Below is my latest external piece, published at PostGlobal, a website run by WashingtonPost.com and Newsweek.com.

The published version contains edits (not by PostGlobal) I did not approve and does not include a major correction I submitted. Below is a more accurate version, which contains my approved edits and requested correction.

Recasting the U.S.-Pakistan Partnership
By Arif Rafiq

The need for the United States to redefine its relationship with Pakistan—a nuclear-armed, frontline state in the war on terror—has never been greater before. Now there is considerable opportunity to do so.

U.S. Senate Democrats issued a letter to George Bush this month urging him to “embark on a new relationship with Pakistan based on cooperation with institutions rather than individuals, and to support the will of the Pakistani people as expressed in the February 18 parliamentary elections.”

Historically, ties between the United States and Pakistan have been strongest with a Republican in the White House and an army general in power in Islamabad. In this scenario, Congress generally plays an antagonistic, if not wholly hostile role. The goodwill usually ends when Democrats in Washington and democrats in Islamabad govern. This has been the story of the on-again, off-again U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

The cycle could be broken in this period of transition with Democratic support for the new civilian government in Islamabad. But the lame duck administration in Washington must also follow suit.

In the Bush administration’s remaining months, it could do irreparable harm to our relationship with Pakistan, where democracy and nationalism have renewed. In a democratic Pakistan, decision-making will be less centralized and more representative of public opinion. But the Bush administration is increasingly acting unilaterally in Pakistan’s tribal areas and has aggressively tried to ensure a pliant government in Islamabad.

And so, amidst the opportunity for U.S.-Pakistan ties to grow also lies the seeds for their unraveling. Long-term, bilateral cooperation is in the interest of both countries, and needs to be secured. This requires recasting the U.S.-Pakistan partnership as one between sovereign democracies.

Toward this end, here are four recommendations for Washington policymakers:

1) Don’t interfere in Pakistan’s internal politics.
Washington has tried to assemble a coalition government to its liking, excluding Pakistan’s second largest party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). Such an approach has backfired, rewarding those who are seen as standing up to the United States. If Washington continues to overplay its hand, it can find such parties in power and itself, partnerless in Islamabad.

2) Engage the Pakistani people.
The United States, however, should make its voice heard in Pakistan. There is plenty of opportunity to do so. US officials visit Pakistan on an almost weekly basis, but rarely speak to the local media. American generals and diplomats appear on the pan-Arab Al Jazeera regularly, but their Pakistan outreach is scant. There’s no excuse for avoiding Pakistan’s news outlets, two of which are exclusively English-language.

Instead of making their case to the Pakistani people, U.S. officials prefer dealing with their Pakistani counterparts behind closed doors. As a result, Pakistanis see the United States not as a friend, but a bully. And the good that Washington does in Pakistan, such as providing Fulbright grants and funding civil society groups, goes vastly underappreciated.

3) Provide a sizable democracy dividend.
Pakistan’s two previous democratic periods were met with massive reductions in U.S. aid, facilitating their demise in a perpetually cash-strapped Pakistan. This time around, the United States should maintain military aid and follow Senator Joseph Biden’s proposal to triple non-military assistance to $1.5 billion.

Pakistan, though deeply impoverished, is an emerging market. Yet, its recent economic surge has produced few jobs. Washington’s help would be most effective in educational and infrastructural development. And it should actively consider a free trade agreement. Pakistan’s major industries, agriculture and textiles, are in a state of crisis. Eliminating trade barriers will make Pakistani exports more competitive, spur job growth, and easily win Pakistani hearts.

4) Forge a comprehensive Pakistan-Afghanistan policy.
Unilateralism and military force cannot defeat the insurgencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But a comprehensive, regional solution can. It would require wedging local militants from al-Qaeda, integrating Pakistani and Afghan insurgents into their respective political systems, and repairing Pakistan-Afghanistan ties.

Ending the insurgencies might also necessitate replacing U.S. and NATO forces with non-neighboring Muslim states such as Indonesia and Turkey. No occupying power has lasted longer than a decade in modern Afghanistan.

Our relations with Pakistan are at a decisive juncture. The current and next administration and Congress have an opportunity to strike a new deal with this nascent Muslim democracy, nuclear power, and pivotal country in a critical region. We cannot afford to let it pass by.

Arif Rafiq is a policy and communications consultant and editor of the Pakistan Policy Blog (www.pakistanpolicy.com).

Source: The Swamp

The letter below was signed by most Democrats in the Senate.

