BREAKING NEWS: Opposition Parties Crush Musharraf Allies

PPP and PML-N Sweep Polls

Aaj Television, a major Pakistani news channel, estimates that the leading opposition parties, the People’s Party (PPP) and Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), together will receive approximately 78% of the total parliamentary seats. If the estimate holds true, the PPP and PML-N will have the ability to impeach President Pervez Musharraf and amend the constitution. They could remove Musharraf, restore the deposed judiciary, repeal Musharraf’s constitutional amendments, and push for parliamentary supremacy. The two parties could form a national unity government together or compete against one another to form a government with the remaining parties–including the PML-Q.

National Assembly Seat Estimates by Aaj Television (Total – 272 Seats):

  • PPP: ~110
  • PML-N: ~100
  • PML-Q: ~20-30
  • MQM & Others: ~30

Provincial Assemblies Outlook:

  • Punjab: PML-N, dominating the province’s north, central, and urban areas, is on top with a large lead.
  • Sindh: PPP ahead with a strong showing. MQM trails behind.
  • NWFP: ANP — a secular, ethnic party– strong in NWFP and wins in Swat, site of jihadi insurgency.
  • Balochistan: PML-Q ahead followed by PPP.


Major PML-Q Losses: Party President Shujaat Hussain, National Assembly Speaker Amir Hussain, Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri, Railways Minister Sheikh Rashid, Hamid Nasir Chattha, Defense Minister Rao Sikander, Religious Affairs Minister Ijazul Haq, Sher Afgan Niazi, Danial Aziz, Humayun Akhtar Khan, and Ghulam Sarwar Khan. Sheikh Rashid has reportedly fled to Spain.

The Survivors: Pervaiz Elahi and Faisal Saleh Hayat, however, won respectively in NA-58 and NA-88.

Close Call for the Maulana: Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) wins safe seat in Bannu (NA-26), but loses at home in Dera Ismail Khan.

The Turnout: Turnout, according to Sarwar Bari of the Free and Fair Elections Network, was approximately 35%.

Violence: 26 killed in poll-related violence.

Print Friendly

Pakistan Decides: Election Day Coverage

Musharraf-Allied, Former Ruling Party Faces Major Losses

People’s Party and Muslim-League Nawaz Lead Nationally

Awami National Party Ahead in NWFP

Shujaat Hussain, Sheikh Rashid, and Amir Hussain Defeated

Polls officially opened in Pakistan at 8AM local time (10PM, Sunday in New York) and will close at 5PM (7AM, New York). The opening was delayed in many locations due to technical reasons or disputes over electoral rolls.

11:42AM (Islamabad)/01:43AM (New York): Turnout is reportedly low. But it’s early in the morning.

11:54AM (Islamabad)/01:55AM (New York): Blasts reported at three polling stations in Quetta. Hand grenades and other explosive material used. No one killed; two arrested.

12:07PM (Islamabad)/02:07 AM (New York): AAJ Television reports turnout is fairly high in Rawalpindi, but low in Lahore, perhaps due to recent terror attacks.

12:24PM (Islamabad)/02:24 AM (New York): High turnout in Sukkur, but some women going back home because of long lines. Turnout in Peshawar fairly low. Recent terror attacks there.

01:25PM (Islamabad)/03:25 AM (New York): DawnNews reports that militants have kidnapped polling agents in Bannu, NWFP (NA-26).

01:59PM (Islamabad)/03:59 AM (New York): GEO reports strong turnout in Nawabshah, Sindh. Pace should pick up somewhat elsewhere in the country into the afternoon as the temperature rises.

05:30PM (Islamabad)/07:30 AM (New York): Polling was to end at 5PM across the country, but seems to have been extended in some districts to encourage those that haven’t voted. Official results from some districts are coming in but very incomplete (e.g. 1/242 polling stations).

05:45PM (Islamabad)/07:45 AM (New York):

Turnout in previous Pakistan National Assembly elections:

  • 43.07% (1998)
  • 45.46% (1990)
  • 40.28% (1993)
  • 35.42 (1997)
  • 41.8% (2002)

05:51PM (Islamabad)/07:51AM (New York): Suggestions of low turnout in Lahore. Could be high in Sindh, excluding Karachi and Hyderabad. If true, could fare well for PPP and not for PML-N.

06:01PM (Islamabad)/08:01AM (New York): Kamran Khan of GEO says the very preliminary results indicate the PPP ahead nationally with the PML-Q and PML-N nearly tied for second. In the NWFP, the ANP is doing better than in 2002. But the results coming in seem to be less than 1% per district.

06:01PM (Islamabad)/08:01AM (New York): Afrasiyab Khattak of the ANP seems pretty content with the elections proceedings, an indication of positive results for his party. Referred to turnout in NWFP as “slow, but steady.”

