“The Kayani extension provides a short-term ceasefire between the PPP and the army, but it will also likely produce re-alignments among its fractious power brokers. And another head-on clash between any two of them is not far from reality.”

An excerpt is below:

“Next week, senior U.S. and Pakistani officials will meet in Washington for the first ever strategic dialogue between the two countries. The Pakistani delegation will be led by Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, but make no mistake: at least when it comes to the Pakistani side, this will be the Gen. Ashfaq Kayani show….”

In the briefing, Kayani articulated his Afghanistan doctrine.  Pakistan, he said, seeks a friendly government, stability, and ”strategic depth” in Afghanistan.  He also added that Pakistan does not seek a Talibanized Afghanistan and offered to train the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

Kayani, like many others in the region, is preparing for a post-American and post-ISAF Afghanistan.  Many actors fear the emergence of a security vacuum in such a context.  Kayani is expressing Pakistan’s willingness (or better put, desire) to fill the void, prevent an outbreak of instability, and even come to support the Karzai government.  His message to Karzai is: if you become our ally (because strategic depth really calls for an alliance, not just friendship) and ditch India, we can help keep you alive and in power.  And, it seems as if there’s an implicit message to the Afghan Taliban — key as both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia try to pull the group away from al-Qaeda: you are not our only option, so don’t take us for granted. 

Kayani’s doctrine is not revolutionary.  Its objectives are no different from Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy from the past thirty years.  But, for the first time, he is publicly demonstrating great flexibility in terms of choice of alliances.  Kayani is essentially a cold realist.  He believes Pakistan has permanent interests, not permanent alliances, in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  And he and the Pakistan Army will do business with the entity that best facilitates achieving those objectives.  Behavior, not personalities, is key.   

Pakistan’s army chief also said that he impressed upon NATO that Pakistan’s “strategic paradigm” needs to be realized.  In that strategic paradigm, India remains a natural, long-term threat and Afghanistan is part of Pakistan’s sphere of influence – the latter being a perspective no different from America’s Monroe Doctrine.  Pakistan’s desire to be the predominant foreign power in Afghanistan is, as I said on a recent radio appearance, a policy that began in the late 1970s with military ruler Zia-ul-Haq.  But the key difference between the two is that the Kayani doctrine is largely agnostic, while the Zia doctrine was heavily religious.

The Pakistan Army’s behavior since 9/11 and India’s isolation from the two recent conferences on Afghanistan in Istanbul and London, demonstrate that Rawalpindi, at the very least, has a veto power on the key decisions regarding Afghanistan’s future.  Pakistan is not simply a nuisance or basketcase, but a regional power that has the capability to leverage a superpower’s depedency on it and check the regional growth of India, a rival, neighbor, and potential superpower. 

In the midst of this high wire act, Pakistan neared bankruptcy.  It has mastered the art of making a dollar out of fifteen cents.  Some would say, it’s done this by getting the United States to pay the remaining eighty five cents.

I have been blogging less frequently in the past two months, but you can catch me regularly on the John Batchelor Show, Saturdays at 9:30PM EST (770AM-NY, WABCradio.com, and XM , XM Radio Channel 158).

You can also follow me on Twitter.

Here’s an excerpt of my FP article:

“Afghanistan’s election crisis has temporarily abated, but Pakistan could soon face a volatile political transition of its own. President Asif Ali Zardari is under ever-increasing pressure to resign. His influence and power are dwindling and will likely continue to diminish in the coming months. By this spring, the Zardari presidency could meet its end….”

Click here to read more

BACKGROUND

The Pakistan military has had ties with a handful of Afghan Muslim militant leaders and groups since the 1970s, which have been proven to be fairly useful in attempts to shape developments in the weak, yet often antagonistic neighboring state.

Since that time period, relations with a variety of actors have changed or fluctuated.  The network of the late Younus Khalis, now led by his son, Anwarul Haq Mujahid, has turned against the Pakistan military.  In its current form, the Tora Bora Mujahideen, it is allied with al-Qaeda as well as the Tehreek-e Taliban of Swat.  Anwarul Haq was recently arrested in Peshawar; also, he sent forces into Swat to support Fazlullah’s insurgency.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the blue-eyed boy of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) till the mid-1990s, was ditched once the Taliban proved to be a viable force that could break the stalemate in Kabul.  Hekmatyar at one point was receiving support from two competing states, Iran and Pakistan, and later fell solely into Tehran’s camp, especially after September 11.  But Hekmatyar was soon pushed out of Iran and, according to press accounts, has maintained a more cooperative relationship with the Pakistan military since then.

