The cease fire is apparently over. Earlier today, a suicide bomber attacked the vehicle of Lt. Gen. Mushtaq Ahmad Baig, the surgeon general of the Pakistani Army, killing him and eight others–including five civilians. There is no reason to believe he was personally targeted by the bomber. Inter-Services Public Relations spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas said that the attacker, disguised as a beggar, was “just waiting for a senior army officer” and detonated himself at a traffic signal “when he saw a staff car with the signature of a senior officer.”

Lt. Gen. Baig headed the Army Medical Corps and likely lacked the security detail provisioned to officers of similar rank within the army’s mainstream. He was apparently traveling in a black Toyota Corolla with a Pakistan Army license plate (see left). Previous attacks on the military in Rawalpindi have focused on softer, more vulnerable targets, such as employee buses. As I have written earlier, the army needs to enact more comprehensive security measures. This is essential toward renewing morale within the institution and denying the militants tactical victories.

Testimonials from those who knew the late Lt. Gen Baig center on his humility, religious piety, and professional excellence as a physician.

The team from Scotland Yard investigating the assassination of Benazir Bhutto released their final report today. Its two major conclusions: head trauma caused by the bomb blast killed Benazir Bhutto and the suicide bomber and the gunman were the same person.

The report states:

“Ms Bhutto’s only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head. The UK experts all exclude this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot.”

“…the UK Home Office pathologist…is unable categorically to exclude the possibility of there being a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck. However…the available evidence suggests that there was no gunshot injury….Dr Cary excludes the possibility of a bullet to the neck or upper trunk as being a relevant factor in the actual cause of death, when set against the nature and extent of her head injury.”

Dr. Nathaniel Cary, the UK Home Office pathologist, is quoted as stating:

“the only tenable cause for the rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb-blast.”

“in my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb-blast and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle.”

“All the available evidence points toward the person who fired shots and the person who detonated the explosives being one and the same person.”

The report’s conclusions are unlikely to satisfy a considerable number of Pakistanis, and in particular, People’s Party leaders and supporters who strongly believe an assassin’s blow took Bhutto’s life.

Rehman Malik, Benazir Bhutto’s security chief, stated on GEO TV that Scotland Yard had a “limited mandate” and did not produce “a conclusive report.” He seemed unprepared to deal with the report’s technical aspects, admitting that he did not read it in full, though he argued among the remaining questions is that of who financed the plot. Sherry Rehman, a senior PPP spokesperson, also did not read the entire report but maintained the party’s position that Bhutto died from an assassin’s blow.

If the People’s Party continues in its rejection of the report’s findings, it will find difficulty gaining international and institutional credence if it cannot rebut them on a technical basis. Its call for a Hariri-like UN investigation has gone ignored and there is little will among the major global powers to concede to one.  Should the People’s Party come to power after the coming elections, it can perhaps obtain a rival third-party report.  Otherwise, Bhutto’s assassination will remain a passively contested issue.

The Scotland Yard report can be seen as a victory for the Musharraf government, which has contended that head trauma associated with the blast, not an assassin’s blow, killed Bhutto. It will, however, not temper the skepticism of most Pakistanis toward the claims made by Musharraf and Britain, one of his Western benefactors.

[Full text of report]

Pakistan continues along a mixed, though largely negative trajectory as the spate of urban suicide bombing continues and insurgents make bold moves in South Waziristan, while the army strengthens its control over Swat and leaders flinch toward national reconciliation. The army’s immediate workload increases, but Gen. Ashfaq Kayani takes clear steps to depoliticize the institution. In both Pakistan and Afghanistan, efforts toward dividing and containing the Taliban continue. Election campaigning proceeds, though in a less spirited fashion prior to Benazir Bhutto’s assassination.