06:19PM (Islamabad)/08:19AM (New York): Pervez Musharraf said earlier today on the government-run PTV (in English) after casting his vote, “whoever [wins], I strongly believe that this politics of confrontation must give way to the politics of reconciliation….I myself with remain committed to a politics of reconciliation with everyone. Whoever is the winner, let them form government, let them run the government for five years, let them ensure the continuity of economic sustainability of this economic upsurge and let us continue to fight this scourge of terrorism more strongly beyond today’s elections.”

Order of PTV News Coverage: President Pervez Musharraf, Musharraf’s Wife and Mother, Interim Prime Minister Muhammad Mian Soomro, PML-Q President Shujaat Hussain, PML-Q Central Leader Pervez Ellahi, PML-N leaders Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, PPP Co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari, JUI-F Chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman, and PPP-S Chairman Aftab Sherpao. According to the Center for Civic Education, the PML-Q received more coverage on state-run television than the PPP and PML-N combined. The PML-Q also spent more on advertising than all other parties combined.

06:53PM (Islamabad)/08:53AM (New York): An analyst on the government-run PTV says that “in a hung parliament, Pakistan’s masses will be stronger.”

08:01PM (Islamabad)/10:01AM (New York): Official election results could be in at 9PM Islamabad/11AM New York.

08:48PM (Islamabad)/10:48AM (New York): The New York Times states turnout in the NWFP was around 20%.

08:58PM (Islamabad)/10:58AM (New York): First complete result is in: Yaqoob Bizenjo of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) wins in NA-272 — ironic, no? He defeats Zubaida Jalal, an independent formerly with the PML-Q, and four other opponents.

09:00PM (Islamabad)/11:00AM (New York): Najmuddin Khan of the PPP wins in NA-33.

09:40PM (Islamabad)/11:40AM (New York): Maulana Fazlur Rahman is losing by a wide margin in NA-24, but NA-26 seems like a safe seat for him.

10:32PM (Islamabad)/12:32PM (New York): The overall trends are leaning toward a strong showing for the PML-N in urban Punjab, the PPP in Sindh (outside of Karachi and Hyderabad), and the ANP in NWFP.

10:49PM (Islamabad)/12:49PM (New York): A GEO analyst makes an excellent point — the data could have an urban bias. Necessary to wait and see how the PML-Q does in rural Punjab where it has focused its campaigning.

Tuesday – 01:15AM (Islamabad)/Monday – 03:15PM (New York): Chaudhry Shujaat loses to Ahmed Mukhtar in hometown of Gujrat/NA-105.

01:44AM (Islamabad)/Monday – 03:44PM (New York): Aaj TV: PPP surge in southern Punjab?

02:19AM (Islamabad)/Monday – 04:19PM (New York): More PML-Q losses: Former National Assembly Speaker Chaudhry Amir Hussain and Danyal Aziz.

Print Friendly

Pakistan’s 2008 Elections: Countdown Ends, Voting Begins

Managed Competition
Millions of Pakistanis will head to the polls today, ostensibly to select their federal and provincial representatives, who in turn will choose the new prime minister and chief ministers. Will their votes matter? To a certain extent, yes. These elections are an exercise in managed competition.

In many electoral districts, the voting public will genuinely decide the victor. Elsewhere, Pervez Musharraf & Co. will actively intervene, skewing the results in their own favor.

That the polls would be rigged was never really a matter of debate. The real questions have been and remain: to what extent will the polls be rigged and where? How far will Musharraf go? Who will lose most from the rigging? Will the rigging–to use one of Musharraf’s favorite military terms–be “surgical” or more of a “shock and awe” variety? If Musharraf opts for the former, he can perhaps stay afloat. If he overstretches, then he will likely be submerged by both the opposition and elements of the so-called “establishment.”

So what would surgical and shock and awe rigging look like exactly? They’re best differentiated by their byproducts.

Surgical rigging could do any number of the following:

  • Prevent the opposition from gaining the 2/3 National Assembly majority necessary to impeach Musharraf and amend the constitution. The PPP, PML-N, and ANP could form a government together, yet be unable to reach the threshold above to fully challenge Musharraf. They would need the support of the JUI-F and independents, making these two segments much sought over.
  • Balance out the PML-N and PPP, giving them equal opportunity to produce a government. This would pit them against one another and give particular weight to the Musharraf-allied PML-Q, making it a sought-after king maker.
  • Have the PML-Q cede the center to the opposition, but form a government in Punjab, keeping it very much alive.
  • Give the PPP its expected plurality, but put the PML-Q in second at the expense of the PML-N. The PML-N would cry foul, but with the PPP would be content with the elections, the PML-N’s objections would be dismissed as those of sore losers.

More ambitious, shock and awe rigging could do any number of the following:

  • Give the PML-Q a plurality of seats and let it form a national government with the MQM, PML-F, and potential others.
  • Significantly dilute the PPP’s share in Sindh, forcing it to pair with the MQM to produce a government there.
  • Give the PML-Q a weighty position in a Balochistan and NWFP governing coalition.

