Public Relations spokesperson Athar Abbas also distanced the army from Musharraf’s claim that Benazir Bhutto was not popular with the Pakistani army.

But Army Has More Duties
While the army might be doing less politicking, its burden has now increased. It has now been tasked with defense of the country’s increasingly scarce wheat supplies. This is on top of its responsibilities in fighting insurgencies, defending Pakistan’s borders, and providing security for some of Pakistan’s major cities after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Today, Gen. Kayani met with junior commissioned and non-commissioned army officers. He emphasized his two major themes of improving the army’s “professional excellence” as the standard of living for all of those in its ranks. But importantly, he emphasized that the army’s primary duty is to defend the country’s borders.

Aitzaz Ahsan’s Return to the PPP
The spirit of reconciliation is alive. Asif Zardari will reportedly promote Aitzaz Ahsan to People’s Party vice chairman. This is a move to push the PPP in Punjab. As I noted earlier, Zardari will be moving to Lahore to build up the party there. But this also marks a challenge to the PML-N and PML-Q, whose support base is almost exclusively in that province.  Aitzaz was paid a visit by Attorney General Malik Qayyum, who reportedly offered an end to his house arrest if he hushed up about the judges issue.

The Travails of Maulana Diesel
It hasn’t been a good week or so for Maulana Fazlur Rahman. He’s been staying indoors lately as a result of the reported assassination threats made against him. His party, the JUI-F, is facing some turbulence; it recently expelled 18 party members. Fazl tells BBC Urdu that a senior Punjab official replied to his request for security by stating, “No money, no security.”

Pakistan has moved forward in the two weeks since the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but toward what exactly remains unclear. The country has displayed a capacity to sustain high-levels of violence, but with economic pressures and social divisions rising, one wonders what is the tipping point.

Musharraf Hangs in the Balance
Stuck in a gray zone, Pervez Musharraf has neither increased nor decreased in power. That is not to say that the political dynamics surrounding him have changed. They have been vastly altered with the murder of Benazir Bhutto.

Bhutto would have served both as an asset for Musharraf as well as a source of consternation. In the short to midterm, her electoral participation would have effectively validated his presidency; her ascendancy to the premiership would be even more of a plus, especially in the eyes of Washington.

Conceivably, Bhutto could have provided Musharraf with the capacity to mobilize public support for campaigns against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In reality, their partnership, if it ever took hold, would have been exclusive and those left out–namely Nawaz Sharif–would logically make the anti-terror campaign a wedge issue, especially with its American origins.

Furthermore, in the mid to long-term (or even sooner), Bhutto would have pressed for a reduction of Musharraf’s presidential powers and, at the opportune moment, his ouster. For much of 2007, Bhutto was maneuvering for a third shot at the premiership. The assumption that she would remain content with a neutered office is naive.

Musharraf remains in power, in a sense, by default. There is a lack of a capable and willing alternative. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, as explained below, has other priorities at the moment. Interested and influential parties are waiting for the elections to produce a new government. Afterwards, evaluations could be made as to whether the new premier constitutes a working partner for Musharraf or a viable and willing alternative to him.

Things are not getting better for Musharraf. His achievements–sustained economic growth, a vibrant and free media, and managing of foreign pressure–are crumbling before his eyes, or better put, in his hands. Should there be any improvement in the security situation in the Frontier Province and FATA, Gen. Kayani–not Musharraf–would likely get the credit. Elections roundly seen as free and fair, while improving his standing, would give his political opponents perhaps overwhelming leverage.

Perhaps Musharraf is sensing the tide. For the second time, Musharraf said yesterday that he would resign from the presidency if the new parliament sought to impeach him. Is this a sign of a weary Musharraf or a threat to external forces pressing for democracy?

Shortly after Musharraf’s coup, his brother told the New York Times that he’d give him the following advice: ”Look, don’t overstay and end up like previous martial law governments. They were thrown out by the people….If he becomes corrupted by power, I’ll be uncomfortable. I hope he does his job, holds elections and gets out.”

His brother, whose wise advice was not heeded, must be uncomfortable now.

Kayani’s Campaign
Since his rise to public notoriety late last year, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has remained both mysterious and a recipient of fairly unguarded praise. Kayani reportedly has no aspirations to political power, but then again the same was said of Pakistan’s last two general-presidents as well as former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Aslam Beg. A “soldier’s soldier,” his priority is revamping Pakistan’s army. He’d like to win the multiple insurgencies and restore the military’s morale and good name in the country.

