Feb 26, 2009
Deferral Till Death
Last August, I wrote:
About deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry: it is strange how so many powerful Pakistanis fear one good judge. It is a testament to how much political and financial power are contingent upon a state of lawlessness and graft. It is also strange that the rule of law movement is being opposed so vigorously when Baitullah Mehsud has accelerated his plans to establish his own judicial system across the tribal areas. In a sense, Pakistanis face a choice between Iftikhar Chaudhry and Baitullah Mehsud. Eliminating the former is a vote for the latter.
Today, President Asif Zardari is on the verge of making peace with Mehsud’s [ex?-]associate Maulana Fazlullah. Without trying, Zardari has given up on establishing an effective civil judicial system in the greater Swat area.
At the same time, Zardari has declared war on a movement focused on establishing the rule of civil law, led by deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
The formula of [Judicial System - Leading Rule of Law Movement Symbol = No Competition for Medieval Militants] has essentially been realized.
The Peoples Party has used a strategy of deferral till death (or death by deferral) for ‘contentious’ issues, such as restoration of the restored judges.
But look at the costs. Law Minister Farooq Naik has been sitting on a “judicial reform” plan for around half a year. Reforms that would produce speedy, effective civil justice — such as establishing night courts — are being delayed so they can be packaged with a boat load of other goodies (such as lowering the judges’ retirement age from 65 to 62 to expedite CJ Iftikhar’s retirement to December 2010).
These goodies will be packaged with another set of goodies for other political parties (Pakhtunkhwa for the ANP; provincial autonomy for the ANP & MQM) to create a mega-constitutional package. The idea is that other political parties, save for the PML-N, will be satisfied enough as to go forward with neutering the courts (by removing the chief justice’s suo moto power) and not ask for a reduction in presidential powers.
[Regarding the presidential powers, note that on the very day Zardari was sworn in as president, Jehangir Badr began equivocating on the issue of nominalizing the presidency. Neither the ANP nor the MQM have proposed a reduction in presidential powers. Also, keep in mind that Washington does not trust Gilani. He is seen as not being able to keep a secret from the ISI.]
The cost of Zardari’s power grab and war against Iftikhar is clear. The ultimate victims of Zardari’s strategy of deferral till death are the Pakistani state system and the people it should be serving.
Update: 2/28 (12:25PM EST) — Babar Sattar, one of my favorite Pakistani columnists, writes:
“Our present system of governance is simply not sustainable and will need to be changed. But if the lawyers’ movement for reform fails, the only type of change that could follow would be the Taliban-style presently being endured by Swat.”
I think it’s kind of a stretch to draw this parallel. for everal reasons
1. you seem to be laying the entire blame of the dysfunctional judicial infrastructure in PATA, a problem that’s been over thirty years in the making at the feet of a government that’s only been in power for a year.
2. you are dismissing provincial autonomy as “goodies” — provinicial autonomy is arguably as important if not more important an issue as the restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry.
3. I mean, I realize that your comparison is theoretical, but looking at things consequentially the lawyer’s movement has largely been co-opted by right-wing groups that really seem to have no problem the taliban establishing a parallel system in the NWFP and FATA. Surely your analysis needs to take that into account — oddly, no one seems to be concerned that the lawyer’s movement has become a pawn for right wing fascists.
1. You’re right. It is a stretch. They are parallel/simulatenous phenomena. There are linkages, which I addressed. But it’s certainly not a one for one, causal relationship. At the very least, there is a high degree of irony. Still, I think specific strategies and tactics of the PPP-led gov’ts attempts to obstruct to the restoration of CJ Iftikhar have helped prevent the emergence of a credible, secular version of ‘speedy and effective’ justice. As for putting the blame on the PPP, I think it’s pretty clear it has been busy playing games and avoiding serious governance. That’s not to say it isn’t any different from previous governments. But being of the brink of disaster should produce behavioral change.
2. I should have been clearer. I don’t view the issue of provincial autonomy itself as a “goodie.” As a political offering, it is a goodie. The newly empowered provincial forces will apply the same level of lethargy to their provincial legislation as they do nationally. Provincial autonomy as a goody is about regional parties getting a bigger piece of the pie. Provincial autonomy as an issue is about more substantive things, such as more localized governance and representativeness.
3. I think it’s more accurate to say that the lawyers’ movement has been abandoned by the political left (ANP + PPP). And I think that should cause us to question their commitment to the rule of law and separation of powers. Also, I think the leadership of the lawyers’ movement has sought to control hard right elements in their midst. Aitzaz did not opt for a dharna in the last Long March in part because he realized that Jamiat and others simply wanted to create havock. The hard right is committed to the lawyers’ movement, because that’s all they have. But I don’t think the hard right is all that the lawyers have.
I have thought about whether the lawyers should aggressively speak out against the legal aspects of Talibanization. If they did so, I think that would facilitate the demise of their movement. They would be the targets of Taliban attacks. Subsequently, the PPP-led gov’t could restrict their public meetings under the pretense of defending the lawyers.
I think what they have been trying to do since the fall is to present the rule of law as a broad solution to Pakistan’s many problems — including poverty, social injustice, and terrorism. If you take a look at some of their recent meetings (and, specifically, CJ Iftikhar’s speech yesterday) they have been trying to address the issue of terrorism to some degree. They went to Dera Ghazi Khan, spoke against the recent suicide bombing, expressed their solidarity with the locals.
Also, Ali Ahmed Kurd also spoke about Balochistan and the injustices committed there. So I think the far-right aspect you emphasized is unfair. I appreciate the movement’s ethnic diversity.
FYI, during Iftikhar’s speech, I heard someone shout: “Naare-e Khilafah!” The man said it twice. No one replied.