In contrast to the Khalis and Hekmatyar networks, there appears to have been far less volatility in Pakistan military-intelligence establishment relationship’s with the network of Jalaluddin Haqqani.  The Haqqani network, now primarily run by Jalaluddin’s son Sirajuddin, seems to serve at least two functions for Rawalpindi:  one, it helps stunt growing Afghan-Indian economic and security ties (by ensuring there are costs to their advance); two, it provides intelligence on the other Afghan and Pakistani militant groups in the area, particularly Baitullah Mehsud’s group.

SOPHIE’S KAYANI’S CHOICE?

Now that seemingly cooperative relationship could be in jeopardy as it clashes more overtly now than ever with Pakistan’s alliance with the United States.

Concerns over the ISI’s contacts with the Haqqani network have been expressed by Washington off the record for at least a year, and on the record, since April.  There is no indication of the ISI facilitating attacks against U.S. forces, but there are reports that it aided in the Haqqani network’s attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

With the significant possibility that the American soldier kidnapped by the Haqqani network is being held in North Waziristan, Pakistan could be compelled to make a choice between the Haqqanis and Washington.

Naturally, the U.S. military seeks the return of its soldier alive and by whatever reasonable means necessary.  If the U.S. soldier is in Pakistan, then a possible demand from Washington to Rawalpindi could be: get us the soldier back or we’ll do it ourselves.  Granted, Washington will not push for a drastic solution that would result in more harm than good, but there is likely a sense of urgency.

Since the hostage is military, the United States is — again, assuming the soldier is in North Waziristan — reeled into the Haqqani’s purported safe haven.  There is less incentive for the Haqqani network to hold on to him for a prolonged period of time, since that would increase the risk of the protective Durand Line ‘wall’ being breached by U.S. forces.  The Haqqani network’s demands for the U.S. to stop operations in Ghazni and Paktika are unrealistic.  As a result, an execution, which would be valuable for the Haqqani network’s propaganda, is likely and that is a scenario Washington would like to avoid.

As Rawalpindi is pressed to make a choice between the Haqqani network and Washington, there are possible indications that its relationship with the former have deteriorated.

The Pakistan military-intelligence establishment’s attempts to isolate Baitullah Mehsud from neighboring militants have faced difficulty and Haqqani does not seem to have played the intended role.  The North Waziristan-based Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who is close to the Haqqanis, has partnered with Mehsud and attacked the Pakistan Army, despite the latter’s attempts to avoid hostilities.  Also, Maulana Sangeen, a major Haqqani network commander, was, according to one report, at the same funeral in which Baitullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain were reportedly attacked.  However, Sangeen later denied he was present at the funeral, telling The News he has nothing to do with the internal fighting Pakistan. At the very least, a key Haqqani commander is publicly trying to avoid the impression of hostilities with the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment.

It’s certainly possible the Haqqani network has kept the soldier in Afghanistan.  The group has a strong presence inside Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces in areas that are no-go for Afghan and U.S.-led coalition soldiers.  If the soldier is in these areas, Pakistan would avoid having to make a difficult choice.

DRONE ATTACKS CAUSING A RE-ALIGNMENT IN THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN WAR?

But let’s assume the Haqqanis are now leaning against the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment or at least entertaining the thought.  Why would that be the case? I’ll answer the question with another question.  What do the Haqqanis, Mehsud, Gul Bahadur, and Maulvi Nazir all have in common (besides being Pakistani/Afghani Pashtun militants  nominally loyal to Mullah Omar, supported now or previously by Pakistan’s intelligence services, and linked to transnational jihadists)?  They are the targets of U.S. drone attacks.

At least in the case of Gul Bahadur, Mehsud, and Nazir, the drone attacks, besides eliminating some high-value targets with increasing precision (though the civilian casualties are often either underestimated or overestimated), are also pushing them toward increased cooperation.  They are all threatened by U.S. drone attacks abetted by the Pakistani state.  The Haqqani network shares a similar predicament as the aforementioned trio.  Will it fully

While Pakistan should ultimately disentangle itself from a scenario in which it is connected to a group that is causing harm an ally, it cannot presently afford an all-out confrontation from a grand alliance of militants.  Pakistan declaring an all-out war against jihadis would push these groups into the arms of al-Qaeda and create an unprecedented convergence of rural, urban, and tribal militants inside the country.