April 6, 2008
The President
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We write out of deep concern over the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan: the negligent policies of the last half-decade have permitted al-Qaeda and the Taliban to regenerate, and to pose a greater threat to the national security of the United States than at any point since September 11, 2001. In order to protect our homeland from attacks which may well be developing in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan at this very moment, we urge you to refocus the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and our national security resources on this region and implement a comprehensive new strategy to keep America safe.

For too long, this Administration has treated Southwest Asia as an afterthought, even as it committed more U.S. troops and treasure to the war in Iraq. The neglect of Afghanistan and Pakistan reflects a failure to recognize this region as the central battlefield in the war against al Qaeda. This Administration’s misguided priorities have deprived our military of the resources they need to win the fight against al Qaeda: as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen put it in December, “in Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.” The commander of American forces in the region, Admiral William Fallon, echoed the sentiment in January: “Back in 2001, early 2002, the Taliban were pretty much vanquished,” he said, “but my sense looking back is that we moved focus to Iraq, which was the priority from 2003 on, and the attention and the resources focused on a different place.”

Such neglect cannot continue indefinitely without endangering not only Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the safety of America as well. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently expressed concern that the shadow of Iraq was decreasing public support in NATO countries for the war effort in Afghanistan. A prominent nonpartisan report chaired by Marine General (Ret.) James L. Jones and former Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering urged that the United States “decouple” the two conflicts— both in funding and in diplomacy. We urge you to take this advice, in order to prevent the war in Iraq from further impeding our vital struggle against our most dangerous enemies.

More than six years after the ouster of the Taliban, the promises made by this Administration for success in Afghanistan remain further than ever from being fulfilled. As the Jones-Pickering report notes, “The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive strategy.” Security has been gravely degraded throughout much of the nation, with the Taliban making much of the country ungovernable and ravaging the capitol itself by frequent bombings and suicide attacks. According to testimony presented by Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell in late February, the central government of Afghanistan controls less than one-third of the country’s territory. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples has said that al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan is “increasing to levels unseen since 2001-2002.”

On this Administration’s watch, Afghanistan has become a virtual narco-state supplying 93% of the world’s opium and heroin, while drug-fuelled corruption and warlordism are recreating the chaos that enabled the Taliban to seize power in the 1990s. Your pledge of a reconstruction program on the scale of the Marshall Plan remains an unfulfilled promise, and the lack of adequate development has undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government and increased popular support for our enemies.

The situation in Pakistan is just as troubling. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s top leadership remain at large, most likely in the sanctuary of Pakistani territory near the Afghan border—and a new generation of terrorists move and operate openly there, free to plot new attacks against our homeland. According to the declassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate of July 2007 entitled The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, al-Qaeda has “protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistani Federal Administered Tribal Areas.”

The recent election in Pakistan provides a rare opportunity to chart a new and more effective course in our two nations’ counter-terrorism partnership. Much of the Pakistani population believes that this Administration has used, and is still using, the weight of the United States government to bolster President Pervez Musharraf rather than facilitate a democratic transition. We urge you to embark on a new relationship with Pakistan based on cooperation with institutions rather than individuals, and to support the will of the Pakistani people as expressed in the February 18 parliamentary elections. Promoting democracy and legitimate government is not only in line with our nation’s core values, but also with our national security interests: Every day that the Pakistani government remains distracted by political uncertainty is a day when the intelligence, military, police and other resources of its government will be diverted from the fight against terrorists who threaten the lives of Pakistanis and Americans alike.

An al Qaeda attack on the U.S. homeland would likely originate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. We urge you to work with Congress on a comprehensive new strategy—to change course now, while time still remains. Clearly, a bold new plan is urgently needed. Our nation cannot afford to stand by while the danger to the region—and to America—grows stronger day by the day.

The dire threats facing Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked: there can be no successful policy in either country without a comprehensive strategy for both. Given the urgency of the threat, we look forward to your prompt response.

Excerpt:

“Third, we must dedicate sufficient resources to secure Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership – including Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri – has reportedly reconstituted to pre-9/11 strength in safe-havens along the Afghanistan / Pakistan border. This was exacerbated when your Administration supported a Pakistani peace deal in the tribal areas giving al Qaeda’s senior leadership time to regroup in this border area. We must refocus our attention on this grave and growing Al Qaeda threat, increasing our military, diplomatic, and economic development efforts in both countries, instead of tying up the bulk of our resources in Iraqi internal sectarian violence.”