Toward this, Kayani declared 2008 the “year of the soldier” and announced various measures to improve services for low-mid level and non-commissioned officers. Additionally, he asserted in a meeting of the corps commanders last week that victory in the nation’s various security challenges requires “will of the people and their support.” Since Pakistan’s elections are a month away, Kayani is likely publicly expressing his insistence that elections largely be free and fair.

Interestingly, the portrayals of Kayani in the Pakistani discourse are almost, if not completely, highly positive. Additionally, there is also a gradually rising call (both direct and indirect) for Kayani to ‘relieve’ Pakistan of Pervez Musharraf (à la the Pakistan National Alliance vs. Bhutto in 1977) . Even if Kayani has ruled out such an option, as it would distract him from his military priorities, he could be compelled to make such a move. But Pakistan’s opposition could have unreasonable expectations of Kayani–specifically in terms of the pace he’d reduce the military’s political role. Its economic role is another story.

Plan C in the Making?
Pervez Musharraf was Washington’s Plan A for Pakistan. As Musharraf’s hold on power began to deteriorate this year, the Bush administration devised a Plan B, pairing him with Benazir Bhutto and having Gen. Kayani in the background. That plan effectively died with the late Benazir Bhutto. But Washington’s made no indication of a reversion to Plan A, a Musharraf-only policy. Instead, it has begun courting the PPP’s Amin Fahim and the PML-N’s Nawaz Sharif. Engagement of Asif Ali Zardari seems to be not so vigorous.

After supporting Nawaz Sharif’s deportation from Pakistan in September 2007, the U.S. is now slowly building ties with him. Washington reportedly convinced Sharif not to boycott the elections after Bhutto’s assassination, but the PPP’s decision to continue on with participation was clearly also a factor. As to how far Washington will go with Nawaz is unclear. The highest U.S. official he’s met with has been the ambassador, but it seems as if visiting congressmen and senators haven’t made even a phone call. Senator Joe Lieberman did meet with Sharif’s deputy Raja Zafarul Haq.

Rumblings in Waziristan and the NWFP
Retired Lt. Gen. Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai resigned as governor of the North-West Frontier Province. Orakzai, who hails from the Tribal Areas and favored dialogue with the neo-Taliban, has been replaced by Owais Ghani, who was governor of the restive Balochistan province prior to his appointment. Ghani’s appointment is yet another instance in which Musharraf has recirculated a loyalist to a critical position. Previously, he appointed Senate Chairman Muhammad Mian Soomro (first in line in presidential succession) as caretaker prime minister.

Orakzai reportedly had wide latitude over efforts to stabilize the Tribal Areas, even supplanting the military there. His replacement is seen by some as an indication of heightened military operations in the area. After all, Ghani presided over the aggressive counterinsurgency campaign in Balochistan which crescendoed with the assassination of its leader Akbar Bugti.

These developments, however, need not mean the end of dialogue with the neo-Taliban. Pakistan’s central government is taking advantage of, and perhaps encouraging, divisions among the tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It will be dividing South Waziristan into two divisions, one for the Ahmedzai Wazirs and the other for the Mehsuds. Fissures between the Ahmedzai Wazirs and Mehsuds are growing, with Maulvi Nazir (an Ahmedzai Wazir) accusing Mehsuds (one of whom is Baitullah Mehsud) of being behind the murder of nine of his supporters. He claims they are under the influence of Uzbeks.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz claimed on Tuesday that a major operation to apprehend Baitullah Mehsud was in the works. Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the addition of 3,000 marines to Afghanistan.

The Ethnic Card and Dirty Politics
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi, has rekindled ethnic divisions in Pakistan to some degree. Both Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, and her son, Bilawal, have made repeated calls for national unity and the preservation of Pakistan’s federation. In fact, Zardari will be moving to Lahore–Punjab’s capital–and seek to reinforce the PPP’s national reach.

However, the Chaudhry cousins (Shujaat Hussain and Pervaiz Elahi), leading figures in Musharraf’s faction of the Muslim League (PML-Q), have sought to play the ethnic card and push for a greater bloc of the Punjabi vote. The PML-Q in Punjab briefly posted advertisements calling for compensation only for non-Sindhis (i.e. Muhajirs, Punjabis, and perhaps Pathans) in the damage from riots ensuing after Bhutto’s murder.

Pervaiz Elahi accused Zardari of being behind his wife’s murder, saying: “Who has benefited from the tragedy? Zardari, and only Zardari. Check the authenticity of her will. Find out the amount for which she was insured.” He also accused Zardari and Sharif of being behind the post-assassination riots.