Surgical rigging would serve two functions: prevent Musharraf’s opponents from ousting him, while keeping them involved in the political process so as to maintain the elections’ and next government’s legitimacy. Musharraf would fare better if he successfully divided the PPP and PML-N and facilitated their reversion to mutual antagonism.

Shock and awe rigging would put Musharraf’s allies in power and the PPP and PML-N into the streets. Musharraf, who has said he would repress post-poll protests, would likely be shown the exit by an Army unwilling to defend a massively rigged elections process. A new president and caretaker government would then likely schedule elections within a few months at latest.

Post-Election Maneuvering
The intrigue does not end when the last ballot is counted. The post-election period, in which a ruling coalition is formed if a single party fails to obtain a majority is as important as the pre-election and election periods. If the elections are accepted by the opposition (the People’s Party vote counts most), then the machinations for shaping the next government will begin.

Recall what happened after the 2002 elections. The PML-Q won a plurality of seats (almost 50% more than the second place PPP), but the PPP won the overall popular vote (which has little electoral value). It took a month for the PML-Q to get enough votes for its prime ministerial nominee, Zafarullah Jamali, and they obtained a slim majority (52%) through a coalition with the MQM as well as PPP defectors and a lot of exchanged money, favors, and threats. Even if there are no debilitating objections to the poll results, the process of forming a government will take a while and a wide variety of governing coalitions are possible.

Washington, as senior Pakistani journalist Nusrat Javed says, prefers a PPP + PML-Q government. This can be a reality. Though PPP Co-Chairman Asif Zardari has met with Nawaz Sharif several times in recent days, he also recently met with Musharraf’s chief advisor Tariq Aziz. Washington must certainly like Zardari’s recent statement that the the army’s fight against the Taliban is “our war.” And it has made it pretty clear it isn’t too fond of Nawaz Sharif. Indeed, things are not necessarily over for the PML-Q. It could change its face and, as some expect, push Chaudhry-alternates Hamid Nasir Chatta or Khurshid Kasuri as party leaders or PM candidates. Alternatively, many in the PML-Q could sense the tide changing and jump ship (or return) to the PML-N. Musharraf has an large array of tools at his disposal, though far less institutional backing than in 2002. A moderately-restrained Musharraf could pull yet another bike trick and end up standing. But, an overzealous Musharraf can crash, not only destroying himself but also the cycle (the PML-Q’s election symbol).

Print Friendly

The PML-Q’s Negative Campaigning

The back page of today’s Khabrain, a leading Pakistan daily, features an interesting political advertisement from Musharraf’s faction of the Muslim League party (PML-Q). [Topi tip: Ali]

The ad paints rival Nawaz Sharif as an agenda-less political opportunist who leans in the direction the political wind blows at the time.

Sharif, once a Zia ul-Haq protege, is shown on the right praying at his grave next to Zia’s son. Below, he’s quoted as saying, “I will complete General Zia ul-Haq’s mission.” On the left, he’s shown at the grave of Benazir Bhutto (an archenemy of Zia), praying alongside senior PML-N leader Javed Hashmi. Below, he’s quoted as saying, “I will complete Benazir Bhutto’s mission.”

Since Sharif’s return to Pakistan, the PML-Q has tried to paint him as a follower, first of Benazir Bhutto (with insinuations against his masculinity) and now the PPP in general. PML-Q President Shujaat Hussain descibed him as part of the PPP’s “B-team.

The bold red text on the bottom of the advertisement asks (presumably both Nawaz Sharif and the reader), “What is your mission?”

The PML-Q has turned to negative campaigning because it has little positive to run on.  Once emboldened by a huge, deficit-running election-year budget, the achievements variably associated with it are vanishing.  Pakistan is in the midst of one of its worst political and security crisis ever.  Additionally, the country faces serious energy and wheat shortages. Surprisingly, Pervaiz Elahi–likely the PML-Q’s prime ministerial candidate/leader in the National Assembly) has blamed all this on none other than former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, a party member.

The party has reportedly changed its strategy, focusing on winning Punjab and not the national elections.  Both the PPP and PML-N will siphon off votes from the PML-Q, which has most recently governed Punjab.  It has tried to play the ethnic/provincial card by casting the PPP as a Sindhi party and the post-Bhutto assassination violence as against non-Sindhis.  But Nawaz Sharif is its major threat in the province, Pakistan’s largest and source of over 50% of its National Assembly seats.  Hence the effort to cast him as a flake and Sindhi tool.

The Collected Sayings of Shujaat Hussain
The Chaudhry cousins have dished out quite a bit of negative sound bites. Below are some selected gems from Shujaat Hussain (more to come):

Print Friendly

Chatter of Demands

The Benazir-Nawaz team is expected to release its “Charter of Demands” tomorrow or Friday.  A sticking point between the two parties is the restoration of the pre-November 3rd judiciary.  Benazir favors postponing that to after the new National Assembly comes in (if ever), while Nawaz has consistently asserted that this is a pre-condition for his electoral participation.

