U.S. Foreign Policy Experts Split on Unilateral Action against al-Qaeda in Pakistan

Pakistan is again the focus of The Atlantic Monthly in its regularly surveying of American foreign policy experts. It asked 41 foreign policy authorities:

  • Should the United States unilaterally go after al-Qaeda leaders and training camps in Pakistan?
    • Results: 50% Yes; 50% No
  • How likely is a U.S. incursion into the tribal areas in the next two years?
    • Results: 65% Somewhat Likely; 18% Highly Likely; 17% Highly Unlikely

It should be noted that none of those surveyed were Pakistan or South Asia specialists.

Some selected responses to the first question:

  • Yes:
    • “While it was a reasonable balancing of risks to give the Pakistanis the time and space to deal with the re-growth of al-Qaeda base on their territory, that time has now passed as it has become clear that they have neither the will or capability to do so. It would certainly be better to do this with stealth than with a large footprint operation, but the time for a direct response is now.”
    • “As al-Qaeda gets stronger in Pakistan and as its leaders elevate their public profile in the shadow of Musharraf’s troubles, the pressure on the administration to do ‘something’ will be high, and it is possible that they will carry out some action to respond to domestic pressure during an election year.”
  • No:
    • “Unless we can be (and how could we be?) 100% sure of finding and capturing Osama Bin Laden himself, the downside—in Pakistan above all but [also] in the Muslim world at large—of being seen to trample on Pakistani sovereignty and to attack and kill Muslims in a Muslim land would be immense, with no comparable gain.”
    • “[It is] better at this point to seek joint operations with Pakistani forces. Unilateral operations by the United States, except in the event of a devastating terrorist strike in the United States shown to emanate from the tribal areas, would be hard to justify and [would] produce a counterproductive backlash in Pakistan.”
    • “Even the best planned raids and air strikes come with probabilities and risks attached, but we should have learned that American unilateralism, especially when other people die, invariably comes with a heavy price tag.”

Participants: Graham Allison, Ronald Asmus, Samuel Berger, Daniel Blumenthal, Stephen Bosworth, Daniel Byman, Warren Christopher, Wesley Clark, Ivo Daalder, Douglas Feith, Jay Garner, Leslie Gelb, Marc Grossman, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Bruce Hoffman, Laura Holgate, John Hulsman, Robert Hunter, Tony Judt, Robert Kagan, David Kay, Andrew Krepinevich, Charles Kupchan, John Lehman, James Lindsay, Edward Luttwak, John McLaughlin, William Nash, Joseph Nye, Carlos Pascual, Thomas Pickering, Paul Pillar, Kenneth Pollack, Joseph Ralston, Susan Rice, Wendy Sherman, Anne-Marie Slaughter, James Steinberg, Shibley Telhami, Anthony Zinni.

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Negroponte on the Hill: Pakistan’s future is too vital to our interests to ignore or downgrade

NOTE: Bush in joint press conference with France’s Sarkozy speaks of his telephone conversation with Musharraf in which he told him, “You can’t be the president and the head of the military at the same time.” He added that extremism can’t be beaten with extremist tactics.


Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte just completed his testimony on Pakistan before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Here are the highlights:

  • Pakistan is a country vital to U.S. interests;
  • Cooperation with Pakistan is critical to U.S. and NATO’s cause in Afghanistan and contributes heavily to efforts in war on terror;
  • Pakistan was “founded on a democratic mandate” and has made “fitful” progress toward the idea of democratic civilian rule. It “seemed” to be on that path till recently.
  • State “strongly counseled against” the imposition of emergency rule but Pakistan’s leadership chose not to follow that advice.
  • Over time the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been tumultuous, but after 9/11 Musharraf decided to ally with us. We are together with the Pakistanis in the fight against al-Qaeda.
  • Many Pakistanis have said that the U.S. has not been a consistent partner. There is, however, no question that Americans have a stake in Pakistan. There is no question that the U.S. should be closely engaged in helping the Pakistani people fight violent extremism and shaping a democratic Pakistan.
  • We strongly disagree with the current government’s decisions, but this should not translate into disengagement.
  • Since 9/11:
    • the Pakistani government has arrested or killed more al-Qaeda and Taliban than any other country;
    • Pakistan’s economy has grown rapidly;
    • civil society and media have grown “events of of recent days notwithstanding”;
      • There is a more participatory national debate;
      • Human rights and civil society organizations are more prominent than in the past;
      • Pakistan has become a more moderate and prosperous country since Musharraf has come into power;
      • But only civilian democracy can secure a prosperous future for Pakistan.
  • “We” urge Musharraf to resign as chief of army staff before he takes the oath for a second term;
  • It won’t be a full transition to democracy, but an important step on that path;
  • The U.S. stands with the Pakistani people in urging the government to commit to holding elections as planned. We are doing our part through assistance program to improve electoral mechanisms;
  • Thanks to bi-partisan congressional support, assistance to Pakistan is accomplishing a great deal for the U.S. and the Pakistani people:
    • Earthquake assistance has had a positive impact generating goodwill that has lasted to this day;
    • FATA aid package will permanently open this challenged environment to government and opportunity; there are a wide range of programs for that area:
      • Security and law enforcement training;
      • Developmental assistance;
      • Democracy and human rights support;
      • Infrastructural aid;
    • This assistance and the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation are critical to achieving our objectives in the war on terror.
  • Military training and Fulbright exchange programs are building essential bridges;
  • Cutting off these programs would send a negative signal to the Pakistani people;
  • Long-term engagement is the only option for the United States;
  • The U.S. cannot afford to have the on-again off-again relationship of the past;
  • Pakistan’s future is too vital to our interests to ignore or downgrade;
  • The challenge is to deal with the government that supports the Pakistani people and strengthens moderate center against violent extremism;
  • With strong Congressional support for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2001, we’ve helped the Pakistanis move down the path of moderation, stability, democracy, and prosperity. We’re asking for Congressional support to renew our commitment to long-term partnership with the Pakistani people;
  • There is not a mission more deserving of our considered patience and steady engagement.