Granted, Zardari did label the PML-Q the Qatil League (Killer League). But the divisiveness of the Chaudhry cousins, and most importantly its ethnic bent, is dangerous could contribute to Pakistan’s destabilization.

Shortages and Outages
Pakistan’s economic woes have exacerbated in recent weeks. Energy shortages have resulted in nation-wide blackouts (for a few hours) and the closure of factories for several weeks. Wheat, already priced astronomically for Pakistani wages, is now in immensely short supply. The caretaker government was to have issued a relief package for Pakistan’s textile industry–the country’s major source of exports–but it has balked at doing so. In the interim, the industry has continued to decline as a result of non-competitive pricing and sustained violence and instability in Karachi, Pakistan’s major port city. The United States is the largest importer of Pakistani textiles; a decline in U.S. consumption in 2008 would constitute yet another blow to troubled exporters.

Earlier today, Pervez Musharraf gave his farewell address to the army of Pakistan, passing the baton on to Gen. Ashfaq Kayani.

Musharraf appeared very stoic, if not discomfited; his successor, Kayani, was calm and cool. Nonetheless, the speech was revealing, with Musharraf detailing the formative role the army has played in his life and the role it should play as nation-builder and guardian of Pakistan.

THE ARMY AS “FAMILY”

Musharraf began his address by thanking Kayani and others for the honor they gave him.

He stated that after 46 years, he is saying goodbye to the army.

The outgoing chief of army staff said, “This army is my life. This army is my passion. I have given this army my love.”

Musharraf stated it was difficult to translate his sadness into words. He described the army as a family — a family that has given him its complete love and loyalty.

He added, that everything good has its end. Everyone has their time to go. This is how life works.

Musharraf continued by saying that while he’s sorry that he has to relinquish command of this “family,” he knows that he spent his 46 years with happiness and honor.

The army, said the former chief of staff, has provided him with many lessons. It has shaped the man he is — all of him. Everything he has learned — his knowledge, confidence, and people and leadership skills — has been taught to him by the army.

Musharraf then highlighted his army experiences. They included two external wars; internal security duties in Sui and Dera Bugti; flood relief; and a year’s service in a high-altitude area.

He said, he had comrades die in his arms during his war. The memories of difficulty and struggle, he remarked, are long-lasting.

THE “SAVIORS” OF PAKISTAN

Next, Musharraf went on to describe his view of the Pakistan army and its role in the country.The army, he said, is an integrating force. It defends national honor and integrity. It and its members are the “saviors of Pakistan.”

Pakistan’s army, commented Musharraf, defends the country from foreign attacks, as well as internal dangers, such as IEDs and suicide attacks. It has brought relief after floods in Balochistan, earthquakes in NWFP and Azad Kashmir. The army, said Musharraf, has reached areas inaccessible by machinery — such as when it developed roads in the remote Karakoram Valley.

Musharraf said it has been an honor to command the army and those who point a figure at or complain about it trouble him. These individuals don’t know, he commented, that the army is the guardian of Pakistan’s security and development.

THE ARMY’S CURRENT CHALLENGES

Musharraf said there is much “pressure” on the army today. Kashmir has always remained problematic. But today, FATA is a source of consternation and there are challenges in the settled areas of the NWFP. Balochistan has its security problems, though its state has improved.Musharraf conceded that the army is “stretched” to the “limit.” But at the same time, he asserted his belief that this “world class army” can rise to the challenges. He told his fellow service members that “when we put this uniform on, we seal our fate…to risking our lives for our country.” He described it as a trust and duty that can’t be shied away from.

Musharraf asserted that “we” — the army — “has to bring this country forward,” knocking out any obstacles along the way. The army, he said, has to face the current challenges and dangers and he is certain that it is prepared.

He expressed his contentment that he, in his opinion, leaves the army in “good condition” with the best equipment and training ever.

ON ASHFAQ KAYANI

Musharraf said that he’s known Gen. Kayani for over 20 years — since the latter was a colonel. He said he has been aware of Kayani’s greatness as a soldier and is certain that the army under him will reach new heights. Musharraf added that Kayani will give the army the dedication he’s shown him. He prayed that God preserves Kayani and enables him to lead the army with confidence and style, taking it to new thresholds.

THE “END”

Musharraf concluded as he began — very emotionally. He said, “I have taken off the uniform, but my heart and mind will always be with you.” Musharraf, now-ex chief of army staff, said he will remain concerned over the army’s interests and state.