Bhutto has little sympathy for the deposed judiciary.  She took umbrage at its rejection of the Bhutto and MQM-specific National Reconciliation Ordinance.  In a Dubai press conference, hours before her return to Pakistan after years of exile, Bhutto excoriated the Supreme Court, accusing it of a historically pro-Punjabi bias.  In fact, she effectively stated–guised in the interrogative–that the court did not intervene in the case of Nawaz Sharif, who she described as “a convicted person, a sentenced, convicted person who was prime minister of Pakistan from Punjab [who] was released and sent to Saudi Arabia with 40 suit cases” while her father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, “was hanged because he was from Sindh.” [Video]

In contrast, Nawaz Sharif has much to gain from bringing back Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry & Company to office.  Nawaz has hedged much of his political future on being the pro-judiciary politician.  Chaudhry, it is said, leans somewhat toward the PML-N.  Moreover, bringing back the previous Supreme Court means the end of Musharraf, as he’d be held accountable for his subversion of the constitution, and that works more in Nawaz’s favor than Benazir’s.

Beyond this issue, the remaining gaps between Benazir and Nawaz are not considerable.  However, this point of contention is a major one, and should the two camps not reach a compromise, the PPP would likely participate in the polls while the PML-N would abstain.

Print Friendly

Musharraf Appoints Caretaker Prime Minister and Cabinet

Pervez Musharraf appointed Muhammad Mian Soomro, a loyalist and chairman of the Senate, as caretaker prime minister. Soomro, as Senate chairman, was in line to succeed Musharraf as president. In that capacity, he is now replaced by Chaudhry Amir Hussain. GEO reports that Salman Shah, an economic adviser to former prime minister Shaukat Aziz, will be minister of finance — an uncontroversial appointment.

The choice of Salman Taseer as minister of commerce is, however, surprising. Taseer, a prominent Pakistani businessman, owns WorldCall, the Daily Times (pictured above), and the Business Plus channel (which signed on to Musharraf’s media code of conduct). He is also a former PPP politician and author of a favorable biography of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father.

His paper’s editorials have consistently been in favor of a Bhutto-Musharraf deal. It is unclear as to whether Taseer’s appointment is a confidence building measure with Bhutto.

Others in the 15-member cabinet include: Nisar Memon, information minister; retired Lt. Gen. Hamid Nawaz, interior minister; and Inam ul Haq, foreign minister. The familiar faces make this cabinet, in many senses, a return to Musharraf’s 2002-3 cabinet.

Print Friendly

The Massacre at Karsaz Bridge: Analysis of the Bhutto Blast (Part 2)

  • Bomber Sketch Released
  • Two Severed Heads Found; Police Still Assert One Bomber
  • Explosives: Russian-Made Grenade and 14 kg RDX suicide belt
  • Multiple Attack Teams?
  • A Nexus Against Bhutto?
  • Political Fallout of the Attacks: Playing Musical Chairs Can Be Dangerous
  • More Questions

Sindh Police has released a sketch of the severed head of an individual it alleges is the sole suicide bomber in Friday’s Karsaz Bridge attack. Reuters’ Kamran Haider quotes a Pakistani security official as stating, “The age of the suspect is between 20 to 25 and he looks to be a Karachiite.” Based on the image, the individual could be from anywhere in Pakistan’s southern half. Karachi is also a diverse city populated by a plurality of Urdu-speaking migrants from India, as well as Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Balochis, Memons, Afghani refugees, Bengalis, and even some Africans. However, the choice of a Karachiite makes sense, as the individual would more easily mix into the crowd and know his way around Pakistan’s largest city. The sketch of his reconstructed face as well as fingerprints believed to be from his severed limbs have been sent to the National Registration and Database Authority (NADRA) and it could come back with results on the bomber’s identity as early as Monday. According to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, approximately 53.5 million Pakistanis have computerized National Identity Cards (NIC) with biometrics as of September 2006. NADRA also makes use of face recognition technology. A second severed head was found — which could support the claims of two suicide bombers made by the Bhutto camp — but police believe that he was a victim of the blasts, not a perpetrator.

Pakistani security officials have shed light on the weapons used in Friday’s attack, but there are conflicting narratives and many questions remain.

Karachi Police’s lead investigator Manzoor Mughal states that the first blast came from a Russian-made hand grenade of approximately 1kg (2.2 lbs). He matches my initial theory on Friday that the goal of the grenade attack was to cause the crowd to disperse, create a hole in Bhutto’s security cordon, and try to take out the former prime minister.

Still, it remains unclear who threw the grenade. Government officials seem to insist on the role of a single attacker, a theory that makes little sense. It puts too much responsibility in the hands of one individual and maximizes the risk of jeopardizing the whole operation.

Let’s assume the suicide bomber threw the grenade. He would need some distance from the convoy, and the greater the distance from the convoy, the greater the risk that he could be caught on his way to it. Moreover, he would’ve attracted attention to himself by throwing the grenade, which was only a means to a more explosive end.