Full Text:

April 4, 2008
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The war in Iraq is in its sixth year. More than 4,000 Americans have been killed and 30,000 wounded in a conflict which has already cost the nation’s taxpayers more than half a trillion dollars. In our nation’s long history since securing our independence, only one war, Vietnam, has been longer and only one, World War II, has been more costly. We are deeply concerned that you and the congressional Republican leadership are intent on staying the current course throughout your Administration and then handing the Iraq war off to future presidents. Indeed, some in your party have indicated we should be prepared to stay in Iraq for fifty or even one hundred years. That would only compound the damage done to our national security by years of flawed Iraq policies. The American people favor and our national security demands a different, better way. We salute the courage and hard work of our troops during more than five years of dangerous and difficult service. But the strategic purpose of the surge strategy you announced more than a year ago – creating the conditions for Iraqis to forge a political solution in order to hasten the day our troops can return home – has not been achieved. In fact, your Administration recently indicated that more U.S. troops will remain deployed in Iraq after the surge has ended than were there when the surge began. This is not what the American people were led to expect when you announced the surge nearly fifteen months ago. The current Iraq strategy has no discernible end in sight and requires the United States to spend additional hundreds of billions of dollars despite urgent national needs in education, health care, and infrastructure improvement, and when high oil prices have provided the Iraqi government with billions in additional revenue that could pay for their own redevelopment and security. This strategy is neither sustainable nor in our broader national security or economic interest. That is why we favor the following four-part strategy to change course:

First, we must urgently seek political accommodation among Iraqis and transition the U.S. mission in Iraq. Our military has done its best in Iraq; it is time for the Iraqis and the Administration’s civilian leaders to do their part. The current Administration policy fails to hold the Iraqis accountable for the lack of progress on political reconciliation and instead holds our troops hostage to an ineffective government. We must demand that others who are key to progress in Iraq exhibit the bravery, creativity and urgency that our troops have shown. We must shift to what General Petraeus has termed a posture of strategic overwatch so that we create additional incentives for the Iraqis to embrace political accommodation which will allow us to reduce US troop levels substantially and devote more of our resources to a number of other important national security challenges. We will also continue to insist on a strong Congressional role in shaping any long-term security arrangements pertaining to Iraq. Your Administration should not create facts that bind the hands of the next president.

Second, we must restore the highest state of readiness to our Army and Marine Corps. Repeated and extended deployments to Iraq have greatly strained our military’s capabilities. Readiness has sunk to levels not seen since Vietnam. Units do not have enough time at home to achieve through training the full-spectrum combat capabilities on which our security depends. We have no ready reserve for an unexpected crisis. We must begin immediately to restore the readiness of our Army and Marine Corps by returning to 12 month deployments, and providing active and reserve units sufficient time at home between deployments to retrain and reequip. We must also continue to provide our warriors, wounded warriors, and veterans with the benefits and services they deserve.

Third, we must dedicate sufficient resources to secure Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership – including Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri – has reportedly reconstituted to pre-9/11 strength in safe-havens along the Afghanistan / Pakistan border. This was exacerbated when your Administration supported a Pakistani peace deal in the tribal areas giving al Qaeda’s senior leadership time to regroup in this border area. We must refocus our attention on this grave and growing Al Qaeda threat, increasing our military, diplomatic, and economic development efforts in both countries, instead of tying up the bulk of our resources in Iraqi internal sectarian violence.

Finally, we must tackle broader challenges of regional stability. We must address two important security challenges – Iran and the ongoing turmoil that confronts our ally Israel and moderate Arab regimes, particularly Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. Regional stability is being hindered by the Administration’s Iraq strategy. The long-term challenge posed by Iran requires serious and sustained diplomatic and political effort, and the current Iraq policy is undermining our ability to meet that challenge. The Administration has not yet engaged in effective diplomacy to work with regional and international partners to forge a longer-term regional security architecture. We believe you must pursue an energetic and effective diplomatic effort to get others in the region invested in addressing Iraq’s political, economic and security issues as well as these broader regional stability challenges.

We believe there is still time for you to recognize that a change in strategy is necessary to repair the grave damage done to our nation’s security. We are committed to bringing about the necessary changes of course articulated in the four-part plan above and hope you will work with us. Implementing elements of this plan will be the focus of our legislative efforts. At the same time as we move forward legislatively, we will press for accountability and oversight on the increasing costs and devastating consequences that the current strategy is having on our national security posture. And Congress and its committees will be preparing to ensure the smoothest possible transition for the next President.

Thank you for the opportunity to share these views. We look forward to a vigorous debate this spring on these critically important strategic questions.

