Interesting footnote to the Khyber Agency raid that netted an alleged al Qaeda figure. 

BBC Urdu reports that locals claim two American commandos arrived on the scene in a tinted window vehicle to observe the operation.  Also, a U.S. Predator/Reaper drone flew over the area.  Pakistani government sources did not confirm or deny the reports.

The U.S. presence in Pakistan is both sensitive and, at times, underestimated.  

After September 11, Islamabad permitted a small, but significant U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and military presence inside the country.  

Joint raids were conducted with the Federal Bureau of Investigations.  United States Special Forces were embedded with Pakistani troops on raids inside North and South Waziristan.  The U.S. military was given access to airbases in Jacobabad and a couple in Balochistan.  Then there is the phenomenon of the missing persons. 

Pakistan also permitted “agents from the CIA, FBI and National Security Agency…to eavesdrop and conduct wiretaps on terrorism suspects” in the country.  This surveillance network has, perhaps, metastasized with or without the consent of Rawalpindi/Islamabad.  The United States has a “network of electronic data collection in Afghanistan and Pakistan [that] allows US experts to monitor hundreds of thousands of telephones and electronic mails every day.” 

It also has “set up a network of human intelligence collectors, which employs hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen.”  I would venture to speculate that officers of the Afghan National Army/Police often play such as role as well.

Her opinions likely coincide with someone’s at the GHQ or ISI HQ.  That is, probably, where her information comes from.  

So, I think a pertinent question is who in Pakistan’s military supports the granting of greater access to United States inside Pakistan and who’s against it?  Furthermore, how will these sentiments impact Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Asif Zardari?  

Neither have the consolidated power (and de-facto legitimacy) of pre-2004 Musharraf.  While former President Pervez Musharraf faced stiff opposition, resulting in several assassination attempts, there was no real threat to his hold on power till early 2007 (2003 was a bit dicey).  Disgruntled generals were ushered out; many were paid off with cushy civilian jobs and real estate.  Access to the same resources is likely more limited now.  As for the general public, resentment toward U.S. involvement inside Pakistan has become deeply embedded inside the Pakistani middle class now more than ever.

Prudence and the law of unintended consqeuences call for a small footprint and treading lightly.