Terrorist Strikes Shi’a Gathering in Peshawar
A teenage suicide bomber clad in black struck an imambargah, a site for ritualistic mourning for Shi’a Muslims, in Peshawar today, the seventh day of the month of Muharram. This month is significant for all Muslims, but it holds a particular importance for the Shi’a. Their commemoration crescendos on the tenth day, Ash’ura, as they mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussain. Ash’ura falls on Sunday; the army, local police, and private mosque security squads are under high alert. However, that will not preclude attacks such as today’s from occurring. The bomber that struck the imambargah today detonated his device after being stopped by police, killing ten individuals. Targeting the Shi’a is a major point of convergence for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and various southern Punjabi Sunni militant groups.

Swat and Getting Swatted
Pakistan’s army continues to make gains in Swat, a settled, scenic valley in the North-West Frontier Province. According to Director General Military Operations Maj. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Operation Rah-e Haq has been successfully completed. The army, he says, established its hold over the area in late December, killing or apprehending major militants associated with Maulana Fazlullah, who remains holed up in a mountainous area packed in by recent heavy snowfall. It is now making steps toward issuing a compensation and development package for the area and has replaced Fazlullah’s FM radio station with several of its own. The speed and effectiveness of the government’s resettlement of internally displaced people and restoring the civil administration and political parties remains significant. Half-hearted measures will only result in local discontent that Fazlullah or a subsequent variant can feed off of.

In a marked contrast to the government’s military success in Swat, it continues to struggle in South Waziristan. This week, two forts were taken over by insurgents, who had little trouble combating the undertrained and ill-equipped paramilitary Frontier Corps. Their Wednesday night attack on a fort, which they held and then withdrew from, was made by a group of 200-1,000 men, overwhelming the 40 FC troops stationed there.

This large scale attack by neo-Taliban affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud is the first of its kind as guerrilla tactics are normally used. If this marks a strategic shift for Mehsud, it is both an alarming development for Pakistan’s military as well as a potential source of opportunity. Its success in Swat was partially precipitated by the overstretching of Maulana Fazlullah’s forces, though Fazlullah’s group is vastly smaller and less sophisticated and armed than Mehsud’s. And so if Mehsud’s forces press toward Pakistani military installations in large numbers, they provide an opportunity to be eliminated in larger numbers of them in a short amount of time with an aerial assault. That is why Mehsud group did not hold on to the fort in Wednesday night’s attack.

U.S. Special Forces’ counterinsurgency training of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps accelerates this year, but there’s no indication that any substantive progress will be achieved before the spring. In the interim, Pakistan could benefit by goading Mehsud into adopting more conventional and exposing tactics.

Tea with the Taliban
As the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan sat and drank chai with former Taliban leader and now Musa Qala governor Abdul Salaam, the strategy of dividing and containing (or incorporating) the Taliban continues in Pakistan. The federal government is exploiting the traditional and on-going rivalries between the Ahmedzai Wazirs and the Mehsuds in Southern Waziristan. It could be imposing a blockade of sorts on the Mehsuds, to the advantage of the Ahmedzais. Curbing the flow of drugs and other illicit contrabands will weaken the Mehsuds, but it’s unclear as to whether the Pakistani military is effectively declaring war on the Mehsud tribe or whether it’s trying to make them see Baitullah Mehsud as a source of their problems.

Eurotrip: The National Reconciliation Tour
On Saturday, Muslim League-Nawaz President Shahbaz Sharif met in Islamabad with Niaz Ahmed, a retired military officer who serves as an intermediary between the Sharif brothers and Pervez Musharraf. The octogenarian retired brigadier was an army instructor to Pervez Musharraf and is well-respected by the Sharif brothers due to past favors. He reportedly presented Shahbaz, the younger Sharif, with an offer straight from Musharraf to take part in a national unity government before the elections and have a considerable role thereafter. The Sharifs were also requested to tone down their criticism of Musharraf.

Shahbaz reportedly replied that he’d have to have discuss any offer with his elder brother, Nawaz, who was nearby in the resort town of Murree. After being caught leaving Ahmed’s Islamabad home by spunky Pakistani journalists, Shahbaz described his meeting with Ahmed as a “courtesy call.” Coincidentally, he also met the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Ali Awadh Asseri. The Saudis have a keen interest in seeing the return of the Sharifs to power and have for years played a role in managing Sharif-Musharraf relations.