Statements by the Bhutto camp further the idea that there was more than one actor involved. It claims there were two suicide bombers at Karsaz, which, as I stated earlier, receives some support by the presence of two severed heads on the scene of the blast. However, there is little other evidence at this point to suggest that there was another suicide bomber involved in the attack at Karsaz. But important details coming from the People’s Party point to a wider conspiracy.

In her Friday press conference, Bhutto stated that her convoy came under gunfire, some of which was aimed at the tires of her vehicle. She is unsure as to whether this occurred before or after the second blast. This suggests the suicide bomber was accompanied by several other accomplices, and there are reports a group of men waiting underneath Karsaz Bridge attracted the suspicions of many before the blast. One report states that they were allegedly wielding sticks (another report says they were also yelling), but makes little sense.

In any event, there is significant reason to believe that the suicide bomber received gun support from several armed men, one of whom potentially threw the grenade. And there is indication that there could have been multiple attack teams, consisting of at least one gunner and one suicide bomber, posted along Bhutto’s 20+ mile parade route.

Bhutto states her security personnel apprehended two men, one with a gun and another with a suicide belt, prior to the blasts. It is unclear when and where the gunner was arrested, but the man with the suicide belt was arrested 13 minutes before the blast in Karachi’s Nursery area—which is further along the parade route, DIRECTLY in between the site of the successful blasts and Bhutto’s intended destination: Mazar-e Quaid.

Were they caught near one another? If so, they could have been part of a team of at least two. Where are they now? Are they being interrogated?

Sindh Home Secretary Ghulam Muhammad Mohtarem told Reuters on October 17 of reports that three different groups were planning to attack Bhutto on her return. It appears he was referring to three units sent by Baitullah Mehsud. So was there a third cell? If so, where were they waiting, and where are they now?

The second blast, which occurred between 30-60 seconds later, was, according to Karachi Police’s lead investigator, from a suicide belt laden packed with 15-20 kg (33-44 lbs) of RDX explosives and shrapnel, perhaps consisting of “ball-bearings and pellets.” Ghulam Muhammad adds that it also contained nuts and bolts. Clearly the goals were to penetrate the armor of Bhutto’s vehicle and, if unsuccessful, inflict mass damage. The attacker sought to get as close to Bhutto as possible, but apparently only made it to the front-left side, while Bhutto was safely in the back.

While the mechanics of the attack are significant, the organizational forces behind it are more important. There is, of course, the theory that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are behind the attacks — independently — without any the support of military, intelligence, or political forces inside Pakistan. However, Baitullah Mehsud has denied involvement in the attacks and neither Osama bin Laden nor Ayman al-Zawahiri have made any statements against Bhutto. They have, however, repeatedly called for the overthrow of Pervez Musharraf. Bhutto has never been on the radar of al-Qaeda Prime, though the same can’t be same for the Taliban.

A more plausible, but still highly-speculative alternative is a loose network of individuals with various, intersecting interests that share one major obstacle: Benazir Bhutto.

Their feud with Bhutto centers on a fight over the control of Punjab and preventing the rolling back of the autonomy of various current and former military-intelligence officials, their fiefdoms, and unconventional wars.

Though Bhutto refused to name the three officials she listed in a letter to Pervez Musharraf prior to her return as direct threats to her life, we’re getting clear indication of who they and their potential associates are.

They include (in order of importance):

  • Ejaz Shah:
  • The Chaudhry Cousins — Pervez Ellahi and Shujaat Hussain:
    • Respectively, chief minister of Punjab and president of Musharraf’s party, the PML-Q;
    • Rise to power allegedly orchestrated by Ejaz Shah;
    • Stand to lose the most from a Bhutto-Musharraf deal — national power + potentially control of Punjab;
    • Exchanged a vigorous war of words with Bhutto prior to her return;
    • Bhutto did not mention their names in her long list of politicians that called on her to support;
    • Fear Bhutto’s potential inroads into Punjab, which would be done by mobilizing masses in rural Punjab;
    • On Saturday, Shujaat called for banning political rallies during election season.
  • Ijaz-ul-Haq:
    • Minister of Religious Affairs in current government;
    • Member of Chaudhries’ PML-Q party;
    • Son of Zia-ul-Haq:
      • Former president and military ruler of Pakistan who overthrew Benazir’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had him executed;
      • Later killed in an air crash believed by some to be orchestrated by a terrorist group, al-Zulfikar, run by Benazir’s brother Murtaza.
  • Potential others:
    • Arbab Rahim:
      • Chief Minister of Sindh;
      • Strong likelihood that he and his party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), will lose control of the province in next elections to Benazir’s People’s Party (PPP);
      • MQM militants attacked PPP activists (and militants) in Karachi street violence coinciding with the ill-fated visit of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to city on May 12, 2007;
      • Bhutto, however, has stated that the next potential attack against her would involve framing the MQM as the culprits.
    • Haji Omar [profile]:

Even if any of the government figures above are involved in the attacks on Bhutto, public punitive action against them would be unlikely. Bhutto, by refusing to mention their names directly, perhaps understands this and would accept their removal from the power structure alone.