• Bomber Sketch Released
• Two Severed Heads Found; Police Still Assert One Bomber
• Explosives: Russian-Made Grenade and 14 kg RDX suicide belt
• Multiple Attack Teams?
• A Nexus Against Bhutto?
• Political Fallout of the Attacks: Playing Musical Chairs Can Be Dangerous
  
• More Questions
  

PAKISTANI POLICE RELEASES IMAGE OF ALLEGED KARACHI BOMBER
Sindh Police has released a sketch of the severed head of an individual it alleges is the sole suicide bomber in Friday’s Karsaz Bridge attack. Reuters’ Kamran Haider quotes a Pakistani security official as stating, “The age of the suspect is between 20 to 25 and he looks to be a Karachiite.” Based on the image, the individual could be from anywhere in Pakistan’s southern half. Karachi is also a diverse city populated by a plurality of Urdu-speaking migrants from India, as well as Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Balochis, Memons, Afghani refugees, Bengalis, and even some Africans. However, the choice of a Karachiite makes sense, as the individual would more easily mix into the crowd and know his way around Pakistan’s largest city. The sketch of his reconstructed face as well as fingerprints believed to be from his severed limbs have been sent to the National Registration and Database Authority (NADRA) and it could come back with results on the bomber’s identity as early as Monday. According to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, approximately 53.5 million Pakistanis have computerized National Identity Cards (NIC) with biometrics as of September 2006. NADRA also makes use of face recognition technology. A second severed head was found — which could support the claims of two suicide bombers made by the Bhutto camp — but police believe that he was a victim of the blasts, not a perpetrator.

THE FIRST BLAST
Pakistani security officials have shed light on the weapons used in Friday’s attack, but there are conflicting narratives and many questions remain.

Karachi Police’s lead investigator Manzoor Mughal states that the first blast came from a Russian-made hand grenade of approximately 1kg (2.2 lbs). He matches my initial theory on Friday that the goal of the grenade attack was to cause the crowd to disperse, create a hole in Bhutto’s security cordon, and try to take out the former prime minister.

Still, it remains unclear who threw the grenade. Government officials seem to insist on the role of a single attacker, a theory that makes little sense. It puts too much responsibility in the hands of one individual and maximizes the risk of jeopardizing the whole operation.

Let’s assume the suicide bomber threw the grenade. He would need some distance from the convoy, and the greater the distance from the convoy, the greater the risk that he could be caught on his way to it. Moreover, he would’ve attracted attention to himself by throwing the grenade, which was only a means to a more explosive end.

THE TEAM(S): GUNNERS AND BOMBERS?
Statements by the Bhutto camp further the idea that there was more than one actor involved. It claims there were two suicide bombers at Karsaz, which, as I stated earlier, receives some support by the presence of two severed heads on the scene of the blast. However, there is little other evidence at this point to suggest that there was another suicide bomber involved in the attack at Karsaz. But important details coming from the People’s Party point to a wider conspiracy.

In her Friday press conference, Bhutto stated that her convoy came under gunfire, some of which was aimed at the tires of her vehicle. She is unsure as to whether this occurred before or after the second blast. This suggests the suicide bomber was accompanied by several other accomplices, and there are reports a group of men waiting underneath Karsaz Bridge attracted the suspicions of many before the blast. One report states that they were allegedly wielding sticks (another report says they were also yelling), but makes little sense.

In any event, there is significant reason to believe that the suicide bomber received gun support from several armed men, one of whom potentially threw the grenade. And there is indication that there could have been multiple attack teams, consisting of at least one gunner and one suicide bomber, posted along Bhutto’s 20+ mile parade route.

THE SUICIDE BOMBER THAT GOT NABBED
Bhutto states her security personnel apprehended two men, one with a gun and another with a suicide belt, prior to the blasts. It is unclear when and where the gunner was arrested, but the man with the suicide belt was arrested 13 minutes before the blast in Karachi’s Nursery area—which is further along the parade route, DIRECTLY in between the site of the successful blasts and Bhutto’s intended destination: Mazar-e Quaid.

Were they caught near one another? If so, they could have been part of a team of at least two. Where are they now? Are they being interrogated?

Sindh Home Secretary Ghulam Muhammad Mohtarem told Reuters on October 17 of reports that three different groups were planning to attack Bhutto on her return. It appears he was referring to three units sent by Baitullah Mehsud. So was there a third cell? If so, where were they waiting, and where are they now?

THE SECOND BLAST
The second blast, which occurred between 30-60 seconds later, was, according to Karachi Police’s lead investigator, from a suicide belt laden packed with 15-20 kg (33-44 lbs) of RDX explosives and shrapnel, perhaps consisting of “ball-bearings and pellets.” Ghulam Muhammad adds that it also contained nuts and bolts. Clearly the goals were to penetrate the armor of Bhutto’s vehicle and, if unsuccessful, inflict mass damage. The attacker sought to get as close to Bhutto as possible, but apparently only made it to the front-left side, while Bhutto was safely in the back.