And so, even if the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment would like to abandon the distinction between ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’, the costs of doing so right now would be far too much. Pakistan would actualize the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri and make itself at the “heart” of a struggle between the West and jihadist forces.

Update: The interregator in the hostage video claims that the solider is in Kandahar.

For the second time this month, Gen. Kayani has called for the ceasing of U.S. drone strikes inside Pakistan.  His statement yesterday was echoed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen. Tariq Majid, who said the attacks were causing political and economic trouble for Pakistan.

General Kayani’s comments could be dismissed as posturing for domestic consumption.  But the timing — two statements in the final period of the Obama transition — suggests otherwise.

It is conceivable that Gen. Kayani consented to U.S. drone strikes in August as he concluded it was the lesser of two evils cash-strapped Pakistan had to choose from — the other evil being U.S. ground incursions.  Factoring in his calculation could have been the fact that the Bush administration was on its way out and there would be a potential opportunity to strike a new deal in four months.

Whether this was Gen. Kayani’s game plan is unclear and it’s uncertain as to whether it would even work.  After taking control over U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus reportedly told the Pakistani leadership that there will be no policy change in the next administration.  

But the role of Gen. Petraeus, who arrives in Islamabad today, in the Obama administration is unclear.  There appears to be a concerted effort by Chairman of Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen to sideline Gen. Petraeus (very transparent in Elizabeth Bumiller’s profile of Adm. Mullen).  

And there will be new, multiple (and perhaps overlapping/competing) centers of power in the Obama administration.  Managing the “team of rivals” will be a cerebral and pragmatic chief executive — a clear contrast from his predecessor.  Despite the continuity of challenges, policy outputs could very well be different.  And that might be what Gen. Kayani is banking on.

Change will not occur overnight.  The Obama administration’s review of the Afghanistan-Pakistan war is expected to conclude by early April.    

A dramatic game changer in Islamabad before then, however, would require an accelerated policy shift.

KAYANI: A “NATIONAL CONSENSUS” ON KASHMIR

Both visits occurred after controversial statements from President Asif Ali Zardari regarding the Kashmir conflict.  On both occasions, Gen. Kayani asserted the existence of a “national consensus” in Pakistan on Kashmir.

The national consensus on Kashmir Gen. Kayani refers to can be seen as a euphemism for the military-intelligence establishment’s viewpoint.  But this also converges with a broad spectrum of public opinion in Pakistan.

There is strong public support in Pakistan for a just resolution to the 61 year conflict over the disputed region.  Pakistanis share historic, cultural, and blood linkages with the people of Kashmir, particularly with those in the currently restive valley.

Strategically, water, road, and trade linkages with Kashmir are essential to Pakistan’s future.  Their importance will increase radically in the coming decades when climate change and resource scarcity are expected to hit South Asia hard. Kashmir is the source of all of the region’s major waterways.

In recent years, Pakistanis have demonstrated their ability to be pragmatic and flexible regarding the Kashmir dispute.  But their concessions were not reciprocated by the Indians, who never fail to miss an opportunity to resolve the conflict.

India has had the luxury to defer final status discussions — only until recently.  Kashmir has gained little traction as an international issue.  But this is of little concern to the Muslim Kashmiris.  In their massive rallies — protesters number in the hundreds of thousands — they have made their voice clear.  They have asked for azaadi or freedom.   While some protesters have called for independence, others have called for a union with Pakistan.  Regardless, their desire to be free of India is clear.  Meanwhile, the rise of Hindu chauvinism in India has moved India’s center to the right and pushed Indians further away from compromise with Muslim Kashmiris.  Last month, a leading right wing Times of India columnist called for the permanent settling of Indian troops in Kashmir, tilting the demographic balance.  Conversely, many leading Indian commentators have called for letting the Kashmir valley go.  This is the cost of taking Musharraf for granted.

THE LIMITS OF COMPROMISE

That, combined with what is seen as the strategic encirclement of Pakistan, has made Pakistanis realize that former President Pervez Musharraf made one concession too many in respect to core security issues.  His compromises, in the eyes of the Pakistani public, have yielded little of permanent value.  Whatever benefits they produced are quickly vanishing after his departure.

Neither the Pakistani public nor its security establishment will accept compromise on Kashmir in a context of weakness.  Gen. Kayani has spoken of “peace through strength.”

TARGETING ISI WILL BACKFIRE ON ZARDARI

In this context, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher’s calls for the “reform” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence will hit a brick wall.  The civilian government is, in effect, being thrown at this wall, i.e. the army, and will bear the direct consequences of such action.  This is something Zardari must consider out of both self and national interest.