Pakistani authorities have detained three men in southern Punjab they believe have links to the blast. This suggests that those who implemented Friday’s terror could include elements of the network oft-described as the “Punjabi Taliban.” Rashid Rauf, alleged to be involved in the summer 2006 al-Qaeda airline plot, was arrested in Bahawalpur, located in southeastern Punjab.

If the attacks were implemented by jihadis hailing from Punjab focused on FATA, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, it remains plausible these individuals were instruments of some of the institutional actors listed above. As a result, they bring several issues to the forefront: governance of Punjab; control of power at the center; and the future of jihad in Kashmir, FATA, and Afghanistan.

Pervez Musharraf is ultimately at the center of all this. The attacks will perhaps force him to make some compelling decisions in the coming weeks and months. Benazir Bhutto clearly understands this, and after the attacks, has been keen to remain on his good side, asserting directly and indirectly her confidence and trust in him.

Will Musharraf take a more assertive stance against the roguish military-intelligence figures near him? Or will he continue to play a precarious balance?

Musharraf might have to make a choice between two camps — the ‘progressives‘ : Tariq Aziz, Ashfaq Kiyani, and Hamid Javed; and the ‘conservatives‘: Ijaz Shah, Shujaat Hussain, and Pervez Ellahi.

The ‘progressives’ favor a deal with Benazir Bhutto and incline less toward support for unconventional warfare within and without Pakistan. The ‘conservatives’ oppose a deal with Bhutto. They’ll definitely lose control of the center and potentially even Punjab, and they (for a variety of reasons) favor Pakistan’s waging of or support for unconventional wars abroad. Musharraf seems to be leaning toward the ‘progressives’, as he’s proposed Tariq Aziz as the caretaker prime minister for the elections and has chosen Ashfaq Kiyani as his succeeding army head.

Ijaz Shah’s posting will expire in February, which can provide a quiet way to say goodbye. The Chaudhries could end up becoming an unbearable burden for Musharraf. But any moves against them will have negative ramifications. It will create a void that can be naturally filled, but mainly by Nawaz Sharif, the elected prime minister Musharraf overthrew in 1999.

The future of Nawaz Sharif remains murky. Two major questions that need to be considered are: 1) Will Musharraf permit Nawaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan and a meaningful role in the political process? 2) Will Sharif change his tune and start to compromise with Musharraf? If the gap between the two is bridged a bit, then an opening can emerge to part ways with the Chaudhries, and bring in Sharif. But all-too-often, inclination toward compromise in Pakistan is seen as a vulnerability. Any sort of mending of relations between the two will require much time and energy — just look at how protracted the Bhutto-Musharraf talks were. Musharraf can perhaps count on Sharif to counter a rising Benazir, but the latter two could, alternatively, both focus on a vulnerable, uniformless Musharraf without a political base, and send him packing.

Reportedly the Saudis have serious objections to holding on to Nawaz beyond mid-November. Sharif was pressure by both Saad Hariri and Bandar bin Sultan to postpone his Saudi departure to after November 7. He was to leave Saudi for London in mid-October, but conceded to his detainers’ demands and only after reportedly becoming very emotional.

There are indications he is very demoralized. Shortly after the attacks, when speaking to a private Pakistani television station via telephone, his voice weakened as he answered a question about when he would return to the country. He meekly replied, “When the people of Pakistan call for me.” And after five seconds or so of silence, the call ended abruptly. Though Musharraf wants Sharif’s return only after the general elections, he is being forced to accept his earlier return. But it can be a severely injured Nawaz who would be more conciliatory after essentially being held hostage for two months.


  1. Where are the gunman and attempted suicide bomber apprehended by Bhutto’s security people and turned over to Karachi police? Are they being interrogated? Why haven’t they been mentioned in most reports?
  2. To what extent were Musharraf and Bhutto’s camps negligent?
  3. Did the jammers provided by Musharraf’s camp work?
  4. Did Bhutto’s supporters accidentally cause some of them to malfunction?
  5. Did it make sense for Bhutto to have an 18-hr procession, especially after individuals such as Ghulam Muhammad Mohtarem urged her to end her procession before sunset and others offered her a helicopter? Why were Bhutto’s “security guards” young, scrawny volunteers? To what extent were they human shields? Wouldn’t professionals have been better?
  6. How will the attacks impact political rallies and mass mobilization? Will Bhutto travel extensively in Punjab?
  7. Did Bhutto’s intelligence come from India via Afghanistan?
  8. Will Musharraf go soft on the military-intel figures if they were involved in the attacks, but hard on jihadis in FATA (though they might have not been involved)?
  9. Will he use the attacks a pre-text for a massive, conclusive operation in FATA?