Q&A responses:

  • “I believe they [the Pakistani military] have their nuclear weapons under effective control.”
  • Electoral timetable should be adhered to. If the emergency measures are lifted in the near future, then there is still time to organize “reasonably fair and free elections.” The longer this emergency situation goes on, the more difficult the political atmosphere will become.
  • Strong preference is that the government terminate emergency ASAP and get country back on track. Sooner that happens, not only the better for Pakistan’s political development, but also less likely that some agonizing reappraisal of assistance program would be required.
  • A number of statutes govern assistance to Pakistan. State hasn’t really gotten to the point of looking to alternatives. Just cataloging of assistance programs and what is or might not be impacted by statues.
  • Judgment at the moment: There’s nothing that will be automatically triggered by the current situation. Everything is covered at the moment by appropriate waivers. But if the situation continues, it will undercut the political support for assistance, or certain aspects of it.
  • U.S. has a Pakistan policy, not a Musharraf policy. It’s not about one leader. It’s about: helping a country; helping institutions transition, electoral assistance; and developing FATA; support of Pakistani army and government in supporting us in Afghanistan.
  • “Basically the political future of Pakistan is for the people of Pakistan to decide.”
  • The longer this situation goes on the more difficult it is going to become.
  • “In the historical record, there were times that they [India] did try to take advantage of political instability in Pakistan” but don’t appear to be doing that now.”
  • If Musharraf doesn’t take off the uniform, there will be principal political repercussions inside Pakistan.
  • On Nawaz Sharif’s exile: That’s an issue between the government of Pakistan and Mr. Sharif. Apparently committed to staying out of the country for a decade – we’ll just have to see how that issue evolves.
  • Extremists are not many in number, but use more extreme methods and are dangerous in that regard.

Congressmen comments:

  • William Delahunt interrupted Negroponte and said, waving his finger and apparently angry, “I think the Pakistani people are on our side.”
  • Dana Rohrabacher: “It’s time to drop this guy [Musharraf]” and side with the moderates.
  • Elliot Engel: Nawaz Sharif also needs to come back.
  • Gary Ackerman: Musharraf a “necessary thug.”
  • Dan Burton: If we abandon Musharraf, same thing that happned in Iran with the Shah will happen in a nuclear Pakistan.
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The Massacre at Karsaz Bridge: Analysis of the Bhutto Blast (Part 2)

  • Bomber Sketch Released
  • Two Severed Heads Found; Police Still Assert One Bomber
  • Explosives: Russian-Made Grenade and 14 kg RDX suicide belt
  • Multiple Attack Teams?
  • A Nexus Against Bhutto?
  • Political Fallout of the Attacks: Playing Musical Chairs Can Be Dangerous
  • More Questions

Sindh Police has released a sketch of the severed head of an individual it alleges is the sole suicide bomber in Friday’s Karsaz Bridge attack. Reuters’ Kamran Haider quotes a Pakistani security official as stating, “The age of the suspect is between 20 to 25 and he looks to be a Karachiite.” Based on the image, the individual could be from anywhere in Pakistan’s southern half. Karachi is also a diverse city populated by a plurality of Urdu-speaking migrants from India, as well as Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Balochis, Memons, Afghani refugees, Bengalis, and even some Africans. However, the choice of a Karachiite makes sense, as the individual would more easily mix into the crowd and know his way around Pakistan’s largest city. The sketch of his reconstructed face as well as fingerprints believed to be from his severed limbs have been sent to the National Registration and Database Authority (NADRA) and it could come back with results on the bomber’s identity as early as Monday. According to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, approximately 53.5 million Pakistanis have computerized National Identity Cards (NIC) with biometrics as of September 2006. NADRA also makes use of face recognition technology. A second severed head was found — which could support the claims of two suicide bombers made by the Bhutto camp — but police believe that he was a victim of the blasts, not a perpetrator.

Pakistani security officials have shed light on the weapons used in Friday’s attack, but there are conflicting narratives and many questions remain.

Karachi Police’s lead investigator Manzoor Mughal states that the first blast came from a Russian-made hand grenade of approximately 1kg (2.2 lbs). He matches my initial theory on Friday that the goal of the grenade attack was to cause the crowd to disperse, create a hole in Bhutto’s security cordon, and try to take out the former prime minister.

Still, it remains unclear who threw the grenade. Government officials seem to insist on the role of a single attacker, a theory that makes little sense. It puts too much responsibility in the hands of one individual and maximizes the risk of jeopardizing the whole operation.

Let’s assume the suicide bomber threw the grenade. He would need some distance from the convoy, and the greater the distance from the convoy, the greater the risk that he could be caught on his way to it. Moreover, he would’ve attracted attention to himself by throwing the grenade, which was only a means to a more explosive end.

Statements by the Bhutto camp further the idea that there was more than one actor involved. It claims there were two suicide bombers at Karsaz, which, as I stated earlier, receives some support by the presence of two severed heads on the scene of the blast. However, there is little other evidence at this point to suggest that there was another suicide bomber involved in the attack at Karsaz. But important details coming from the People’s Party point to a wider conspiracy.

In her Friday press conference, Bhutto stated that her convoy came under gunfire, some of which was aimed at the tires of her vehicle. She is unsure as to whether this occurred before or after the second blast. This suggests the suicide bomber was accompanied by several other accomplices, and there are reports a group of men waiting underneath Karsaz Bridge attracted the suspicions of many before the blast. One report states that they were allegedly wielding sticks (another report says they were also yelling), but makes little sense.

In any event, there is significant reason to believe that the suicide bomber received gun support from several armed men, one of whom potentially threw the grenade. And there is indication that there could have been multiple attack teams, consisting of at least one gunner and one suicide bomber, posted along Bhutto’s 20+ mile parade route.

Bhutto states her security personnel apprehended two men, one with a gun and another with a suicide belt, prior to the blasts. It is unclear when and where the gunner was arrested, but the man with the suicide belt was arrested 13 minutes before the blast in Karachi’s Nursery area—which is further along the parade route, DIRECTLY in between the site of the successful blasts and Bhutto’s intended destination: Mazar-e Quaid.

Were they caught near one another? If so, they could have been part of a team of at least two. Where are they now? Are they being interrogated?

Sindh Home Secretary Ghulam Muhammad Mohtarem told Reuters on October 17 of reports that three different groups were planning to attack Bhutto on her return. It appears he was referring to three units sent by Baitullah Mehsud. So was there a third cell? If so, where were they waiting, and where are they now?

The second blast, which occurred between 30-60 seconds later, was, according to Karachi Police’s lead investigator, from a suicide belt laden packed with 15-20 kg (33-44 lbs) of RDX explosives and shrapnel, perhaps consisting of “ball-bearings and pellets.” Ghulam Muhammad adds that it also contained nuts and bolts. Clearly the goals were to penetrate the armor of Bhutto’s vehicle and, if unsuccessful, inflict mass damage. The attacker sought to get as close to Bhutto as possible, but apparently only made it to the front-left side, while Bhutto was safely in the back.