Sincerely,
Nancy Pelosi
Speaker of the House

Harry Reid
Senate Majority Leader

Steny H. Hoyer
House Majority Leader

Richard J. Durbin
Senate Assistant Majority Leader

David R. Obey
Chairman, House Appropriations Committee

Robert C. Byrd
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee

Ike Skelton
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

Carl Levin
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

Howard Berman
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Joseph R. Biden Jr.
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Silvestre Reyes
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

John Murtha
Chairman, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee

Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee

Nita Lowey
Chairwoman, House State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee

Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman, Senate State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee

Hillary Rodham Clinton, an aspirant for the Democratic presidential nomination, released today her plan for Afghanistan-Pakistan, which she describes as the “forgotten front line” in the war on terror.  The New York senator called for the appointment of a special envoy to Pakistan-Afghanistan “to develop a regional strategy to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.” She stressed on the linked fates of both countries:

“Providing security to Afghanistan cannot be accomplished without greater security on the Afghan-Pakistan border and greater stability within Pakistan.”

The plan leans toward viewing Pakistan within the prism of Afghan stability.  In doing so, it reflects a prevailing weakness with the U.S. foreign policy establishment — namely, subsuming a pivotal country of 165 million population country under a critical, but more peripheral nation of 30 million.  A substantive Pakistan policy would require an appreciation of the country on its own right and not simply how it pertains to the challenges, real as they may be, in Afghanistan.  It necessitates a paradigmatic shift that gives greater weight to Pakistan in the Pak-Afghan equation.  For long, U.S. policymakers have overly prioritized the Afghan side of the border.  Active consideration must also be given to how policies in and toward Kabul impact Islamabad.

Clinton’s plan does offer four Pakistan-specific proposals:

• moving beyond a Musharraf-centric policy and toward a broader engagement of political and civil society actors in Pakistan;
• increasing non-military assistance to the country (“aid should be targeted at strengthening democratic institutions, building civil society, and improving economic and educational opportunities. A stable and democratic Pakistan will be a stronger security partner for the United States in the years ahead.”);
• making military assistance more accountable (no explanation of how);
• improving Pakistan-India relations (no specifics; did not mention the “K”-word).

This plan follows her January statement calling for the joint British-American oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.  Also, in recent weeks, Clinton has appropriated the Republican talking points accusing Obama of threatening to attack Pakistan.

Polls concerning U.S.-Pakistan relations tend to focus on how Pakistanis view the United States.  A new Gallup survey provides a look at the flip side.  How do Americans view Pakistan?

Pakistan is one of the most unfavorably viewed countries.  Seventy two percent of Americans polled have negative views on Pakistan.  It trails Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, but finds itself ahead of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian Authority, North Korea, and Iran.  Republicans are almost twice more likely than Democrats to view Pakistan positively.

By Arif Rafiq

[Published in the Daily Star (Lebanon), Daily Times (Pakistan), and Guardian's Comment is Free]

President George W Bush rightly called Pakistan’s recent national and provincial elections “a victory for [its] people”. But, even as he uttered those words, his administration was working behind the scenes to subvert the will of Pakistan’s people by trying to dictate the composition of their next coalition government and prop up the election’s biggest loser, President Pervez Musharraf. Bush is playing a dangerous game, risking the collapse of Pakistan’s political process for the sake of his own legacy.

Millions of Pakistanis delivered a clear message at the polls. Collectively, they voted against Musharraf and religious extremists, and in favor of democracy, the rule of law, and good governance.

Nationally, no single party received a majority, but the centrist, democratic opposition won more than 70% of the national assembly seats. The Musharraf-allied faction of the Muslim League party (PML-Q) came in third, polling only 15%, despite the assistance of surgical vote-rigging. Most of its senior leaders were defeated in their constituencies – including one who hadn’t lost an election in 26 years. The PML-Q, created in 1999 by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, is now political deadwood.

An alliance between the two largest parties, the late Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League faction (PML-N) is what the country needs and what most Pakistanis want. The PPP and PML-N have the numbers to form a unity government. They also realize that this is perhaps their last chance to “save” Pakistan.

Together with the pro-democracy army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, this coalition can address Pakistan’s most pressing challenges, including terrorism. With the addition of smaller parties and independents to the coalition, they can also impeach Musharraf and restore the judiciary, which he had deposed. This is unpalatable to the Bush administration, which has helped keep Musharraf in power, despite the fact that 75% of Pakistanis want him to resign.

The Bush administration finds the PML-N’s nationalism and antagonism to Musharraf particularly troublesome. Sharif has called for Pakistan’s foreign policy to be debated in parliament, but supports continued cooperation with the United States. His party also wants the sacked Supreme Court justices to be restored.

The US government, however, endorsed the justice’s illegal removal, seeing the court’s insistence on constitutional accountability for Musharraf as complicating its regional objectives. The court, for example, required Musharraf to present alleged terror suspects – some of whom were likely “rendered” to Pakistan by the CIA – detained for years without government acknowledgment.