  • 10/22/2007 – 3:15PM -
    • I intended to note this in my original posting, forgot to do so, but was reminded Mushtaq Minhas made the point on AAJ TV’s Bolta Pakistan show that two of Pakistan’s leaders were assassinated — Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 — and the perpetrators of the act were never identified.
    • Assassination, violent political transitions, and intrigue date back to early in Pakistan’s history. These destructive impulses remain. And while Pakistan has an active and open press, that will not necessarily preclude the story from ‘closing’ with essential questions unanswered. The media (and public opinion) is a machine that can be manipulated and so much else can occur in between now and mid-January to ‘sandwich’ this story or push it to the side. In other words, there is a strong likelihood that the specific perpetrators of the act — and perhaps their organization affiliations — will be identified, but the elite forces behind them, if there were any, won’t be noted.
    • I would not consider this a defeat for those who hope for a Pakistan that features: peaceful, institutionalized transitions of power; competitive politics; representative and good governance; and public accountability. The attacks can still be leveraged to forge a consensus among Pakistan’s discordant elite on norms of conduct and engagement, consolidate public support against the use of violence in politics, and open up the political process to those that have been marginalized.
  • 10/22/2007 – 3:58PM –
    • Sindh Governor Ishrat-ul-Ibad tells the NYT’s Carlotta Gall that there were two suicide bombers, carrying, respectively, 17-22 lbs and 33 lbs of C-4 explosives (not RDX). There were two heads found. Pakistani authorities previously stated that the second head was that of a victim and that the first blast was from a grenade.
Print Friendly

Paradoxes and Political Intrigue Persist in Pakistan

Developments in Pakistan in recent days further the view for both insiders and outsiders that the country is a perplexing bowl of contradictions and political intrigue.

The Karachi Stock Exchange closed at all-time highs on Monday and Tuesday. Investor confidence boosted due to Pervez Musharraf’s re-election as president (pending the validation of his candidacy), which they associate with future political stability and continuity of pro-growth, liberal economic policies. Their sentiments might be valid in the mid-term, but the next three months, at the very least, will be a roller coaster period for the country—and Pakistan’s securities markets will likely not be as immune to the volatility as they have been before.

On the same day as the market rally, a helicopter escorting Musharraf to Kashmir crashed, killing four individuals. This was also the first day of work for Musharraf’s slated army successor, Ashfaq Kiyani, as vice chief of army staff. Though the president was never in any danger and there is no sign of foul play, the context eerily resembles the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. The accident is a keen reminder that a single event of this sort can have a defining impact, but as with Zia’s demise, need not necessarily result in systemic change.

While investors are buoyant down south in Karachi, the country’s northwest has witnessed some of its most severe fighting between Pakistan’s army and local-foreign insurgents. According to the army, 45 troops and 150 insurgents have been killed in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan. There have also been significant civilian casualties, with non-combatants fleeing the area. The government has been bombarding insurgents from the air with helicopter gunships and jets. The heightened use of air power markedly differs from the government’s previous ground-oriented strategy, which sought to avoid so-called collateral damage and earning further disfavor of locals. It suggests any number of the following:

  • the army has decided its strong avoidance of civilian casualties has been too costly;
  • patience on its side is wearing thin;
  • there is significant external pressure on Islamabad to bring in decisive results before the winter;
  • or a strategic and/or political (via Bhutto deal) window of opportunity has emerged to enable a forceful confrontation of militants.

Perhaps the army has opted for a Balochistan-like strategy, in which it would deliver strong, decisive blows to the insurgency (costing many innocent civilian lives) and follow up with a heavy infusion of development funds. Large scale, yet short-term violence would be complemented by a vast improvement in quality of life and incorporation/subsidization of local elites. In FATA, these funds would largely come from the 5-year $750 million US aid package and opportunities from its duty-free economic opportunity zone program, and would trickle down to the locals via notables with newly padded pockets.

A critical player in the political solution in FATA will be Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who, despite being in the political “opposition,” has proved to be almost as loyal to Musharraf as the Chaudhries. Fazlur Rahman is epitome of the “siyasi ulema” (political Islamic scholars) Abdur Rashid Ghazi lambasted on national television minutes before his demise in the Lal Masjid compound. The JUI-F should play a significant role in liaisoning between FATA notables and insurgents and the federal government/military. Its role in bringing a death blow to the MMA and APDM will not go unrewarded. The pending dissolution of the NWFP assembly will result in fresh provincial elections that might see MMA factions running on their own tickets, and a final tally that places the JUI-F in a stronger individual provincial position than before.

Recent comments by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, and to a lesser extent Shaukat Aziz, have sought to cast doubt on the government’s sincerity in its deal with Benazir Bhutto and her People’s Party. Aziz boasted of having divided and outsmarted the opposition, which is true, and Shujaat bluntly stated that the government has no intention of following through on its promises to Bhutto — and that it it will, in fact, get political cover from the Supreme Court ruling the National Reconciliation Ordinance invalid.