While the mechanics of the attack are significant, the organizational forces behind it are more important. There is, of course, the theory that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are behind the attacks — independently — without any the support of military, intelligence, or political forces inside Pakistan. However, Baitullah Mehsud has denied involvement in the attacks and neither Osama bin Laden nor Ayman al-Zawahiri have made any statements against Bhutto. They have, however, repeatedly called for the overthrow of Pervez Musharraf. Bhutto has never been on the radar of al-Qaeda Prime, though the same can’t be same for the Taliban.

A more plausible, but still highly-speculative alternative is a loose network of individuals with various, intersecting interests that share one major obstacle: Benazir Bhutto.

Their feud with Bhutto centers on a fight over the control of Punjab and preventing the rolling back of the autonomy of various current and former military-intelligence officials, their fiefdoms, and unconventional wars.

Though Bhutto refused to name the three officials she listed in a letter to Pervez Musharraf prior to her return as direct threats to her life, we’re getting clear indication of who they and their potential associates are.

They include (in order of importance):

  • Ejaz Shah:
  • The Chaudhry Cousins — Pervez Ellahi and Shujaat Hussain:
    • Respectively, chief minister of Punjab and president of Musharraf’s party, the PML-Q;
    • Rise to power allegedly orchestrated by Ejaz Shah;
    • Stand to lose the most from a Bhutto-Musharraf deal — national power + potentially control of Punjab;
    • Exchanged a vigorous war of words with Bhutto prior to her return;
    • Bhutto did not mention their names in her long list of politicians that called on her to support;
    • Fear Bhutto’s potential inroads into Punjab, which would be done by mobilizing masses in rural Punjab;
    • On Saturday, Shujaat called for banning political rallies during election season.
  • Ijaz-ul-Haq:
    • Minister of Religious Affairs in current government;
    • Member of Chaudhries’ PML-Q party;
    • Son of Zia-ul-Haq:
      • Former president and military ruler of Pakistan who overthrew Benazir’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had him executed;
      • Later killed in an air crash believed by some to be orchestrated by a terrorist group, al-Zulfikar, run by Benazir’s brother Murtaza.
  • Potential others:
    • Arbab Rahim:
      • Chief Minister of Sindh;
      • Strong likelihood that he and his party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), will lose control of the province in next elections to Benazir’s People’s Party (PPP);
      • MQM militants attacked PPP activists (and militants) in Karachi street violence coinciding with the ill-fated visit of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to city on May 12, 2007;
      • Bhutto, however, has stated that the next potential attack against her would involve framing the MQM as the culprits.
    • Haji Omar [profile]:

Even if any of the government figures above are involved in the attacks on Bhutto, public punitive action against them would be unlikely. Bhutto, by refusing to mention their names directly, perhaps understands this and would accept their removal from the power structure alone.

Pakistani authorities have detained three men in southern Punjab they believe have links to the blast. This suggests that those who implemented Friday’s terror could include elements of the network oft-described as the “Punjabi Taliban.” Rashid Rauf, alleged to be involved in the summer 2006 al-Qaeda airline plot, was arrested in Bahawalpur, located in southeastern Punjab.

If the attacks were implemented by jihadis hailing from Punjab focused on FATA, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, it remains plausible these individuals were instruments of some of the institutional actors listed above. As a result, they bring several issues to the forefront: governance of Punjab; control of power at the center; and the future of jihad in Kashmir, FATA, and Afghanistan.

Pervez Musharraf is ultimately at the center of all this. The attacks will perhaps force him to make some compelling decisions in the coming weeks and months. Benazir Bhutto clearly understands this, and after the attacks, has been keen to remain on his good side, asserting directly and indirectly her confidence and trust in him.

Will Musharraf take a more assertive stance against the roguish military-intelligence figures near him? Or will he continue to play a precarious balance?

Musharraf might have to make a choice between two camps — the ‘progressives‘ : Tariq Aziz, Ashfaq Kiyani, and Hamid Javed; and the ‘conservatives‘: Ijaz Shah, Shujaat Hussain, and Pervez Ellahi.

The ‘progressives’ favor a deal with Benazir Bhutto and incline less toward support for unconventional warfare within and without Pakistan. The ‘conservatives’ oppose a deal with Bhutto. They’ll definitely lose control of the center and potentially even Punjab, and they (for a variety of reasons) favor Pakistan’s waging of or support for unconventional wars abroad. Musharraf seems to be leaning toward the ‘progressives’, as he’s proposed Tariq Aziz as the caretaker prime minister for the elections and has chosen Ashfaq Kiyani as his succeeding army head.

Ijaz Shah’s posting will expire in February, which can provide a quiet way to say goodbye. The Chaudhries could end up becoming an unbearable burden for Musharraf. But any moves against them will have negative ramifications. It will create a void that can be naturally filled, but mainly by Nawaz Sharif, the elected prime minister Musharraf overthrew in 1999.

The future of Nawaz Sharif remains murky. Two major questions that need to be considered are: 1) Will Musharraf permit Nawaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan and a meaningful role in the political process? 2) Will Sharif change his tune and start to compromise with Musharraf? If the gap between the two is bridged a bit, then an opening can emerge to part ways with the Chaudhries, and bring in Sharif. But all-too-often, inclination toward compromise in Pakistan is seen as a vulnerability. Any sort of mending of relations between the two will require much time and energy — just look at how protracted the Bhutto-Musharraf talks were. Musharraf can perhaps count on Sharif to counter a rising Benazir, but the latter two could, alternatively, both focus on a vulnerable, uniformless Musharraf without a political base, and send him packing.

Reportedly the Saudis have serious objections to holding on to Nawaz beyond mid-November. Sharif was pressure by both Saad Hariri and Bandar bin Sultan to postpone his Saudi departure to after November 7. He was to leave Saudi for London in mid-October, but conceded to his detainers’ demands and only after reportedly becoming very emotional.

There are indications he is very demoralized. Shortly after the attacks, when speaking to a private Pakistani television station via telephone, his voice weakened as he answered a question about when he would return to the country. He meekly replied, “When the people of Pakistan call for me.” And after five seconds or so of silence, the call ended abruptly. Though Musharraf wants Sharif’s return only after the general elections, he is being forced to accept his earlier return. But it can be a severely injured Nawaz who would be more conciliatory after essentially being held hostage for two months.