And in yet another coincidence, Shahbaz Sharif, Pervez Musharraf, and Niaz Ahmed will all be in London this Friday. Shahbaz claims he’s going to London for medical treatment, but there’s no sign his hair plugs need re-alignment.

As of now, Nawaz Sharif, who is seen by some as less compromising than his brother, has continued his call for a national unity government without Pervez Musharraf. But he has called for a re-scheduling of elections so that new election commission could be formed, headed by deposed Supreme Court Justice Rana Baghwandas, enabling the participation of Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e Insaaf and the Jamaat-e Islami. The PPP strongly rejected Sharif’s proposal.

The elections delay serves the interest of all parties save the PPP, which will lose the sympathy vote as we get further away from Benazir Bhutto’s death. This brings up some significant questions in regard to the national reconciliation talk.

Is it an attempt by Musharraf to divide and control the opposition? Until now, the PML-N has been following the lead of the PPP. Is that changing? Does the PML-N share an interest with Musharraf in checking the PPP, particularly in Punjab? We’ll probably get a good sense this weekend as to the status of the Sharif-Musharraf talks.

Where’s the PPP in all this? Earlier this week, there was a rumored meeting between Musharraf and Asif Zardari, which the PPP denied. But Amin Fahim, the PPP vice chairman, likely met Musharraf around a week ago. PPP spokesman Farhatullah Babar said that “all options are open” in regard to cooperation with Musharraf after the elections.

And what about the PML-Q? Earlier this week, Pervaiz Elahi, always on the attack, said that “all those parties after smelling their defeat in the upcoming general elections are giving suggestions for formation of the national government which has no constitutional, ethical and democratic reasons.” But then Chaudhry Shujaat, his cousin, stated yesterday that his party will form a national unity government after the elections and will invite the PPP and PML-N.

Pakistan will likely see some form of a national unity government. But it remains to be seen as to whether it will be formed before or after the elections, with or without Pervez Musharraf, and all the parties, including the PML-Q.

Kayani’s De-Politicization of the Army
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani issued an order prohibiting army officers from meeting with politicians. When the directive was first reported, it was unclear as to whether Pervez Musharraf, now a civilian president, was included in the category of politicians. After all, he still lives in the military’s headquarters. Retired Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, a former chief of army staff, tells the Daily Times that meeting with Musharraf is also prohibited, but there was no confirmation from government sources. New Inter-Services Public Relations spokesperson Athar Abbas also distanced the army from Musharraf’s claim that Benazir Bhutto was not popular with the Pakistani army.

But Army Has More Duties
While the army might be doing less politicking, its burden has now increased. It has now been tasked with defense of the country’s increasingly scarce wheat supplies. This is on top of its responsibilities in fighting insurgencies, defending Pakistan’s borders, and providing security for some of Pakistan’s major cities after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Today, Gen. Kayani met with junior commissioned and non-commissioned army officers. He emphasized his two major themes of improving the army’s “professional excellence” as the standard of living for all of those in its ranks. But importantly, he emphasized that the army’s primary duty is to defend the country’s borders.

Aitzaz Ahsan’s Return to the PPP
The spirit of reconciliation is alive. Asif Zardari will reportedly promote Aitzaz Ahsan to People’s Party vice chairman. This is a move to push the PPP in Punjab. As I noted earlier, Zardari will be moving to Lahore to build up the party there. But this also marks a challenge to the PML-N and PML-Q, whose support base is almost exclusively in that province.  Aitzaz was paid a visit by Attorney General Malik Qayyum, who reportedly offered an end to his house arrest if he hushed up about the judges issue.

The Travails of Maulana Diesel
It hasn’t been a good week or so for Maulana Fazlur Rahman. He’s been staying indoors lately as a result of the reported assassination threats made against him. His party, the JUI-F, is facing some turbulence; it recently expelled 18 party members. Fazl tells BBC Urdu that a senior Punjab official replied to his request for security by stating, “No money, no security.”

Earlier this evening, a bomb blast struck Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, in the vicinity of Gul Ahmed Chowrangi in the Quaidabad area. Ten individuals have been killed and over forty injured.