Of course, a popular, democratically elected government and an independent judiciary in Islamabad complicate relations with the US. Democracy is intrinsically messy, but it won’t jeopardise Pakistan’s partnership in the war on terror. The Bush administration, however, has become used to dealing with one man and is increasingly impatient. In its final year, it would like to increase the odds of a Republican victory in November’s US presidential election. Toward this end, progress in Pakistan and Afghanistan would be highly valuable.

As a result, the Bush administration is aggressively interfering in coalition talks between Pakistan’s political parties. It wants to pair the PPP with the discredited PML-Q and isolate the PML-N. US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, for example, has held a joint meeting with senior Musharraf advisor, Tariq Aziz, and PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto’s widower.

Vice-President Dick Cheney’s office also is reportedly playing an active role. Zardari, in a joint press conference with Sharif, refused to answer a question about whether there is pressure from the US to ally with Musharraf. But he and Sharif did agree “in principle” to form a government.

The Bush administration’s forceful manipulation of Pakistan’s political leadership is dangerous for both Pakistan and the US. Its favoured arrangement could divide the opposition, keep Musharraf ascendant, and provide continuity in the Pakistan army’s campaign against militants. But it would also likely de-legitimise the next government before it comes into power, rupture Pakistan’s largest political party, and create a nationalist backlash against the US.

The US needs to take a step back and let Pakistan’s political process proceed naturally. The end result might not be optimal, but if the Bush administration overplays its hand, it could find itself partnerless in Pakistan.

In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2008.

Pakistan is again the focus of The Atlantic Monthly in its regularly surveying of American foreign policy experts. It asked 41 foreign policy authorities:

• Should the United States unilaterally go after al-Qaeda leaders and training camps in Pakistan?
  • Results: 50% Yes; 50% No
• How likely is a U.S. incursion into the tribal areas in the next two years?
  • Results: 65% Somewhat Likely; 18% Highly Likely; 17% Highly Unlikely

It should be noted that none of those surveyed were Pakistan or South Asia specialists.

Some selected responses to the first question:

• Yes:
  • “While it was a reasonable balancing of risks to give the Pakistanis the time and space to deal with the re-growth of al-Qaeda base on their territory, that time has now passed as it has become clear that they have neither the will or capability to do so. It would certainly be better to do this with stealth than with a large footprint operation, but the time for a direct response is now.”
  • “As al-Qaeda gets stronger in Pakistan and as its leaders elevate their public profile in the shadow of Musharraf’s troubles, the pressure on the administration to do ‘something’ will be high, and it is possible that they will carry out some action to respond to domestic pressure during an election year.”

• No:
  • “Unless we can be (and how could we be?) 100% sure of finding and capturing Osama Bin Laden himself, the downside—in Pakistan above all but [also] in the Muslim world at large—of being seen to trample on Pakistani sovereignty and to attack and kill Muslims in a Muslim land would be immense, with no comparable gain.”
  • “[It is] better at this point to seek joint operations with Pakistani forces. Unilateral operations by the United States, except in the event of a devastating terrorist strike in the United States shown to emanate from the tribal areas, would be hard to justify and [would] produce a counterproductive backlash in Pakistan.”
  • “Even the best planned raids and air strikes come with probabilities and risks attached, but we should have learned that American unilateralism, especially when other people die, invariably comes with a heavy price tag.”

Participants: Graham Allison, Ronald Asmus, Samuel Berger, Daniel Blumenthal, Stephen Bosworth, Daniel Byman, Warren Christopher, Wesley Clark, Ivo Daalder, Douglas Feith, Jay Garner, Leslie Gelb, Marc Grossman, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Bruce Hoffman, Laura Holgate, John Hulsman, Robert Hunter, Tony Judt, Robert Kagan, David Kay, Andrew Krepinevich, Charles Kupchan, John Lehman, James Lindsay, Edward Luttwak, John McLaughlin, William Nash, Joseph Nye, Carlos Pascual, Thomas Pickering, Paul Pillar, Kenneth Pollack, Joseph Ralston, Susan Rice, Wendy Sherman, Anne-Marie Slaughter, James Steinberg, Shibley Telhami, Anthony Zinni.

In an address earlier this morning at a New Hampshire college, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, announced a fairly comprehensive Pakistan policy — the first candidate to do so.