  1. Where are the gunman and attempted suicide bomber apprehended by Bhutto’s security people and turned over to Karachi police? Are they being interrogated? Why haven’t they been mentioned in most reports?
  2. To what extent were Musharraf and Bhutto’s camps negligent?
  3. Did the jammers provided by Musharraf’s camp work?
  4. Did Bhutto’s supporters accidentally cause some of them to malfunction?
  5. Did it make sense for Bhutto to have an 18-hr procession, especially after individuals such as Ghulam Muhammad Mohtarem urged her to end her procession before sunset and others offered her a helicopter? Why were Bhutto’s “security guards” young, scrawny volunteers? To what extent were they human shields? Wouldn’t professionals have been better?
  6. How will the attacks impact political rallies and mass mobilization? Will Bhutto travel extensively in Punjab?
  7. Did Bhutto’s intelligence come from India via Afghanistan?
  8. Will Musharraf go soft on the military-intel figures if they were involved in the attacks, but hard on jihadis in FATA (though they might have not been involved)?
  9. Will he use the attacks a pre-text for a massive, conclusive operation in FATA?


  • 10/22/2007 – 3:15PM -
    • I intended to note this in my original posting, forgot to do so, but was reminded Mushtaq Minhas made the point on AAJ TV’s Bolta Pakistan show that two of Pakistan’s leaders were assassinated — Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 — and the perpetrators of the act were never identified.
    • Assassination, violent political transitions, and intrigue date back to early in Pakistan’s history. These destructive impulses remain. And while Pakistan has an active and open press, that will not necessarily preclude the story from ‘closing’ with essential questions unanswered. The media (and public opinion) is a machine that can be manipulated and so much else can occur in between now and mid-January to ‘sandwich’ this story or push it to the side. In other words, there is a strong likelihood that the specific perpetrators of the act — and perhaps their organization affiliations — will be identified, but the elite forces behind them, if there were any, won’t be noted.
    • I would not consider this a defeat for those who hope for a Pakistan that features: peaceful, institutionalized transitions of power; competitive politics; representative and good governance; and public accountability. The attacks can still be leveraged to forge a consensus among Pakistan’s discordant elite on norms of conduct and engagement, consolidate public support against the use of violence in politics, and open up the political process to those that have been marginalized.
  • 10/22/2007 – 3:58PM –
    • Sindh Governor Ishrat-ul-Ibad tells the NYT’s Carlotta Gall that there were two suicide bombers, carrying, respectively, 17-22 lbs and 33 lbs of C-4 explosives (not RDX). There were two heads found. Pakistani authorities previously stated that the second head was that of a victim and that the first blast was from a grenade.
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BB Strikes Back: Press Conference Coverage

In the footer of the previous post, “The Massacre at Karsaz Bridge: Analysis of the Bhutto Blast (Part 1),” I posted real-time updates of Benazir Bhutto’s press conference at Bilawal House this afternoon Pakistan Standard Time. The press conference was long and my summary ended up becoming lengthy, deserving a separate post. It is below.

UPDATE: 7:43 AM - Press conference will be starting late. Extra-stringent security measures being taken slowing down entrance of journalists into Bhutto home.

UPDATE: 7:55 AM – Former Interior Minister and Bhutto loyalist Retd. Gen. Naseerullah Babar rejected any connections of Baitullah Mehsud to the Bhutto blasts. He said Mehsud’s men could not have carried out the attacks as they lack the language skills and ability to mix in Karachi. Above all, Mehsud had in recent days denied threatening attacks against Benazir upon her return to Pakistan (which we noted in our previous post). Babar rejects the grenade attack claim by the government, instead stating that a timed/triggered device was used.

UPDATE: 8:04 AM - Benazir Bhutto’s press conference has begun. She’s presently reading a statement.

UPDATE: 8:08 AM - The press conference is a logistical mess. Seems like it was in the veranda. One Pakistani channel only has video and another only has audio. Bhutto has proposed splitting up the conference, enabling her to deal separately with photographers, Pakistani journalists, and foreign journalists.

UPDATE: 8:12 AM - The sound system at the press conference does not work or does not exist. It will resume when a working one is set up.

UPDATE: 8:24 AM - Bhutto is now speaking in English. She says [paraphrased]:

  • Didn’t want the top PPP leadership in the truck with her. Knew there would be an attack and didn’t want the entire leadership taken out.
  • Originally, her party’s MNAs were not going to be in the truck, but that decision was reversed.
  • She and her camp noticed that the street lights were shut off at sunset on Shahar-e Faisal.
  • She doesn’t blame the government. Tried to get in touch with National Security Adviser, Tariq Aziz, but was unsuccessful.
  • Her security advisers were having trouble identifying suicide bombers and assassins within the crowd. Claims that if the street lights were on, her guards would have been able to identify the suicide bombers.
  • Sherry Rehman tried to text message members of the press, noting the security challenges.
  • Her security team started scanning the crowds with floodlights. Her security guards arrested one man with a pistol. Thirteen minutes before the first bomb blast, her media cell received a call from the PPP camp at Nursery (area of Karachi) stating they found a man with a suicide belt, handed him over to the police, but were not satisfied with their response.
  • Bhutto says she personally witnessed Arif Khan, the ARY cameraman, as he lost his life.

UPDATE: 8:25 AM - Benazir says:

  • Initial reaction to the first blast was that it was firecrackers.
  • Blast occurred as Abida Hussain was suggesting to her that they should mention their program for bringing representative government to the Tribal Areas to counter extremism.
  • The truck stopped for some reason after the second blast.
  • Shots were fired toward the truck, likely at the tires, and this was either immediately before the suicide bombings or afterwards. [In other words, the lone bomber theory espoused by the Interior Ministry is bogus in her opinion. Bhutto later suggests there is more than one suicide bomber, and the comments above perhaps suggest that there were accomplices in the area issuing fire].

UPDATE: 8:27 AM - Benazir continues:

  • The suicide bomber (second , if there were more than one) was directly thwarted by her volunteer guards. He managed to get close but he hit the front of the truck, while Benazir and her political secretary were in the back. Could have been worse.

UPDATE: 8:30 AM - Now she’s describing the heroics of other PPP politicians.

UPDATE: 8:31 AM - Benazir says:

  • She and other PPP leaders owe their lives to those who strengthened their cordon around the truck after the first blast.
  • The second blast was so strong that it put a dent in the hefty armored truck. Could have been much, much worse without that cordon.
  • At least 50 of her security guards have died.
  • “This was a dastardly and cowardly attack…the first in the history of Pakistan…of multiple suicide attacks on a political leader.”
  • Says suicide attacks are against Islam. Innocents men, a young woman and child died.
  • Says three security guards sitting on the edge of her truck also died.
  • Street was littered with dead bodies and glass.
  • Police bravely did their duty.
  • Adds, “These armed militants want to destroy Pakistan…want to damage Islam…want to destroy the political, socio-economic hopes of Pakistan through a democratic order.”
  • Salutes heroes and parents of these brave children. Wishes to thank all the party workers and supporters of democracy.