The attack targeted ordinary pedestrians in a fruit and vegetable market area during a peak grocery shopping hour. The bomb blast also occurred in close proximity to the gate of a factory, perhaps that of Gul Ahmed Textiles Mills, Pakistan’s largest home textiles exporter. But it appears as if the attack took place too late to target workers leaving the facility.

There is no real indication that the operation was a suicide mission. Eyewitnesses indicate that the bomb blast occurred near a motorcycle, but conflict as to whether or not an individual was seated on the vehicle. However, Sindh police chief Azher Farooqi tells the BBC that the explosives were hidden underneath a fruit cart.

This area of Karachi has, for many years, been home to violence between various political parties and ethnic groups. Leading officials in both the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Jamaat-e Islami (JI) issued their immediate condemnations of the attacks on Pakistani television. Later, condemnations were issued by members of other parties in Pakistan, including the PPP, PML-N, and Awami National Party (ANP).

Pathans constitute a large percentage of Quaidabad’s residents. Over an hour later, a third blast was reported elsewhere in Pakistan, targeting the election office of the Awami National Party, which promotes Pathan/Pashtun nationalism. In between the two bombings in Karachi and Peshawar, there was another blast, reportedly at a bakery in an industrial area in Hub, Balochistan–again, during a peak grocery shopping period of the day. It is unclear as to whether they are related. However, if the area in Hub had a strong Pathan labor population, then the common thread linking today’s three explosions could be that they targeted Pathan civilians.

Interestingly, Pervez Musharraf is currently in Karachi–but nowhere near the site of the attacks.

Earlier this afternoon local time, a suicide bomber attacked a group of police gathered near Lahore’s High Court, the scene of renewed protests by Pakistan’s lawyers’ movement. The attack killed approximately 23 people and injured over 60.

The bomber did not appear to attack protesters, but took opportunity to target an event in which government security personnel–in this case, police officers–would be assembled in large concentrations (à la police training in Iraq).

What is most significant about this attack is that it occurred in Lahore, which is Pakistan’s second largest city and has largely been immune from Pakistan’s deterioration of law and order. Lahore is distinct from Karachi, which has been home to varying waves of violence for over 20 years, in its ethnic homogeneity and vastly greater quality of life. Lahore, in many senses, is a city that works; Karachi, is an overwhelmed and misgoverned basket case.

And so the arrival of suicidal terror in Lahore is all the more alarming. It suggests that the extremist elements responsible for the violence, if they are part of a single entity, can hit any part of Pakistan at will. In the past year or so, suicide blasts have hit all of Pakistan’s major cities: Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar, and Quetta. Almost 3,500 Pakistanis were killed in 2007 terror attacks. The terror wave has targeted both individual senior Pakistani figures (politicians in and outside of government and military officers) as well as concentrations of low-ranked government officers.

WHO AND WHAT IS NEXT?
The level of violence in Pakistan has been sustained and its crescendo is nowhere in sight. Today’s attack in Lahore comes after the Pakistani army was to have made a renewed effort to apprehend Baitullah Mehsud, allegedly behind Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, though this operation could be delayed by the massive snowfall in Pakistan’s northwest. It is conceivable that today’s attacks were a message from Mehsud intending to restrain the Pakistani government.

But with the start of the month of Muharram tonight–significant to all Muslims, but to the Shi’a in particular–and the elections slated for February 18, the wave of terror is likely to continue, if not worsen. Karachi is under a red alert and the army remains in the city, but that does not preclude the possibility of sectarian attacks there. Tomorrow is Friday and congregational prayers are frequent targets in sectarian attacks.

Even more destabilizing would be a successful attack on a senior politician. There are reports of threats against Nawaz Sharif and Maulana Fazlur Rahman. The assassination of Fazl would fragment his party’s control of the North-West Frontier Province, potentially creating an opening for the neo-Taliban. The murder of Sharif would set much of urban Punjab against Pervez Musharraf, though his brother Shahbaz (a former chief minister of Punjab) is more than capable to fill in his shoes.