THE NETWORK: A MILITARY-CIVILIAN-JIHADI NEXUS?
While the mechanics of the attack are significant, the organizational forces behind it are more important. There is, of course, the theory that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are behind the attacks — independently — without any the support of military, intelligence, or political forces inside Pakistan. However, Baitullah Mehsud has denied involvement in the attacks and neither Osama bin Laden nor Ayman al-Zawahiri have made any statements against Bhutto. They have, however, repeatedly called for the overthrow of Pervez Musharraf. Bhutto has never been on the radar of al-Qaeda Prime, though the same can’t be same for the Taliban.

A more plausible, but still highly-speculative alternative is a loose network of individuals with various, intersecting interests that share one major obstacle: Benazir Bhutto.

Their feud with Bhutto centers on a fight over the control of Punjab and preventing the rolling back of the autonomy of various current and former military-intelligence officials, their fiefdoms, and unconventional wars.

Though Bhutto refused to name the three officials she listed in a letter to Pervez Musharraf prior to her return as direct threats to her life, we’re getting clear indication of who they and their potential associates are.

They include (in order of importance):

• Ejaz Shah:
  • Retired general;
  • Currently heads the Intelligence Bureau (IB) — distinct from the more powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI);
  • Allegedly former liaison to the Taliban and Al Qaeda; Linked to Omar Shaikh, alleged killer of Daniel Pearl;
  • Former home secretary of Punjab and architect of rise to power of current rulers of Punjab;
  • Close to Musharraf, but represents camp opposed to deal with Benazir (along with the Chaudhry Cousins) — pro-deal include Ashfaq Kiyani, Tariq Aziz, and Hamid Javed;
  • On Friday, Bhutto called on Musharraf to fire him;
  • Immediately hung up on a journalist who called him after the blasts.
• The Chaudhry Cousins — Pervez Ellahi and Shujaat Hussain:
  • Respectively, chief minister of Punjab and president of Musharraf’s party, the PML-Q;
  • Rise to power allegedly orchestrated by Ejaz Shah;
  • Stand to lose the most from a Bhutto-Musharraf deal — national power + potentially control of Punjab;
  • Exchanged a vigorous war of words with Bhutto prior to her return;
  • Bhutto did not mention their names in her long list of politicians that called on her to support;
  • Fear Bhutto’s potential inroads into Punjab, which would be done by mobilizing masses in rural Punjab;
  • On Saturday, Shujaat called for banning political rallies during election season.
• Ijaz-ul-Haq:
  • Minister of Religious Affairs in current government;
  • Member of Chaudhries’ PML-Q party;
  • Son of Zia-ul-Haq:
    • Former president and military ruler of Pakistan who overthrew Benazir’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had him executed;
    • Later killed in an air crash believed by some to be orchestrated by a terrorist group, al-Zulfikar, run by Benazir’s brother Murtaza.
• Potential others:
  • Arbab Rahim:
    • Chief Minister of Sindh;
    • Strong likelihood that he and his party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), will lose control of the province in next elections to Benazir’s People’s Party (PPP);
    • MQM militants attacked PPP activists (and militants) in Karachi street violence coinciding with the ill-fated visit of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to city on May 12, 2007;
    • Bhutto, however, has stated that the next potential attack against her would involve framing the MQM as the culprits.
  • Haji Omar [profile]:
    • Neo-Taliban warlord in FATA;
    • Told Reuters of his capability to kill Benazir Bhutto if she cooperates with the United States.

Even if any of the government figures above are involved in the attacks on Bhutto, public punitive action against them would be unlikely. Bhutto, by refusing to mention their names directly, perhaps understands this and would accept their removal from the power structure alone.

POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS
Pakistani authorities have detained three men in southern Punjab they believe have links to the blast. This suggests that those who implemented Friday’s terror could include elements of the network oft-described as the “Punjabi Taliban.” Rashid Rauf, alleged to be involved in the summer 2006 al-Qaeda airline plot, was arrested in Bahawalpur, located in southeastern Punjab.

If the attacks were implemented by jihadis hailing from Punjab focused on FATA, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, it remains plausible these individuals were instruments of some of the institutional actors listed above. As a result, they bring several issues to the forefront: governance of Punjab; control of power at the center; and the future of jihad in Kashmir, FATA, and Afghanistan.

