On Saturday, a group of less than 500 politicians annointed Asif Ali Zardari as the next president of Pakistan. It was less the victory of democracy, and more that of small-minded elites.

These politicians have bandwagoned around Zardari — a man bankrupt of achievement, aptitude, moral rectitude, and public esteem, blamed by many for the downfall of his wife’s political career during the 1990s, effectively separated/estranged from her and indifferent to politics a year and a half back and now the inheritor of her checkered legacy.

They have lavished Zardari with undeserved platitudes and legitimacy.

They say, Zardari is a symbol of the federation. If he is, he indicates that it is corrupted and ignorant of its own best interests.

They say, Zardari and his party have a mandate; it is the majority party. Not true. The PPP has a majority only in Sindh — not in the center and not in the other provinces. In reality, no party has a national mandate. Hence the presence of coalition governments across the board and hence the logic of a non-partisan, non-controversial president.

Most likely, these politicians will ride Zardari to the mountain top and, once his political apex has been reached, push him down the other side. That is the story of Pakistani politics. But, in attaching themselves to such a controversial and erratic figure, they risk delegitimizing themselves. After all, this is the PPP — the Pakistan Pirs Party or the Populist Patrimonial Party, I would say — a cult that unites liberal, feudal, and serf in an awkward union.  In cults, there are no checks and balances.

And in a sign of the increasing personalization of things, i.e. Zardarization or the development of a cult of Zardari, the Sindh government initially announced that Monday would be a holiday to commemorate Zardari’s election. This was later rescinded by Zardari. How magnanimous. The PPP-led government of Sindh has put paid advertisements on private television channels congratulating Zardari on his election, displaying the PPP flag and previous leaders, and thanking the other political parties that voted for him. These were clearly PPP advertisements paid for with public funds.

Political power has been concentrated in the hands of a single man — the head of a party without a national majority.

Zardari is the president, head of the largest party, controls a puppet prime minister, and has a pliant supreme court. His personal defense lawyer is the law minister. His best friend’s wife is the speaker of the National Assembly. Another close associate is head of the Intelligence Bureau.  Personal friends have been and will continue to be posted in other critical positions across the country.  A nepotocracy, if you will.

The big question is: will Zardari reduce presidential powers to their original, nominal level?  That he says that he will does not make it guaranteed.  Remember, Amin Fahim was to be prime minister.  Remember, all judges were to be restored by an executive order (according to three separate agreements).  

Based on this year’s experience, Zardari will make promises and will have plenty of excuses to explain why he cannot fulfill them.  He will ‘try.’  He will move forward, back, and even sideways.  Often, he will admit that he simply lied.  Who cares?  Like He-Man, he has the power. And in the end, these powers are likely to stay.  

A possible strategy for Zardari is to initiate the process of reducing presidential powers, but tack on a host of other controversial issues in a massive amendment.  This would produce a drawn out process that in the end yields little change and has Zardari defeating his opponents by attrition.  Or, there will all of a sudden be a rising chorus of jiyalas and lifafa journalists who will call on Zardari to not reduce his powers.  Zardari will say, “My party has asked me to retain these powers.  The exigencies of today call for a powerful president.”

In a sense, little has changed since the departure of Musharraf.  Pakistan has gone from Mush to Much (mustache).  A one stop shop for foreign countries still exists to an extent, though Zardari does not and will never control the army and ISI.  But Zardari has the same powers as Musharraf and continues much of the same policies.  Though the election of a new president does not mean there is a new government, pundits writing advice to Zardari in the newspapers implicitly acknowledge that he is the de-facto head of government.  They speak of the policies he must pursue and the changes he must make.  Mr. Gilani has disappeared.  It is as if the assassination attempt on him was successful.  And it’s an indirect endorsement of the presidential system.

Additionally, there has been a recycling of characters from the Musharraf era: Mian Manzoor Wattoo, Salmaan Taseer, Hamid Nasir Chatta, Hina Rabbani Khar, Mahmoud Ali Durrani, and Abida Hussain (a sixteenth time turncoat). The governing coalition — consisting of the MQM (soon), JUI-F, and PML-Q liberals – is effectively the same as the last, except for the ANP.  [I consider the JUI-F as part of the last government.] 

All this and the breakup of the PPP-PML(N) coalition, the defeat of the lawyers’ movement, and consolidation of power in the hands of Zardari represents the culmination of efforts to sabatoge the mandate of February 18th.