Both events would place Pakistan further on the path of ethnic and provincial fragmentation. Moreover, it would decisively eliminate any sort of balance between Pervez Musharraf and the opposition parties. This would create an unmanageable scenario in which Musharraf’s popularity plummets (yes, there is room for decline) while the political opposition to him, however sizable, lacks a clear leadership. In the balance, Pakistan’s army would be ascendant; but neither would this be in its corporate interests, nor would its cohesiveness remain immune to the centrifugal forces.

Pakistan is in an election season–naturally a partisan affair–and, at the same time, there are forces pulling the country apart at the seams. If there is any good Pervez Musharraf can offer his country at this point, it can be an assertive effort to maintain inter-ethnic and sectarian solidarity in his country. This requires partnering with opposition political figures in ensuring their security and restraining the PML-Q’s use of ethnic chauvinism.

CNN reports that Benazir Bhutto was to give U.S. officials a “secret” document on the day she was killed. The document details measures by which Pakistan’s intelligence services would allegedly rig the elections. Bhutto intended to give the dossier first to Sen. Arlen Specter then to presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.

The choice of these American politicians is interesting. It suggests that Bhutto believed they would be more effective than elements in the Bush administration. Specter, who was in Islamabad ready to visit Bhutto later Thursday evening, often diverges with the Bush administration despite being a Republican. Clinton and Obama are leading Democratic contenders who would relish an opportunity to throw a blow at the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Pakistan provides such an opportunity given the perceived success of the Iraq surge and its integrality to the Afghanistan problem — the primordial post-9/11 U.S. national security issue.

Bilawal Bhutto Zardari read the will of his mother, Benazir Bhutto, earlier today in Pakistan.  It designated his father, Asif Zardari, as chairman of the party, who then reportedly declined the position, offering it to Bilawal.  They will co-chair the party. 

Sherry Rehman, a leading PPP figure, has been on the record stating that Bilawal will return to Oxford to continue his studies.  Asif Zardari will run the party on a day-to-day basis, while Bilawal will nominally chair the party till he is completely ready to hold the reigns.  Yusaf Raza Gilani, PPP senior vice chairman, said that Zardari will be the final decision maker in Bilawal’s absence. 

As I have written earlier, Bilawal is the best bet to continue the Bhutto name.  But as a 19 year old unable to speak Urdu and raised for much of his life out of the country, he’s thoroughly unprepared to lead the largest political party in a 160 million person country.  At the same age, his mother sat as an observer in her father’s negotiations with Indira Gandhi at Simla.  Bilawal’s had no such grooming.

The major development has been the sidelining of Amin Fahim.  Does he remain as the party’s vice chair?  Will he continue as a Bhutto loyalist, in spite of having a teenager selected over him as party leader?  He will be the party’s candidate for prime minister.  Zardari hasn’t registered for the elections.  Bilawal is ineligible to contest.  Fahim is a PM candidate by default.  He could very well play the role of Turkey’s Abdullah Gul, holding the PM spot till Asif Zardari or Bilawal are ready (if ever).

And what of Asif Zardari?  Will his control over the PPP last long?  Does he have the energy and the party support?  Will he serve as a placeholder for Bilawal — or will he reign over the party’s fragmentation?  Remember, Benazir faced significant opposition during her rise to the party’s helm — and from non-family members as well.  Her consolidation of power was indelicate, to say the least. Let’s see if party stalwarts remain loyal to Zardari, or whether they’ll slowly push him back to Dubai.

The murder of Benazir Bhutto has created a leadership vacuum within the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The populist, center-left party gained patrimonial colors after the execution of its founder, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in 1979.

Party leadership passed on to his wife, Nusrat. However, their daughter, Benazir, would soon rise to center stage, eclipsing–quite aggressively–her mother and brothers. Benazir was effectively at the party’s helm for the past two and a half decades, becoming at some point its chairperson for life. The party has no internal elections and Bhutto’s competitors were shut out.

Filling her shoes will be no easy task. Not only did Bhutto wield an almost absolute command over the People’s Party, but her persona–very much tied to her father’s–made many willing, if not desiring, to accept her complete stewardship.