Pervez Musharraf is ultimately at the center of all this. The attacks will perhaps force him to make some compelling decisions in the coming weeks and months. Benazir Bhutto clearly understands this, and after the attacks, has been keen to remain on his good side, asserting directly and indirectly her confidence and trust in him.

Will Musharraf take a more assertive stance against the roguish military-intelligence figures near him? Or will he continue to play a precarious balance?

Musharraf might have to make a choice between two camps — the ‘progressives‘ : Tariq Aziz, Ashfaq Kiyani, and Hamid Javed; and the ‘conservatives‘: Ijaz Shah, Shujaat Hussain, and Pervez Ellahi.

The ‘progressives’ favor a deal with Benazir Bhutto and incline less toward support for unconventional warfare within and without Pakistan. The ‘conservatives’ oppose a deal with Bhutto. They’ll definitely lose control of the center and potentially even Punjab, and they (for a variety of reasons) favor Pakistan’s waging of or support for unconventional wars abroad. Musharraf seems to be leaning toward the ‘progressives’, as he’s proposed Tariq Aziz as the caretaker prime minister for the elections and has chosen Ashfaq Kiyani as his succeeding army head.

Ijaz Shah’s posting will expire in February, which can provide a quiet way to say goodbye. The Chaudhries could end up becoming an unbearable burden for Musharraf. But any moves against them will have negative ramifications. It will create a void that can be naturally filled, but mainly by Nawaz Sharif, the elected prime minister Musharraf overthrew in 1999.

NAWAZ SHARIF: HOMEWARD BOUND?
The future of Nawaz Sharif remains murky. Two major questions that need to be considered are: 1) Will Musharraf permit Nawaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan and a meaningful role in the political process? 2) Will Sharif change his tune and start to compromise with Musharraf? If the gap between the two is bridged a bit, then an opening can emerge to part ways with the Chaudhries, and bring in Sharif. But all-too-often, inclination toward compromise in Pakistan is seen as a vulnerability. Any sort of mending of relations between the two will require much time and energy — just look at how protracted the Bhutto-Musharraf talks were. Musharraf can perhaps count on Sharif to counter a rising Benazir, but the latter two could, alternatively, both focus on a vulnerable, uniformless Musharraf without a political base, and send him packing.

Reportedly the Saudis have serious objections to holding on to Nawaz beyond mid-November. Sharif was pressure by both Saad Hariri and Bandar bin Sultan to postpone his Saudi departure to after November 7. He was to leave Saudi for London in mid-October, but conceded to his detainers’ demands and only after reportedly becoming very emotional.

There are indications he is very demoralized. Shortly after the attacks, when speaking to a private Pakistani television station via telephone, his voice weakened as he answered a question about when he would return to the country. He meekly replied, “When the people of Pakistan call for me.” And after five seconds or so of silence, the call ended abruptly. Though Musharraf wants Sharif’s return only after the general elections, he is being forced to accept his earlier return. But it can be a severely injured Nawaz who would be more conciliatory after essentially being held hostage for two months.

QUESTIONS:

1. Where are the gunman and attempted suicide bomber apprehended by Bhutto’s security people and turned over to Karachi police? Are they being interrogated? Why haven’t they been mentioned in most reports?
2. To what extent were Musharraf and Bhutto’s camps negligent?
3. Did the jammers provided by Musharraf’s camp work?
4. Did Bhutto’s supporters accidentally cause some of them to malfunction?
5. Did it make sense for Bhutto to have an 18-hr procession, especially after individuals such as Ghulam Muhammad Mohtarem urged her to end her procession before sunset and others offered her a helicopter? Why were Bhutto’s “security guards” young, scrawny volunteers? To what extent were they human shields? Wouldn’t professionals have been better?
6. How will the attacks impact political rallies and mass mobilization? Will Bhutto travel extensively in Punjab?
7. Did Bhutto’s intelligence come from India via Afghanistan?
8. Will Musharraf go soft on the military-intel figures if they were involved in the attacks, but hard on jihadis in FATA (though they might have not been involved)?
9. Will he use the attacks a pre-text for a massive, conclusive operation in FATA?