UPDATES: 8:47 AM - Bhutto continues:

  • “What does the attack last night signify? The attack was more than the unity and integrity of Pakistan. The attack was not an attack on an individual. It wasn’t an attack on me. The attack was on what I represent. It was an attack on democracy. It was an attack on the very unity and integrity of Pakistan — because the PPP is a federal party that cuts across Pakistan’s economic, ethnic, provincial and religious divides. It was an attack on Pakistan’s progress. The unity of Pakistan depends on democratic order. It’s an attack on the Pakistani people’s empowerment. It wasn’t an attack on just one political leader. It was on all political leaders in the Pakistan — whether they’re in the ARD or not.
  • The message they’re trying to send: “All those who believe in democracy that you can’t do a campaign, that if you do a campaign we’ll kill you, don’t go out, don’t express your fundamental rights of political expression.”
  • It was attack of a militant minority that thrived under a military dictatorship in the 70s and 80s, like Al-Badr of 70s and “thugs” from the Zia era.
  • Or militants of the present era who wish to kill and maim innocent people.
  • Militants are saying that peace-loving people are not safe together; the only safe people are the militants because no one attacks them.
  • They’re a minority that wants to hijack the destiny of the nation. This is a battle for democracy. We wish it to be peaceful. We wish it to be political.
  • Negotiations with Musharraf were begun to avoid bloodshed.
  • Willing to risk our lives and liberty to save Pakistan and democracy from militant takeover — not willing to give up the country to them. The militants are killing our armed forces in tribal areas of Pakistan. They want to dissipate energy of this great nation. I and my colleagues want to save Pakistan, and saving Pakistan requires saving democracy. We can make our people the guardians of democracy to guard this great land of ours.
  • We will not stop our campaign. We will not stop our struggle — despite the heavy loss we incurred yesterday. This is the land that gave us birth. This land to which we’ll return.
  • We do not want Pakistan to disintegrate into little fiefdoms run by warlords, issuing their fatwas. We appeal to all the citizens of Pakistan, to all those who are true Muslims to look into their hearts and not support violence, but instead support peace, political change, and democracy.
  • “The attack last night was a message sent by the enemies of democracy, the enemies of Pakistan, the enemies of political parties of the country, and the enemy of Islam.”
  • The attacks were an attempt to blackmail us and all workers for human rights. Not just the political parties, but also civil groups. These militants are against a value system – the value system of pluralism and equal rights, gender equality and empowerment.
  • I have no problem with those who have a different view than mine. I have a problem with those who take up weapons to force others into submission. The people of Pakistan will not be forced into submission.
  • Dictatorship fuels extremism. These cowards attacked a woman, unarmed men and kids accompanying me.
  • I let it known to the perpetrators of the crime that the PPP will not be deterred.
  • It is imperative for us to save Pakistan — to save Pakistan through democracy, to save the fundamental rights of our people.
  • The PPP will offer janazah (funeral) prayers for all those who lost their lives on October 21.
  • Those who called me include Musharraf, Karzai, Advani from India, Nawaz Sharif, Altaf Hussain, Asfandyar Wali (leader of ANP), Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, several high commissioners and embassies. [Note who wasn't mentioned. Shaukat Aziz and the Chaudhry Cousins.]

UPDATE: 8:48 AM - Benazir says:

  • Before I came to Pakistan it was conveyed to me that several suicide squads had been sent to kill me. The information was received from a brotherly Muslim country [i.e. Afghanistan]. There would be a suicide squad from Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and finally, one from Karachi. The source also gave the telephone numbers of some of these suicide bombers and their handlers. This information was passed on to the government of Pakistan. She hopes that with so much information the government could have apprehend them, but understands the difficulty.
  • She was advised not to come, but says she also gave her word to the people of Pakistan. She says, in Urdu, that she gave her word to her people and .
  • She wrote to Musharraf that if someone does something to her, she won’t blame the Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, or Al Qaeda, but “those people, that in my opinion, mislead people.”
  • She says that she knows who are the forces of militancy. They are cowards. She has named three people and more in that letter.
  • She appeals to people in the government to continue giving her intelligence.
  • The next attack: She hears the next attack will be consist of placing operatives in the police department near her homes in Clifton and Larkana. Commandos will be sent in the garb of a rival political party [i.e. MQM] and the rival party will be blamed. She shared this information with Musharraf’s government and is confident that they won’t let this attack materialize.
  • Clarifies she is accusing the government, rather she is accusing certain people who “abuse their positions and powers.”
  • Says, “I know the battle to save Pakistan will require a heroic effort and the people will support us to protect our country from a militant threat.”
  • Adds that it is important that all the moderate forces join together. Militancy is not a threat to an individual, but to the unity and integrity of Pakistan, and the image and true message of Islam.

UPDATE: 8:56AM - During Q&A, Benazir says:

  • She won’t mention those three names.
  • States that a journalist told her that a retired military official told him that the MQM would try to assassinate her, but it’s not true. Other political parties are “just red herrings.”
  • “Insha’Allah there won’t be any need to same these names.”

UPDATE: 9:00 AM - Bhutto clarifies:

  • The government itself is not involved, but she thinks certain individuals [within it] are.
  • She adds that empowering the people will defeat terror, but there are major vested interests in terror, e.g. drug money.

UPDATE: 9:02 AM - Q&A continues:

  • Bhutto says, “We think it was a suicide attack.”

UPDATE: 9:05 AM - The evening call to prayer is going on. Press conference taking a short break.

UPDATE: 9:08 AM - Press conference has resumed. Bhutto’s speaking on what she sees as the message of Islam.

UPDATE: 9:11 AM - Q&A continues:

  • Bhutto says, “I will stay here. I will come and go because I lecture here and there and also will visit my children…..There is no importance to my life….Elections must be held. Without elections, violence will worsen. We will have to show courage. We need political solutions to political problems. The use of force is important sometimes, but it is not enough.”

UPDATE: 9:12 AM - Press conference has completed. I will make the notes above more comprehensible.

UPDATE: 3:06 PM - Revision completed.

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The Massacre at Karsaz Bridge: Analysis of the Bhutto Blast (Part 1)

  • Karachi Police and Interior Ministry: Single attacker threw grenade and then blew himself up
  • Alleged Suicide Bomber Found: Severed head retrieved; DNA tests being conducted
  • Asif Zardari, Bhutto’s Husband: Intelligence bureau responsible
  • The Toll: 138 dead; 550 injured–including senior politicians
  • The Location: Potential significance
  • Bhutto to Name Names: Intelligence Bureau?