To top it off, Bhutto has been lionized since her passing. News anchors on Pakistan’s private channels now refer to her as Shaheed Benazir Bhutto; she is now a martyr. Within hours of her passing, the news channels ceased to use the word ‘death’ and instead term her passing as shahadat, or martyrdom.

No potential successor shares the unique set of characteristics as Bhutto: the ‘royal’ name; popular appeal in Pakistan; political instinct; and deep contacts and friendships with leaders and influencers in the West. Most likely, Bhutto’s void will be filled by multiple individuals. The probable candidates are listed below in order of importance.

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Amin Fahim
As the vice chairman of the PPP, Amin Fahim is best positioned to assume leadership of the party. Fahim led the party in the National Assembly and was its presidential candidate in the faux polls held in October.

He is a feudal figure from Bhutto’s home province and political base of Sindh. Fahim has considerable name recognition nationally, but does not have the Bhutto name and the star power associated with it. His international connections are not strong, so he lacks Bhutto’s capacity to leverage an extensive network of foreign friends and supporters in order to challenge the U.S.-backed Musharraf.

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Asif Zardari
Most eyes are naturally focusing on Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s widower and closest adult relative with a political background. But Zardari is not a Bhutto; he did not marry “into” the family. His influence comes from two sources: one, like Bhutto and Fahim, he comes from an influential Sindhi feudal family; two, he was married to the daughter of Pakistan’s most popular politician post-Jinnah.

But Zardari is not viewed as the inheritor of the Bhutto mantle. And so it is highly likely that his political status will recede with the murder of his wife.

Zardari is a stained political figure. The PPP has, in recent years, sought to distance itself from him, who garnered the moniker “Mr. 10 Percent” as a result of his prolific corruption.

At best, he will play the role of a figurehead in a post-Bhutto PPP. Not only is Zardari hampered by negative perceptions and the lack of a claim to the Bhutto name, he is also in poor physical health. And it’s also unclear as to whether he is emotionally prepared to play politics; Zardari has been extremely distraught in multiple appearances on national television since yesterday. He also has three teenage children to raise.

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Aitzaz Ahsan
As a leading figure in the lawyers’ movement, Aitzaz Ahsan’s popularity–particularly with the middle and upper-middle class–has risen considerably this year. As a result, his relations with Benazir Bhutto cooled considerably; she was not happy, to say the least, with his commitment to Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and the judiciary’s cause.

Ahsan withdrew his nomination papers from the January elections; it’s unclear as to whether he had Bhutto’s endorsement, though it’s likely it was done against her will. His commitment to the judicial cause, while earning Bhutto’s anger, also gained points with the Pakistani public. Ahsan is seen as one of the few viable politicians who refused to consent to Musharraf’s subversion of the constitution. And so he can serve as a vehicle for restoring the public trust in the People’s Party as a popular, democratic front.

Unlike Bhutto, Ahsan is Punjabi, not Sindhi and so it’s difficult to see him alone holding up Bhutto’s popular base in Sindh. He could, to some extent, help propel the People’s Party in Punjab, but that would put the party on a more agitational course with not only the PML-Q, but also the PML-N — and it’s unclear as to whether the party wants to tussle with the latter.

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Bilawal Bhutto Zardari
As Benazir Bhutto’s eldest child, Bilawal’s entry into politics would precede that of his younger sisters (aged 16 and 14 respectively), if he choses to enter this dangerous field. But he’s only 19 and barely speaks Urdu. Bilawal just began his studies at Oxford, after living in Dubai for eight years–almost half his life. While Benazir spent her adolescence and early adulthood as her father’s political apprentice–even accompanying him to the Simla negotiations with Indira Gandhi–Bilawal has had no similar training. Bilawal’s political career will begin, if ever, gradually and in a highly managed fashion

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Farhatullah Babar
A long-time Bhutto loyalist and spokesperson, Babar will continue in his media relations capacity and providing counsel to the remainder of the party’s senior brass. He did not register for the January national and provincial elections and resigned from the Senate in 2006. If he returns to electoral politics, it’s more likely he’ll re-enter that body.