UPDATES

• 10/22/2007 – 3:15PM -
  • I intended to note this in my original posting, forgot to do so, but was reminded Mushtaq Minhas made the point on AAJ TV’s Bolta Pakistan show that two of Pakistan’s leaders were assassinated — Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 — and the perpetrators of the act were never identified.
  • Assassination, violent political transitions, and intrigue date back to early in Pakistan’s history. These destructive impulses remain. And while Pakistan has an active and open press, that will not necessarily preclude the story from ‘closing’ with essential questions unanswered. The media (and public opinion) is a machine that can be manipulated and so much else can occur in between now and mid-January to ‘sandwich’ this story or push it to the side. In other words, there is a strong likelihood that the specific perpetrators of the act — and perhaps their organization affiliations — will be identified, but the elite forces behind them, if there were any, won’t be noted.
  • I would not consider this a defeat for those who hope for a Pakistan that features: peaceful, institutionalized transitions of power; competitive politics; representative and good governance; and public accountability. The attacks can still be leveraged to forge a consensus among Pakistan’s discordant elite on norms of conduct and engagement, consolidate public support against the use of violence in politics, and open up the political process to those that have been marginalized.
• 10/22/2007 – 3:58PM –
  • Sindh Governor Ishrat-ul-Ibad tells the NYT’s Carlotta Gall that there were two suicide bombers, carrying, respectively, 17-22 lbs and 33 lbs of C-4 explosives (not RDX). There were two heads found. Pakistani authorities previously stated that the second head was that of a victim and that the first blast was from a grenade.

Developments in Pakistan in recent days further the view for both insiders and outsiders that the country is a perplexing bowl of contradictions and political intrigue.

KSE RISES
The Karachi Stock Exchange closed at all-time highs on Monday and Tuesday. Investor confidence boosted due to Pervez Musharraf’s re-election as president (pending the validation of his candidacy), which they associate with future political stability and continuity of pro-growth, liberal economic policies. Their sentiments might be valid in the mid-term, but the next three months, at the very least, will be a roller coaster period for the country—and Pakistan’s securities markets will likely not be as immune to the volatility as they have been before.

MUSHARRAF ESCAPES DANGER ONCE AGAIN
On the same day as the market rally, a helicopter escorting Musharraf to Kashmir crashed, killing four individuals. This was also the first day of work for Musharraf’s slated army successor, Ashfaq Kiyani, as vice chief of army staff. Though the president was never in any danger and there is no sign of foul play, the context eerily resembles the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. The accident is a keen reminder that a single event of this sort can have a defining impact, but as with Zia’s demise, need not necessarily result in systemic change.

WAZIRISTAN ON FIRE
While investors are buoyant down south in Karachi, the country’s northwest has witnessed some of its most severe fighting between Pakistan’s army and local-foreign insurgents. According to the army, 45 troops and 150 insurgents have been killed in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan. There have also been significant civilian casualties, with non-combatants fleeing the area. The government has been bombarding insurgents from the air with helicopter gunships and jets. The heightened use of air power markedly differs from the government’s previous ground-oriented strategy, which sought to avoid so-called collateral damage and earning further disfavor of locals. It suggests any number of the following:

• the army has decided its strong avoidance of civilian casualties has been too costly;
• patience on its side is wearing thin;
• there is significant external pressure on Islamabad to bring in decisive results before the winter;
• or a strategic and/or political (via Bhutto deal) window of opportunity has emerged to enable a forceful confrontation of militants.

Perhaps the army has opted for a Balochistan-like strategy, in which it would deliver strong, decisive blows to the insurgency (costing many innocent civilian lives) and follow up with a heavy infusion of development funds. Large scale, yet short-term violence would be complemented by a vast improvement in quality of life and incorporation/subsidization of local elites. In FATA, these funds would largely come from the 5-year $750 million US aid package and opportunities from its duty-free economic opportunity zone program, and would trickle down to the locals via notables with newly padded pockets.

FAZLUR RAHMAN AND THE FRACTURING OF THE MMA
A critical player in the political solution in FATA will be Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who, despite being in the political “opposition,” has proved to be almost as loyal to Musharraf as the Chaudhries. Fazlur Rahman is epitome of the “siyasi ulema” (political Islamic scholars) Abdur Rashid Ghazi lambasted on national television minutes before his demise in the Lal Masjid compound. The JUI-F should play a significant role in liaisoning between FATA notables and insurgents and the federal government/military. Its role in bringing a death blow to the MMA and APDM will not go unrewarded. The pending dissolution of the NWFP assembly will result in fresh provincial elections that might see MMA factions running on their own tickets, and a final tally that places the JUI-F in a stronger individual provincial position than before.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION OR POLITICAL GIMMICK?
Recent comments by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, and to a lesser extent Shaukat Aziz, have sought to cast doubt on the government’s sincerity in its deal with Benazir Bhutto and her People’s Party. Aziz boasted of having divided and outsmarted the opposition, which is true, and Shujaat bluntly stated that the government has no intention of following through on its promises to Bhutto — and that it it will, in fact, get political cover from the Supreme Court ruling the National Reconciliation Ordinance invalid.