The night was over — or so we had thought. Benazir Bhutto’s caravan was moving at a snail’s pace through Karachi on Shahra-e Faisal (Faisal Road) from Jinnah International Airport to Mazar-e Quaid (Jinnah’s Mausoleum). The former prime minister’s first day back in Pakistan had met its end without incident, suggesting that Pakistan’s ongoing political transition would accede somewhat to the norms that those in other countries take for granted. Only a few minutes later, shortly after midnight, we would realize that those hopes were illusory.

After spending almost ten hours on the open platform above the truck, Bhutto made her way downstairs to the secure, armor plated zone. Approximately 10 minutes later, at 12:09 AM Pakistan Standard Time (PST), a relatively minor bomb blast occurred, catching the attention of the throngs of People’s Party supporters following the Bhutto procession. In the gleeful atmosphere, many of them assumed the cause of the noise was fairly innocuous — a flat tire.

There are conflicting reports as to what caused the first explosion. According to Pakistan analyst, Bhutto friend, and eyewitness Victoria Schofield, the first explosion came from a parked car that aroused the suspicion of the police and that a bomb inside went off as the police began to search the vehicle. If accurate, this suggests two possibilities: one, the bomb exploded as a result of police unknowingly activating a trigger; or two, that a culprit was on the scene watching both the police presence and the Bhutto procession and manually activated a trigger in response. However, a trigger-based bomb is being ruled out by Karachi Police and Pakistan’s Interior Ministry for a number of reasons, including, as Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao confirms, that the jamming devices installed in Bhutto’s tour truck and/or surrounding security vehicles would have prevented a trigger-based bomb from going off.

In fact, Karachi Police Chief Azhar Farooqi tells the AP that the first blast was from a grenade.

Both Karachi Police and the Interior Ministry report that there was a single bomber and that he used a grenade (first blast) to distract the crowd (also perhaps to put Bhutto’s vehicle to a complete stop, clear a path to her truck, and potentially force her evacuation and exposure) and then, approximately two minutes later, detonated the second, larger bomb strapped to himself. This second blast apparently occurred very close to Bhutto’s convoy and caused two police vehicles escorting her truck to go on fire. Bhutto was immediately evacuated from the vehicle and escorted in a protective jeep waiting nearby.

Aftab Sherpao confirms that a suicide jacket was found. He tells AAJ News that the scene of blast being combed with the explosive device and components yet to be fuly examined. Manzoor Mughal tells Reuters that the head of the alleged bomber has been found and DNA tests are being conducted. He adds that 15-20 kg of explosives were used in the attack.

Raja Umer, also with the Karachi Police, states that his organization is looking into whether there were two suicide bombers. This, however, has not been repeated by any other official, and there is no video imagery nor eyewitness accounts to suggest there were two bombers.

So far the blasts have taken the lives of 138 individuals and injured 550. The primary victims have been People’s Party (PPP) workers, policemen, and security officials within the immediate vicinity of Bhutto’s truck. PPP figures injured include: Amin Fahim (released), Abida Hussain, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Jehangir Badar, Raja Pervez Ashraf, and Murad Ali Shah (in serious condition).

The blast occurred half way in between the origin and destination of Bhutto’s procession, specifically near the intersection of Karachi’s busiest road, Shahra-e Faisal and Karsaz Road, which is beneath the newly-built Karsaz Roundabout/Overpass/Bridge (whatever you want to call it!). This location is in close proximity to the National Stadium and more importantly a Pakistan State Oil gas station.

Karachi’s mayor has been furiously building over and underpasses in the city–some of which have been quite shoddy. In fact, an overpass in Karachi collapsed in September and underpasses flooded while under construction due to the monsoon rains. The gas station and overpass proximity lend us to think that there was a significance to the location. In fact, it raises the following question: Did the attacker(s) seek damage on a far larger scale by inducing the collapse of the bridge and/or causing the gas station to explode? Bhutto’s truck, according to some reports, was and remains directly under the bridge.

It seems clear that the attackers would value location over time. Bhutto’s procession had already taken 10 hours to travel around 10 miles. The remaining dozen or so miles would presumably have taken a similar amount of time. And yet, none of this was scheduled. Bhutto supporters had congregated around her planned final destination hours before the blast and television commentators stated a few hours into her parade that her arrival there would be fairly imminent. If time was an issue, it could be in the sense that the bomber just got sleepy. Imagine having to wait that long just to kill yourself. Location-wise, as he map below demonstrates (coming later day), Bhutto’s caravan should have gone further straight on Shahra-e Faisal and would have taken a right turn much later on.


1) Who was the young man at Dubai International Airport who tried to gain entrance into the VIP lounge claiming to be Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s nephew? Does he have any relation to the blast?

2) What was the role of the vehicle without a license plate?

3) Did Benazir Bhutto’s security detail receive the jammers they requested? Aftab Sherpao states that they did.

4) Why were the street lights along Shahra-e Faisal turned off? Who was responsible for that?

5) How will the attacks impact Bhutto’s public presence? Will she travel into Punjab?

6) Why is Bhutto refusing to release the names of the three officials she has implicated in the assassination attempts of her?


Note: Benazir Bhutto will be giving a press conference at Bilawal House today at 4PM PST ( 7AM EST – 11AM GMT). She will reportedly name names, i.e. the individuals she listed as threats to her safety in a recent letter to Musharraf. Will Ejaz Shah, head of the Intelligence Bureau, be among them?


UPDATE: 6:55 AM - BBC reports that Bhutto told Paris-Match magazine shortly after the attacks, “I know exactly who wants to kill me. It is dignitaries of the former regime of General Zia who are today behind the extremism and fanaticism.”

UPDATE: 4:04 PM - I’ve moved the real-time press conference coverage to a separate post.

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Paradoxes and Political Intrigue Persist in Pakistan

Developments in Pakistan in recent days further the view for both insiders and outsiders that the country is a perplexing bowl of contradictions and political intrigue.

The Karachi Stock Exchange closed at all-time highs on Monday and Tuesday. Investor confidence boosted due to Pervez Musharraf’s re-election as president (pending the validation of his candidacy), which they associate with future political stability and continuity of pro-growth, liberal economic policies. Their sentiments might be valid in the mid-term, but the next three months, at the very least, will be a roller coaster period for the country—and Pakistan’s securities markets will likely not be as immune to the volatility as they have been before.