Shujaat’s comments should be taken with a grain (or bucket) of salt. One, Washington — Musharraf’s greatest benefactor — strongly wants the deal to go through fully. Two, Shujaat stands to lose most from the Bhutto-Musharraf deal. Musharraf’s presidency is essentially set (barring a Supreme Court rejection of his candidacy), but Shujaat’s party has to face off against Bhutto’s in the general elections. Images of him and his cousin appear frequently on Pakistani television screens, with a massive wave of advertisements on private channels (source of funding unclear) hailing the achievements of the governments of Musharraf (“Sub se pahlay Pakistan”) and Pervez Ellahi (“Para likha Punjab”). The Chaudhries may have reluctantly consented to a Bhutto-Musharraf deal, but they will show some feistiness to retain their dominance over Punjab and share of federal power.

The rejection of Shujaat’s statements by a Musharraf spokesperson suggests that the president will have to play a fine balancing act between PML-Q partisan and partner of Benazir. It’s the same kind of lack of partiality the Bush administration has sought to display in recent days vis-a-vis Pakistan (i.e. support for the country, not just one man–Musharraf). Should Musharraf alienate his PML-Q base, one might witness the party distancing itself from Musharraf and veering toward some sort of rapprochement, if not re-consolidation, with the PML-N.

The PML-N offers little in political value without the presence of at least one Sharif brother in Pakistan. As a result, the Musharraf government was keen on keeping the former prime minister out of the country prior to his re-election. Since then, they have expressed resistance to his return prior to general-elections — though it is unclear as to whether this is a reflection of the government’s needs or the wishes of the Bhutto camp.

Nawaz is reportedly to return to London after Eid. If proven to be true, it will indicate that Sharif and family were informed of this upon return to Saudi, as Kulsoom Nawaz made such claims early at that point. Also it would prove to partially explain the Sharif family’s relative quietness in the past few weeks. From London, the Sharif brothers could return to Pakistan between November and post-elections in January. Reports suggest family members will trickle into Pakistan individually. Nawaz’s son Hassan has said his father will return to Pakistan between November 15 and 30. A pre-election return is more likely for Shahbaz Sharif. Odds of a Nawaz return pre-elections would multiply if he got another Supreme Court ruling in his favor. If Nawaz returns after the general elections, he could shake things up if discontent in the PML-Q and with others is high. Alternatively, his return could come after the candles have been blow out and the cake has been eaten.

Najam Sethi has stated that the Bhutto-Musharraf understanding will likely produce a PPP government (and Musharraf presidency) at the center, a PML-Q controlled Punjab with a significant PPP presence, a PPP-PML coalition government in NWFP and Balochistan, and a PPP-MQM coalition government in Sindh.

I think Sethi errs in only noting three political mouths (other than his own) Musharraf has to feed. There’s a four rewardee, the JUI-F. Fazlur Rahman’s deeds on behalf of Musharraf in recent weeks, as well as in the past four years, cannot simply be wishful lobbying. JUI-F will likely play an important role in addressing issues of militancy in NWFP, Balochistan, and FATA. Washington probably recognizes and supports this. Moreover, it makes little sense for JUI-F to have enabled Musharraf’s re-election under the current parliament and the fracture of its political alliance only to be punished with a loss of provincial power.

The JUI-F will likely be a part of the NWFP government at least for the same reasons the MQM will share power with the PPP in Sindh. Both were used to displace the previous ruling party, which necessitates a ‘soft landing’ for them — especially since they’re still useful. The PPP’s Sindh compromise is a concession for power at the national level, though its relations with the MQM will have its share of challenges. Sethi doesn’t seem to give much thought to a PML-Q presence at the national level. Mushahid Hussain and others with the party have proposed the idea of a national unity government. While this remains possible, strong animosities between PML-Q stalwarts and the PPP, combined with Benazir Bhutto’s compromises vis-a-vis Musharraf, will likely prohibit her from entertaining such an idea. Why would she accept a prime ministership already diluted by the troika?

The general elections will be held under the rule of a caretaker government. At this point, there is only pure speculation as to who will be the interim prime minister. Candidates include: Jehangir Karamat, Ishrat Hussain, and Hamid Nasir Chattha. Tariq Aziz and Shujaat Hussain have been tasked with arranging for the interim set-up, but clearly Benazir will have significant input in these matters as they will factor significantly in the outcome of the elections (i.e. free and/or favorable).

Print Friendly


Arif Rafiq, a Washington, DC-based consultant on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues. [About]

For Media and Consulting Inquiries:
E-mail // Tel: +1(202) 713-5897

On Twitter:

On the Radio:
Arif Rafiq regularly appears on the John Batchelor Show Friday nights from 09:30-10:00pm Eastern Time. Tune your dial to 770AM in New York or 630AM in DC. The show appears on affiliates in other cities. Listen live online at WABCRadio.com.
AddThis Social Bookmark Button AddThis Feed Button


Pakistani Bloggers