Shujaat’s comments should be taken with a grain (or bucket) of salt. One, Washington — Musharraf’s greatest benefactor — strongly wants the deal to go through fully. Two, Shujaat stands to lose most from the Bhutto-Musharraf deal. Musharraf’s presidency is essentially set (barring a Supreme Court rejection of his candidacy), but Shujaat’s party has to face off against Bhutto’s in the general elections. Images of him and his cousin appear frequently on Pakistani television screens, with a massive wave of advertisements on private channels (source of funding unclear) hailing the achievements of the governments of Musharraf (“Sub se pahlay Pakistan”) and Pervez Ellahi (“Para likha Punjab”). The Chaudhries may have reluctantly consented to a Bhutto-Musharraf deal, but they will show some feistiness to retain their dominance over Punjab and share of federal power.

The rejection of Shujaat’s statements by a Musharraf spokesperson suggests that the president will have to play a fine balancing act between PML-Q partisan and partner of Benazir. It’s the same kind of lack of partiality the Bush administration has sought to display in recent days vis-a-vis Pakistan (i.e. support for the country, not just one man–Musharraf). Should Musharraf alienate his PML-Q base, one might witness the party distancing itself from Musharraf and veering toward some sort of rapprochement, if not re-consolidation, with the PML-N.

NAWAZ’S NOVEMBER SURPRISE?
The PML-N offers little in political value without the presence of at least one Sharif brother in Pakistan. As a result, the Musharraf government was keen on keeping the former prime minister out of the country prior to his re-election. Since then, they have expressed resistance to his return prior to general-elections — though it is unclear as to whether this is a reflection of the government’s needs or the wishes of the Bhutto camp.

Nawaz is reportedly to return to London after Eid. If proven to be true, it will indicate that Sharif and family were informed of this upon return to Saudi, as Kulsoom Nawaz made such claims early at that point. Also it would prove to partially explain the Sharif family’s relative quietness in the past few weeks. From London, the Sharif brothers could return to Pakistan between November and post-elections in January. Reports suggest family members will trickle into Pakistan individually. Nawaz’s son Hassan has said his father will return to Pakistan between November 15 and 30. A pre-election return is more likely for Shahbaz Sharif. Odds of a Nawaz return pre-elections would multiply if he got another Supreme Court ruling in his favor. If Nawaz returns after the general elections, he could shake things up if discontent in the PML-Q and with others is high. Alternatively, his return could come after the candles have been blow out and the cake has been eaten.

POWER DISTRIBUTION POST-GENERAL ELECTIONS
Najam Sethi has stated that the Bhutto-Musharraf understanding will likely produce a PPP government (and Musharraf presidency) at the center, a PML-Q controlled Punjab with a significant PPP presence, a PPP-PML coalition government in NWFP and Balochistan, and a PPP-MQM coalition government in Sindh.

I think Sethi errs in only noting three political mouths (other than his own) Musharraf has to feed. There’s a four rewardee, the JUI-F. Fazlur Rahman’s deeds on behalf of Musharraf in recent weeks, as well as in the past four years, cannot simply be wishful lobbying. JUI-F will likely play an important role in addressing issues of militancy in NWFP, Balochistan, and FATA. Washington probably recognizes and supports this. Moreover, it makes little sense for JUI-F to have enabled Musharraf’s re-election under the current parliament and the fracture of its political alliance only to be punished with a loss of provincial power.

The JUI-F will likely be a part of the NWFP government at least for the same reasons the MQM will share power with the PPP in Sindh. Both were used to displace the previous ruling party, which necessitates a ‘soft landing’ for them — especially since they’re still useful. The PPP’s Sindh compromise is a concession for power at the national level, though its relations with the MQM will have its share of challenges. Sethi doesn’t seem to give much thought to a PML-Q presence at the national level. Mushahid Hussain and others with the party have proposed the idea of a national unity government. While this remains possible, strong animosities between PML-Q stalwarts and the PPP, combined with Benazir Bhutto’s compromises vis-a-vis Musharraf, will likely prohibit her from entertaining such an idea. Why would she accept a prime ministership already diluted by the troika?

CARETAKER GOVERNMENT
The general elections will be held under the rule of a caretaker government. At this point, there is only pure speculation as to who will be the interim prime minister. Candidates include: Jehangir Karamat, Ishrat Hussain, and Hamid Nasir Chattha. Tariq Aziz and Shujaat Hussain have been tasked with arranging for the interim set-up, but clearly Benazir will have significant input in these matters as they will factor significantly in the outcome of the elections (i.e. free and/or favorable).