On the same day as the market rally, a helicopter escorting Musharraf to Kashmir crashed, killing four individuals. This was also the first day of work for Musharraf’s slated army successor, Ashfaq Kiyani, as vice chief of army staff. Though the president was never in any danger and there is no sign of foul play, the context eerily resembles the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. The accident is a keen reminder that a single event of this sort can have a defining impact, but as with Zia’s demise, need not necessarily result in systemic change.

While investors are buoyant down south in Karachi, the country’s northwest has witnessed some of its most severe fighting between Pakistan’s army and local-foreign insurgents. According to the army, 45 troops and 150 insurgents have been killed in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan. There have also been significant civilian casualties, with non-combatants fleeing the area. The government has been bombarding insurgents from the air with helicopter gunships and jets. The heightened use of air power markedly differs from the government’s previous ground-oriented strategy, which sought to avoid so-called collateral damage and earning further disfavor of locals. It suggests any number of the following:

  • the army has decided its strong avoidance of civilian casualties has been too costly;
  • patience on its side is wearing thin;
  • there is significant external pressure on Islamabad to bring in decisive results before the winter;
  • or a strategic and/or political (via Bhutto deal) window of opportunity has emerged to enable a forceful confrontation of militants.

Perhaps the army has opted for a Balochistan-like strategy, in which it would deliver strong, decisive blows to the insurgency (costing many innocent civilian lives) and follow up with a heavy infusion of development funds. Large scale, yet short-term violence would be complemented by a vast improvement in quality of life and incorporation/subsidization of local elites. In FATA, these funds would largely come from the 5-year $750 million US aid package and opportunities from its duty-free economic opportunity zone program, and would trickle down to the locals via notables with newly padded pockets.

A critical player in the political solution in FATA will be Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who, despite being in the political “opposition,” has proved to be almost as loyal to Musharraf as the Chaudhries. Fazlur Rahman is epitome of the “siyasi ulema” (political Islamic scholars) Abdur Rashid Ghazi lambasted on national television minutes before his demise in the Lal Masjid compound. The JUI-F should play a significant role in liaisoning between FATA notables and insurgents and the federal government/military. Its role in bringing a death blow to the MMA and APDM will not go unrewarded. The pending dissolution of the NWFP assembly will result in fresh provincial elections that might see MMA factions running on their own tickets, and a final tally that places the JUI-F in a stronger individual provincial position than before.

Recent comments by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, and to a lesser extent Shaukat Aziz, have sought to cast doubt on the government’s sincerity in its deal with Benazir Bhutto and her People’s Party. Aziz boasted of having divided and outsmarted the opposition, which is true, and Shujaat bluntly stated that the government has no intention of following through on its promises to Bhutto — and that it it will, in fact, get political cover from the Supreme Court ruling the National Reconciliation Ordinance invalid.

Shujaat’s comments should be taken with a grain (or bucket) of salt. One, Washington — Musharraf’s greatest benefactor — strongly wants the deal to go through fully. Two, Shujaat stands to lose most from the Bhutto-Musharraf deal. Musharraf’s presidency is essentially set (barring a Supreme Court rejection of his candidacy), but Shujaat’s party has to face off against Bhutto’s in the general elections. Images of him and his cousin appear frequently on Pakistani television screens, with a massive wave of advertisements on private channels (source of funding unclear) hailing the achievements of the governments of Musharraf (“Sub se pahlay Pakistan”) and Pervez Ellahi (“Para likha Punjab”). The Chaudhries may have reluctantly consented to a Bhutto-Musharraf deal, but they will show some feistiness to retain their dominance over Punjab and share of federal power.

The rejection of Shujaat’s statements by a Musharraf spokesperson suggests that the president will have to play a fine balancing act between PML-Q partisan and partner of Benazir. It’s the same kind of lack of partiality the Bush administration has sought to display in recent days vis-a-vis Pakistan (i.e. support for the country, not just one man–Musharraf). Should Musharraf alienate his PML-Q base, one might witness the party distancing itself from Musharraf and veering toward some sort of rapprochement, if not re-consolidation, with the PML-N.

The PML-N offers little in political value without the presence of at least one Sharif brother in Pakistan. As a result, the Musharraf government was keen on keeping the former prime minister out of the country prior to his re-election. Since then, they have expressed resistance to his return prior to general-elections — though it is unclear as to whether this is a reflection of the government’s needs or the wishes of the Bhutto camp.

Nawaz is reportedly to return to London after Eid. If proven to be true, it will indicate that Sharif and family were informed of this upon return to Saudi, as Kulsoom Nawaz made such claims early at that point. Also it would prove to partially explain the Sharif family’s relative quietness in the past few weeks. From London, the Sharif brothers could return to Pakistan between November and post-elections in January. Reports suggest family members will trickle into Pakistan individually. Nawaz’s son Hassan has said his father will return to Pakistan between November 15 and 30. A pre-election return is more likely for Shahbaz Sharif. Odds of a Nawaz return pre-elections would multiply if he got another Supreme Court ruling in his favor. If Nawaz returns after the general elections, he could shake things up if discontent in the PML-Q and with others is high. Alternatively, his return could come after the candles have been blow out and the cake has been eaten.

Najam Sethi has stated that the Bhutto-Musharraf understanding will likely produce a PPP government (and Musharraf presidency) at the center, a PML-Q controlled Punjab with a significant PPP presence, a PPP-PML coalition government in NWFP and Balochistan, and a PPP-MQM coalition government in Sindh.

I think Sethi errs in only noting three political mouths (other than his own) Musharraf has to feed. There’s a four rewardee, the JUI-F. Fazlur Rahman’s deeds on behalf of Musharraf in recent weeks, as well as in the past four years, cannot simply be wishful lobbying. JUI-F will likely play an important role in addressing issues of militancy in NWFP, Balochistan, and FATA. Washington probably recognizes and supports this. Moreover, it makes little sense for JUI-F to have enabled Musharraf’s re-election under the current parliament and the fracture of its political alliance only to be punished with a loss of provincial power.

The JUI-F will likely be a part of the NWFP government at least for the same reasons the MQM will share power with the PPP in Sindh. Both were used to displace the previous ruling party, which necessitates a ‘soft landing’ for them — especially since they’re still useful. The PPP’s Sindh compromise is a concession for power at the national level, though its relations with the MQM will have its share of challenges. Sethi doesn’t seem to give much thought to a PML-Q presence at the national level. Mushahid Hussain and others with the party have proposed the idea of a national unity government. While this remains possible, strong animosities between PML-Q stalwarts and the PPP, combined with Benazir Bhutto’s compromises vis-a-vis Musharraf, will likely prohibit her from entertaining such an idea. Why would she accept a prime ministership already diluted by the troika?