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Shah Mehmood Qureshi
As head of the PPP in Punjab, Qureshi will continue to shape the party’s operations in the country’s largest province. A feudal and Cambridge graduate, he frequently comes on political talk shows on behalf of the party. Qureshi could increasingly become a power broker at the national level.

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Sherry Rehman
A graduate of Smith College, Sherry Rehman came from a similar cultural and ideological background as Benazir Bhutto. While she can help continue the party’s media campaign in both Pakistan and the West, odds are she will do little more.

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Fatima Bhutto
A 25-year old Columbia graduate and daughter of Benazir’s slain brother, Fatima is perhaps the ultimate wild card in the post-Benazir PPP. Relations between she and her aunt were immensely hostile. Fatima accused Benazir of being behind the assassination of her father, Murtaza Bhutto–one of Benazir’s younger brothers. Fatima has been an active columnist and civil society advocate in Karachi. She has the name, the brain, and the brawns to play politics. In a potential step toward rapproachment with other Bhuttos and the Zardaris, she and her Lebanese stepmother, Ghinwa Bhutto–who runs her own PPP faction–attended Benazir’s funeral. That’s, however, a long way from mending ties with her late aunt’s inner circle. Though Fatima has been reluctant to assume any status seen as hereditary, she could come to see some utility in national politics. Will she and her stepmother rejoin Benazir’s PPP, or will they continue to remain separate, and even push for defections toward their camp? It’s all very much in the air.

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Other Influentials: Raza Gilani; Jehangir Bader; Raza Rabbani; Babar Awan; Qaim Ali Shah; Enver Baig

• Benazir Bhutto laid to rest near her father in Garhi Khuda Baksh
• Javed Iqbal Cheema, Interior Ministry spokesperson: Baitullah Mehsud Responsible for Bhutto’s Killing
  • Claims intelligence services intercepted Mehsud conversation at 9:15 AM PST today (Thursday, 11:15PM New York) in which he congratulated a person referred to as Maulvi Sahib (a title, not a name) on Bhutto’s murder who tells him “They were our men.”
    • Interestingly, Mehsud asks Maulvi Sahib, “Who were they?” If the transcript is accurate (translated from Pashto into Urdu and then English), it means that Mehsud did not know the identity of the attackers. In fact, he probably was not aware of the plot’s specifics as Maulvi Sahib tells him, “I will give you more details when I come.”
    • But, Maulvi Sahib congratulates Mehsud first, who then returns the pleasantry. So Mehsud, if the transcript is real and accurate, likely issued the attack but delegated planning and management to a subordinate–Maulvi Sahib. And so though it’s unclear when Maulvi Sahib says, “They were our men,” whether “our” includes Mehsud, it most likely it does. Mehsud issues an order to Maulvi Sahib afterwards: “Do not inform their family presently.” So Maulvi Sahib is an manager working under Baitullah Mehsud.
  • Blow to head, not bullets or ball bearings, killed Bhutto
  • Transcript of conversation, external postmortem of Bhutto, and video of gunman firing at Bhutto released
  • People’s Party rejects Interior Ministry’s findings; Farooq Naik of PPP: “It is a pack of lies.”
• Government to hold All Parties Conference to discuss elections [Link]
• Violence across Pakistan
  • Karachi: Plastics factory set on fire, killing 6;
  • Rioting in Karachi causes major telecom outage [Link]
  • Liaquat Ali Jatoi’s home set on fire
  • Banks, gas stations, rail cars, and shops set on fire
• Army sends battallions to major cities in Sindh: Hyderabad (2 batallions), Mirpurkhas, Jamshoro, Badin, Thatta, Tandoallah Yar, Nowshero Feroz, Dadu, Shakarpur, Khairpur, Larkana, Shahadad Kot, Ghotki, Kashmore, and Karachi (Orangi, Malir, Sahfora Chowk, Bin Qasim, SITE Area, and Steel Mills Colony).
• Government earlier claimed ball bearings from blast, not bullet, killed Bhutto; Murder scene hosed off with water soon after assassination

My opinion piece, issued by Project Syndicate, has been picked up by a number of publications, including Pakistan’s Daily Times, Lebanon’s Daily Star, Miami Herald, the Scotsman, the San Diego Union-Tribune, and The Guardian’s Comment is Free.