It consists of four main elements:

1. “Triple non-security aid, to $1.5 billion annually.  For at least a decade.  This aid would be unconditioned: it’s our pledge to the Pakistani people.  Instead of funding military hardware, it would build schools, clinics, and roads.”
2. “Condition security aid on performance. We should base our security aid on clear results.   We’re now spending well over $1 billion annually, and it’s not clear we’re getting our money’s worth.  I’d spend more if we get better returns—and less if we don’t.”
3. “Help Pakistan enjoy a ‘democracy dividend.’  The first year of democratic rule should bring an additional $1 billion — above the $1.5 billion non-security aid baseline.  And I would tie future non-security aid — again, above the guaranteed baseline — to Pakistan’s progress in developing democratic institutions and meeting good-governance norms. ”
4. “Engage the Pakistani people, not just their rulers.  This will involve everything from improved public diplomacy and educational exchanges to high impact projects that actually change people’s lives.“
   

His speech’s conclusion is noteworthy:

“I believe that Pakistan can be a bridge between the West and the global Islamic community.  Most Pakistanis want a lasting friendship with America.  They respect and admire our society.  But they are mystified over what they see as our failure to live up to our ideals.

The current crisis in Pakistan is also an opportunity to start anew… to build a relationship between Pakistan and the United States upon which both our peoples can depend – and be proud.”

NOTE: Bush in joint press conference with France’s Sarkozy speaks of his telephone conversation with Musharraf in which he told him, “You can’t be the president and the head of the military at the same time.” He added that extremism can’t be beaten with extremist tactics.

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte just completed his testimony on Pakistan before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Here are the highlights:

• Pakistan is a country vital to U.S. interests;
• Cooperation with Pakistan is critical to U.S. and NATO’s cause in Afghanistan and contributes heavily to efforts in war on terror;
• Pakistan was “founded on a democratic mandate” and has made “fitful” progress toward the idea of democratic civilian rule. It “seemed” to be on that path till recently.
• State “strongly counseled against” the imposition of emergency rule but Pakistan’s leadership chose not to follow that advice.
• Over time the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been tumultuous, but after 9/11 Musharraf decided to ally with us. We are together with the Pakistanis in the fight against al-Qaeda.
• Many Pakistanis have said that the U.S. has not been a consistent partner. There is, however, no question that Americans have a stake in Pakistan. There is no question that the U.S. should be closely engaged in helping the Pakistani people fight violent extremism and shaping a democratic Pakistan.
• We strongly disagree with the current government’s decisions, but this should not translate into disengagement.
• Since 9/11:
  • the Pakistani government has arrested or killed more al-Qaeda and Taliban than any other country;
  • Pakistan’s economy has grown rapidly;
  • civil society and media have grown “events of of recent days notwithstanding”;
    • There is a more participatory national debate;
    • Human rights and civil society organizations are more prominent than in the past;
    • Pakistan has become a more moderate and prosperous country since Musharraf has come into power;
    • But only civilian democracy can secure a prosperous future for Pakistan.
• “We” urge Musharraf to resign as chief of army staff before he takes the oath for a second term;
• It won’t be a full transition to democracy, but an important step on that path;
• The U.S. stands with the Pakistani people in urging the government to commit to holding elections as planned. We are doing our part through assistance program to improve electoral mechanisms;
• Thanks to bi-partisan congressional support, assistance to Pakistan is accomplishing a great deal for the U.S. and the Pakistani people:
  • Earthquake assistance has had a positive impact generating goodwill that has lasted to this day;
  • FATA aid package will permanently open this challenged environment to government and opportunity; there are a wide range of programs for that area:
    • Security and law enforcement training;
    • Developmental assistance;
    • Democracy and human rights support;
    • Infrastructural aid;
  • This assistance and the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation are critical to achieving our objectives in the war on terror.
• Military training and Fulbright exchange programs are building essential bridges;
• Cutting off these programs would send a negative signal to the Pakistani people;
• Long-term engagement is the only option for the United States;
• The U.S. cannot afford to have the on-again off-again relationship of the past;
• Pakistan’s future is too vital to our interests to ignore or downgrade;
• The challenge is to deal with the government that supports the Pakistani people and strengthens moderate center against violent extremism;
• With strong Congressional support for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2001, we’ve helped the Pakistanis move down the path of moderation, stability, democracy, and prosperity. We’re asking for Congressional support to renew our commitment to long-term partnership with the Pakistani people;
• There is not a mission more deserving of our considered patience and steady engagement.