The general elections will be held under the rule of a caretaker government. At this point, there is only pure speculation as to who will be the interim prime minister. Candidates include: Jehangir Karamat, Ishrat Hussain, and Hamid Nasir Chattha. Tariq Aziz and Shujaat Hussain have been tasked with arranging for the interim set-up, but clearly Benazir will have significant input in these matters as they will factor significantly in the outcome of the elections (i.e. free and/or favorable).

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[Op-Ed] Obama, Osama and American Trauma (The Daily Times)

The Daily Times

August 18, 2007

By Arif Rafiq

Pakistan is emerging as a frontline state in yet another war: the battle for the presidency of the United States.

The firestorm caused by Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama’s roundly criticised pledge to violate Pakistani sovereignty should President Musharraf not respond to actionable intelligence concerning Al Qaeda has since subsided. But rather than letting out a sigh of relief, Islamabad should see Obama’s comments as an ominous sign of things to come.

The current US political environment makes Pakistan the ‘perfect culprit’ during high-stress periods in the American “war on terror” and is marked by increased levels of pessimism towards and opposition to the war in Iraq and an imminent, subverted, or successful terror plot against a Western country. A bi-partisan consensus on Iraq as an irreversible failure or a successful terrorist attack on European or US interests could put Pakistan in great difficulty.

There are two reasons for this push-Pakistan dynamic. First, it is easier to go after identifiable targets than an elusive adversary. Plus a thought is precipitating that the Taliban-Al Qaeda lifeline starts in Pakistan. If Pakistan is not effective in stemming the tide on its side, there is no point mopping up the floor in Afghanistan; the US should attempt to turn off the tap and that lies in Pakistan.

Second, it is election season in the US: partisan sentiments are high, terrorism is a major issue, and American voters prefer strength to weakness. Democrats largely favour a pullout from Iraq, but by no means will lay down their guns. They cannot be seen as pusillanimous, so they will replace ‘a war that cannot be won and should have never been fought’ (in Iraq) with the ‘real war Bush didn’t finish’ (in Pakistan-Afghanistan). The Pakistan card is the Democrats’ means to establish their national security credentials.

Republicans might have little choice but to join the chorus. This is an unlikely scenario and dependent on their abandoning Iraq and the easing of US-Iran tensions. The latter possibility would generate interest in and free up resources to focus on Pakistan and a ‘winnable war’.

But the most dangerous is the potential for unilateral action in Pakistan by the Bush administration. It is conceivable in two scenarios. In the first, a legacy-driven Bush administration in its last year in office is desperate to cap the war on terror and needs a ‘decisive’ achievement. It possesses what it believes trustworthy intelligence on the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri in the northwest of Pakistan. Pakistan’s ruler at the time is politically, militarily, and psychologically unable to act upon the information. Seeing its potentially last opportunity to apprehend or eliminate one or both of Al Qaeda’s top two vanishing, Bush authorises one or more of the following against the high-value target(s): a US Predator strike, capture by teams of US Special Forces, or elimination by a not-so-surgical air strike.

In the second scenario, Al Qaeda successfully attacks the US again and a mix of intelligence, assumptions, and political convenience help Washington conclude that the plot emanated from Pakistan. Not only does the American president authorise actions from scenario one against Al Qaeda in Pakistan, but sees fit and is compelled by political allies, opponents, and public opinion to punish Islamabad diplomatically, economically, and even militarily.

The range of potential punitive actions against Pakistan is wide and the resulting damage even wider. At its worst, Pakistan could be cemented as an economically backward, socially fragmented, politically unstable, militarily weak international pariah for decades.

So what must be done to prevent such a dire outcome? Islamabad must first appreciate that a worst-case scenario is indeed possible. Next, it must take preventative measures to reverse the push on Pakistan trend before it fully takes hold.

At home, it must work to develop a broad political coalition sufficient to decisively eliminate or apprehend those in Pakistan engaged in or plotting terror both within and outside of the country. Additionally, it needs to convince its sceptical populace of the need to confront terrorists militarily. Finally, it should wean the indigenous population of Waziristan from foreign terrorists that have entrenched themselves among them.

In the United States, Islamabad must commit to a pro-active and wide-ranging communications and diplomatic programme to reshape and consolidate elite and popular opinion of Pakistan. More specifically, it should help shape an American political discourse in which calls for unilateral strikes in or punitive actions against Pakistan by credible individuals are inconceivable.

Pakistan’s diplomats work most effectively with their American executive branch counterparts, but are ill-equipped to deal with the broad spectrum of actors involved in a potential push-Pakistan policy. The Pakistan Foreign Office must select appropriate internal and external talent to liaise with leading Democratic and Republican presidential campaigns; relevant members of Congress and staffers; editorial boards, news and opinion writers for key newspapers and major mainstream and partisan magazines; Middle East and South Asia experts in the US think tanks; hosts of major cable news and talk radio programmes and elite bloggers.

Islamabad must figure out how to ensure that its perspective is processed through the vast political machinery in Washington — the vast community that makes things happen. It can no longer afford to simply speak to the man at the top, especially since he is close to leaving.

Islamabad can take heed from its counterparts in Riyadh and Tel Aviv, who in recent years each tasked a young, media-savvy diplomat (versed in American, not British English) with speaking before the US media. The Saudis’ rocky road post-9/11 was softened by the smooth-talking Adel al-Jubair.

Additionally, the Pakistani government should invite each major presidential candidate and their foreign policy advisors to meet with senior political and military leaders. Briefings with top Pakistani officials and secure tours of areas close to the Pak-Afghan border will also help greatly in making these candidates understand the complexity of the situation. This would be timely and critical as US politicians’ perspectives on Pakistan are remarkably undereducated and fluid.

Lastly, Islamabad should also consider periodically embedding major print and electronic American journalists with Pakistani military units along the border with Afghanistan. Firsthand glimpses of Pakistani forces in action, combined with meeting families of slain Pakistani soldiers, best display Islamabad’s commitment to combat terrorism.

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Arif Rafiq, a Washington, DC-based consultant on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues. [About]

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Arif Rafiq regularly appears on the John Batchelor Show Friday nights from 09:30-10:00pm Eastern Time. Tune your dial to 770AM in New York or 630AM in DC. The show appears on affiliates in other cities. Listen live online at WABCRadio.com.
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