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Pakistan after Bhutto

By Arif Rafiq

With the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s state of turmoil has reached a new crescendo. As head of the nation’s most popular political party, Bhutto largely transcended Pakistan’s ethnic and sectarian divides. Her return from exile in October was seen as a step toward curbing the country’s dangerous fragmentation; her murder shatters those hopes. President Pervez Musharraf must take immediate steps – most importantly, the formation of a national unity government – to prevent Pakistan from tearing apart at the seams.

In deciding that her People’s Party would participate in the January parliamentary election, Bhutto threw a lifeline to Musharraf, who has been beset by multiple insurgencies, a nationwide terrorist threat, and rock-bottom legitimacy. Both Musharraf and his supporters in Washington hoped that mainstream parties’ participation in the election would end Pakistan’s governance crisis and provide popular support for a decisive confrontation with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Now, however, the election will likely be postponed. Indeed, Musharraf might be compelled to impose emergency rule again, as he did in November, should Pakistan’s stability further deteriorate. There are reports of violence in cities across Pakistan. Karachi, a multi-ethnic metropolis, could erupt into full-scale chaos. During the 1990’s, violence there between Bhutto’s party and a local ethnic party – now allied with Musharraf – took thousands of lives.

In these circumstances, a state of emergency could be warranted. But, given Musharraf’s lack of legitimacy, such a move would further infuriate Bhutto’s supporters, whose street power Bhutto had contained since October. This could set the stage for a violent confrontation between the Pakistani masses and Musharraf’s regime.

The nightmare scenario envisioned by many in Pakistan – a nuclear-armed country actively targeted by al-Qaeda and the Taliban – could become a reality. But this need not be a foregone conclusion.

Musharraf, who regularly claims to act on the basis of a “Pakistan first” policy, must now let go of partisan objectives and form a national unity government led by a prime minister from the opposition. Any subsequent measures, including temporary imposition of emergency rule and full-scale war against the terrorists, require the complete support of the opposition parties. Musharraf and his political allies cannot be seen as benefiting from Bhutto’s assassination; nor can they afford the perception of a cover-up. His opponents must be incorporated into the decision-making process.

A national unity government must assume three major responsibilities. First, it must establish an independent commission to determine who was responsible for Bhutto’s murder. While political assassination is not unfamiliar – Pakistan’s first prime minister was killed in the same park where Bhutto was murdered – it is imperative that the culprits be apprehended and tried. Anything short of this would permanently taint Pakistan’s leadership and impede all attempts at political reconciliation.

Second, it must take necessary measures to ensure public safety and political stability, while paving the way for free and fair elections. It must offer Pakistan a consensual path toward winning back its tribal areas from the insurgents, end the wave of terror in its cities, and ensure the election of a new, legitimate government.

Finally, it must begin a dialogue with Musharraf and the military on a permanent, constitutional separation of powers. If Bhutto had not been assassinated and, instead, successfully became prime minister, she would likely have clashed with Musharraf over his arbitrary empowerment of the presidency at the expense of the premiership. The issue will not go away with Bhutto’s death.

Pakistan’s civil and military elite must create a broad consensus – perhaps with foreign assistance, but never with foreign meddling – on the constitutional roles of the prime minister, president, and the military. Ravaged by endemic elite discord since its founding, Pakistan desperately needs an elite reconciliation that includes all of the country’s major stakeholders. Otherwise, Pakistan’s terrorists, who feed off of political instability, will continue to gain, while the country’s poor and illiterate majority will continue to lose ground.

The murder of Benazir Bhutto need not result in the country’s demise. Pakistan’s elite have an opportunity to overcome their differences, unite in opposition to militants, and transform their failing state into a stable and prosperous democracy.

If they succeed in bringing about a national renewal, Bhutto, a monumental political figure in Pakistani history, will not have died in vain.

Arif Rafiq, a policy and communications consultant, edits the Pakistan Policy Blog (www.pakistanpolicy.com).

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2007.

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