Q&A responses:

• “I believe they [the Pakistani military] have their nuclear weapons under effective control.”
• Electoral timetable should be adhered to. If the emergency measures are lifted in the near future, then there is still time to organize “reasonably fair and free elections.” The longer this emergency situation goes on, the more difficult the political atmosphere will become.
• Strong preference is that the government terminate emergency ASAP and get country back on track. Sooner that happens, not only the better for Pakistan’s political development, but also less likely that some agonizing reappraisal of assistance program would be required.
• A number of statutes govern assistance to Pakistan. State hasn’t really gotten to the point of looking to alternatives. Just cataloging of assistance programs and what is or might not be impacted by statues.
• Judgment at the moment: There’s nothing that will be automatically triggered by the current situation. Everything is covered at the moment by appropriate waivers. But if the situation continues, it will undercut the political support for assistance, or certain aspects of it.
• U.S. has a Pakistan policy, not a Musharraf policy. It’s not about one leader. It’s about: helping a country; helping institutions transition, electoral assistance; and developing FATA; support of Pakistani army and government in supporting us in Afghanistan.
• “Basically the political future of Pakistan is for the people of Pakistan to decide.”
• The longer this situation goes on the more difficult it is going to become.
• “In the historical record, there were times that they [India] did try to take advantage of political instability in Pakistan” but don’t appear to be doing that now.”
• If Musharraf doesn’t take off the uniform, there will be principal political repercussions inside Pakistan.
• On Nawaz Sharif’s exile: That’s an issue between the government of Pakistan and Mr. Sharif. Apparently committed to staying out of the country for a decade – we’ll just have to see how that issue evolves.
• Extremists are not many in number, but use more extreme methods and are dangerous in that regard.

Congressmen comments:

• William Delahunt interrupted Negroponte and said, waving his finger and apparently angry, “I think the Pakistani people are on our side.”
• Dana Rohrabacher: “It’s time to drop this guy [Musharraf]” and side with the moderates.
• Elliot Engel: Nawaz Sharif also needs to come back.
• Gary Ackerman: Musharraf a “necessary thug.”
• Dan Burton: If we abandon Musharraf, same thing that happned in Iran with the Shah will happen in a nuclear Pakistan.

• Bush: Musharraf must hold elections and resign from army
  
• Rice criticizes imposition of emergency rule; states U.S. aid to Pakistan “under review”
• Musharraf meets with U.S. ambassador
  
• Martha Raddatz/ABC NEWS: CENTOM chief “visibly upset” after leaving Friday meeting with Musharraf
• Tuesday’s U.S.-Pakistan defense talks delayed
• WEDNESDAY: Deputy Sec. of State Negroponte to testify before House on Pakistan

The trio of the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia constitutes Pakistan’s most important foreign benefactors. All eyes, however, are on Washington this week as observers are looking to see the Bush administration will change its Pakistan policy in response to Pervez Musharraf’s imposition of emergency rule.

Washington’s reaction is highly important because of the strategic necessity of bilateral cooperation for both countries – especially at this time and juncture.

WHY ISLAMABAD NEEDS WASHINGTON

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID: Pakistan is a leading destination of U.S. foreign aid (total — not per capita). It has received approximately $10 billion in assistance from Washington since 2002. This figure was dished out a lot on the Sunday talk shows and is probably included in every presidential candidate’s talking points now. Expect to hear it repeatedly incessantly as Pakistan remains a hot issue in the U.S. over the coming months.

Washington’s aid serves to compensate Islamabad for costs incurred in its support for the war on terror, subsidize the modernization of Pakistan’s military, and provide macroeconomic stability. It helps further the Musharraf regime’s primary policy objectives: structural economic reform; maintaining conventional military parity with India; and ensuring the support of current and ex-military brass by distributing the spoils from the war on terror.

SOLE SUPERPOWER + REGIONAL FOOTING: At a broader level, Washington is a global hegemon with footprints in Pakistan’s proximity and serious long-term interests in the region. It does not serve the interest of Pakistan, nor any other state for that matter, to incur its unfettered wrath. Non-state actors, in contrast, have a different calculus marked by far less territorial and infrastructural risk.

There is a naive belief in Pakistan, including lately with some of Musharraf’s supporters, that — if necessary — they can ditch the United States and totally rely on China. But this route would only buy the current regime a few months. It’s not tenable beyond that. Pakistan would sent on the path of Myanmar — a pariah run by a military junta. In 1971, the army wrongly assumed that China would offer support after India’s entry into Pakistan’s civil war. But China did little for them then and expectations of what it can and will do now should be measured.

WHY WASHINGTON NEEDS ISLAMABAD

In the past, Washington wiped its hands clean of Islamabad upon the temporary cessation of the latter’s strategic utility. But in the short-term, and indeed beyond, it remains in the U.S. interest to have strong ties with Pakistan.