Moreover, the idea of reform presupposes the existence of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in this realm.  Intelligence agencies by nature operate in an amoral universe.  They are tasked with doing the government’s dirty work clandestinely and non-conventionally.  Their sole task is to serve the national interest, unconstrained not by conventional bounds but simply by capability and risk.  Criticizing one agency on moral grounds makes little sense — they all play the same game by the same (lack of) rules.  There is not a conflict of morals, but of interests.  These can only be dealt with by clandestine competition or dialogue and compromise at a conventional level.  The latter is the more prudent path.

The first target of ISI “reform” would seemingly be the organization’s director general, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj.  Indeed, some in Washington are pressing for civilian control of the ISI.  This is a recipe for disaster.  Zardari’s earlier attempt to bring the ISI under civilian control failed.  After another attempt, he’ll find himself sitting out on the pavement outside of the presidential palace.  Zardari lacks the legitimacy and power with which to assert himself over the military.  While the Pakistani public supports the cessation of the ISI’s political role, there is no support for tying the organization’s hands in other matters.  If pressed by Zardari, Gen. Kayani would be forced to enter the political realm, against his will, because of civilian excess.  Zardari should be wiser and focus on his self-proclaimed mandate of roti (bread), kapra (clothing), and makan (a home).

And so, Gen. Kayani is delineating the parameters of acceptable discourse on Kashmir, and at a broader level, Pakistan’s national security issues. Gen. Kayani has given the civilians free reign over non-security matters.  He has, however, drawn a line in the sand.  The civilians cannot pass the line of control into his own domain.  Given Zardari’s consolidation of power and the absence of checks and balances upon him, a foolish press against the military would compel that institution to intervene, making his presidency the shortest in Pakistan’s history.

FYI: Zardari’s visit to Britain — described in the Pakistani press as a “summoning” — resulted in the indefinite postponement of his scheduled visit to China, which is seen as Pakistan’s staunchest ally.  Pakistani rightists and even those in the center believe that Zardari’s closest advisors are trying to push Pakistan away from China.  Interestingly, Gen. Kayani will embark on a 5-day visit of China next week.  The smoking man speaks.

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani gave his first truly public address.  He said:

“I would like to reiterate that Pakistan desires to co-exist in peace with its neighbors and beyond.  A peace with honor and dignity, and azaadi (freedom) with grace.  This can only be guaranteed from a position of strength. Remember eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.”

As the Musharraf era comes to a close, it seems as if Gen. Kayani realizes he must fill the void to some degree — especially in a time in which he and his colleagues feel strategically encircled.  Gen. Kayani, I think, is telling Afghanistan and India — and even the United States — that he’ll play hardball if he has to.

The smoking man isn’t so cryptic afterall.

He also emphasized on the importance of national consensus to adequately address the nation’s security threats, describing it as being of the “utmost importance.” He added that all elements of government need to be on the same page. Kayani said that the securing Pakistan requires a comprehensive appreciation of the country’s threats and a similarly multifaceted solution.

Kayani’s public statements have often been somewhat general and susceptible to multiple interpretations. But it appears as if he is responding to international pressure, particularly from Washington, against talks with militants in Pakistan’s frontier. He seems to also be biding for some time. Kayani is not diminishing the importance of the military component to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign, but he is possibly indicating that any policy, whether it is new or a continuation of the old, requires bringing Pakistan’s influentials and general public on board.

It will be difficult for such a national dialogue to proceed successfully as time simply won’t stand still. The snow has melted and the region is entering a critical spring.
Militants have held off from attacking Pakistan’s large cities since the new government has come into power. They’re trying to see in which direction the government will go. But it is unclear as to whether the government itself is moving along in a singular direction. The political intrigue certainly does not help.

Furthermore, Washington remains committed to hitting al-Qaeda and Haqqani targets in North Waziristan. But it also seems to be targeting Maulvi Nazir, a Pakistani Taliban figure who has acted against al-Qaeda and other foreign militants. If true, Washington could be sending a message to Islamabad: there is no such thing as ‘good Taliban’. (Alternatively, Islamabad could have consented to the attacks, based on a belief that Nazir was renegging on his opposition to foreign militants). The Taliban are also heating things up in the Khyber Agency along major transit route for U.S. and ISAF supplies.

To a large degree, the new coalition government finds itself between the militants and pressure from Washington and other Western capitals. It’s an unenviable position. Decisive movement in either direction will have a serious cost. And vacillation is not an option.