STABILIZING AFGHANISTAN: In the short to mid-term, the Pakistan-Afghanistan region along with Iran and Iraq constitute the three major strategic-military arenas for the United States. Pakistan shares a 1600 mile border with Afghanistan and provides critical supply routes for NATO forces in Afghanistan. Its frontier and tribal areas are an extension of NATO’s war in Afghanistan. Stabilizing Afghanistan, to some extent, requires a resolution to the Pak-Afghan border dispute and Pakistan’s crisis of governance in the northwest.

IRAN: Pakistan might provide critical air space in a future U.S. military campaign against Iran. IPI pipeline. More on Iran.

EMERGING ECONOMY: Pakistan is a massive country with a population over 160 million. A majority of its population is poor and illiterate, but Pakistan is an emerging market with one of the world’s best performing bourses and a growing — but increasingly strained — middle class.

NUCLEAR POWER: A nuclear power, elements within Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex have been part of the most active proliferation network. Though Pakistan’s nukes are firmly in the hands of its military and secured by a solid command and control structure, it is in Washington’s interest to ensure that these weapons are in the hands of individuals least likely to utilize or lend them.

MUSLIM DEMOCRACY: The world’s second largest Muslim country, Pakistan has greater democratic credentials than its Arab brethren and – with a mix of good policy and luck – can become a model Muslim democracy.

ENERGY CORRIDOR: Strategically located between Persian Gulf and Central Asian energy suppliers and growing consumers India and China, Pakistan and its new port city of Gwadar promises to become vital trans-Asian energy corridor/transit point in the coming years and decades.

WHAT WILL WASHINGTON DO?

In assessing Washington’s ‘final’ response to emergency rule in Pakistan, I would take the words of Tariq Fatemi, a retired senior Pakistani diplomat, as a guiding reference. He stated Sunday morning (New York time) on GEO that the U.S. and other western countries will express “regret and expectation of improvement”, but in the end it will be business as usual. Their primary interests in Pakistan, he added, center on three things:

1. The war on terror;
2. Continuation of military campaigns along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border;
3. Ensuring Pakistan’s help in a war against Iran.

Indeed, this theme was echoed by conservative commentator Brit Hume on Fox News Sunday. Describing Musharraf as a “bulwark” for the U.S., Hume noted that the current crisis presents a huge foreign policy dilemma for Washington, but there could be a plus side: Musharraf could more effectively help the U.S. under the current arrangement, i.e. emergency rule. In the end, he says, “We’ll make statements, issue urgings, and hold our nose and go on.”

But the situation in Pakistan is highly fluid and both the courses taken by the administrations in Islamabad and Washington will depend largely on the level of the street protests in Pakistan.

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated in a press conference earlier today,”Now is not the time for threatening aid that effect the Pakistani people.” He stated that the “next few weeks will be critical [for Pakistan” — the time frame he mentioned suggests this is perhaps the window Washington is giving Musharraf to resolve things.

However, it might not take too long to get a sense of the path Washington takes on Pakistan. By the middle of the week, we’ll perhaps have come a long way from CENTOM Chief Admiral William Fallon’s long meeting with Musharraf, which — according ABC News’ Martha Raddatz — he left “visibly upset” after failing to convince the Pakistani president not to impose emergency rule.

On Wednesday, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on “Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan.” He will be grilled by Tom Lantos, Gary Ackerman, and Dana Rohrabacher in a full committee hearing. In anticipation, Negroponte and State will likely have to ready to produce some concrete positions and not simply dance around in diplomatic language.

An important factor could be whether Rice feels she has been ‘burned’ by Islamabad. Emergency rule was imposed despite her warnings against it. Moreover, it was implemented while she was busy in Turkey mediating between Turkish, Iraqi, and Kurdish parties.

Another factor are the rivalries within the Bush administration. Its Pakistan policy has been shaped significantly by the office of the vice president, which has proven to be recklessly obstinate and could advise “staying the course.” Moreover, Rice has her hands full with the ‘revived’ Israeli-Palestinian talks and Turkey-Iraq-Kurd problem. She reportedly had difficulty reaching Musharraf today — but did eventually manage to speak with him. An overwhelmed Rice could be more patient with a beleagured Musharraf, perhaps letting Cheney’s office remain in the driver’s seat. Alternatively, she could put on her black skirt and stiletto boots and make an impromptu visit to Islamabad and play hardball with Musharraf (she is in Jerusalem after all).

In short, the Bush administration hopes for things to settle down and for Musharraf to reverse his extra-constitutional moves, resign from the army, and continue as president. However, Musharraf has likely moved beyond the point of no return. Washington should help construct a safe, immediate exit for him and leverage the current climate to help produce a democratic Pakistan in which strong political parties, judiciary, and army work in concert to tackle the country’s many challenges, including terrorism, poverty, illiteracy, and establishing the rule of law.