Asif Zardari will most probably be in the driver’s seat, officially, within a few months.

This weekend, he announced that he’ll run for parliament in the June by-elections. More importantly, he told BBC Urdu that he’ll become prime minister “if necessary,” giving himself wide latitude to make a push for the premiership in the summer.

In recent months, Zardari has appointed loyalists to key positions, including: Rehman Malik (de-facto interior minister), Fehmida Mirza (National Assembly speaker), Zulfiqar Mirza (Sindh home secretary), and Farooq Naik (law minister). He’s pushed out Amin Fahim, who would be less willing to vacate the post of prime minister than Yousaf Raza Gillani. Zardari has progressed considerably toward consolidating his control over the PPP.

Zardari’s behavior, in this respect, has been quite methodical. But there are questions that remain regarding his future intentions.

The Judges
Zardari alternates between committing to the restoration of all the deposed judges and lambasting them as too “political” and unwilling to come to his aid. So what’s the purpose of the self-righteousness? Is it to create an opening for the “minus one” formula, i.e. restoring all the judges except Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, or a constitutional package that would reduce their powers? Or does Zardari simply seek to apply ‘moral’ pressure publicly on the judges, putting them on the defensive, thereby indirectly ensuring they will operate to his favor?

The Future of Musharraf
Pervez Musharraf has been making concession after concession to Zardari (e.g. dropping all corruption and murder cases, eliminating the graduation requirement). So, what does Zardari owe Musharraf in return? A Manhattan condo with a nice view of Central Park? Or a couple more years as defanged president?

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement
A previous round of talks with the MQM broke down. The party was not represent in the first cabinet induction phase. But the federal and Sindh cabinets are expected to grow ad infinitum, creating future opportunities for the MQM to join the government. Zardari, however, has been speaking softly while carrying a big stick. His party’s government has taken steps to bring back to politics the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi)–the rival of Altaf Hussain’s Muttahida Qaumi Movement.

The Muslim League-Nawaz
All these questions deeply involved the PML-N, which has been committed to the judges’ restoration, opposed to Musharraf, and hostile toward the MQM. Zardari’s been playing big tent politics to an extent. But his tent is near its occupancy limit. Either some inside will have to be removed or the door will need to be shut.

The Dubai-based station al-Arabiya has broadcast video of Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin, who was kidnapped in the Khyber Agency in February. He says he is being held by Taliban forces and requested that their demands be met so he can be released.

The station translated Azizuddin’s comments from Urdu into Arabic. Later, GEO News also broadcasted the video in its original Urdu.

The ambassador says, “I am Tariq Azizuddin, the ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan.  On Februrary 11, we were on our way toward Afghanistan in our official car.  We were grabbed in the Khyber Agency after Ali mosque…by mujahideen of the Taliban…We are their guests…”

He asked the government of Pakistan to comply with the Taliban demands, which he did not specify. Interestingly, he asked that Pakistan’s ambassadors in Tehran and Beijing “to do all they can to protect their lives and to answer all the demands of the Mujahedeen of Taliban in order to secure their release.”

Rahimullah Yusufzai tells GEO that the Taliban requested the release of 10 Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, including Mullah Obaidullah. He also said that the Taliban let Azizuddin speak with his family twice. Previously the Taliban have been said to request the release of Mansoor Dadullah, captured by Pakistani security forces immediately before Azizuddin’s kidnapping.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Education has posted a draft version of its 2008 education policy. [PDF]

A message on the ministry’s website requests feedback from specialists. Correspondence can be sent to:

Mr. T. M. Qureshi
Ph: 051-9262043
Fax: 051-9260945
E-Mail: tmqureshi2000@yahoo.com or jea_pnd@yahoo.com

Update: Link above, previously incorrect, has been fixed.

The by-elections for the national and provincial assemblies, originally scheduled for June 3, will now occur on June 18.  The period for submitting nomination papers has been extended to May 6.  The original deadline was this coming Monday.

This gives the government additional time to have the Supreme Court remove the graduation requirement, which currently prevents Asif Zardari from running for parliament.  It also gives Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif additional time to secure their electoral eligibility, either through a deal with Pervez Musharraf or a decision in their favor from a friendly Supreme Court.  The governing coalition has agreed to restore the deposed judiciary, but there are internal differences over their self-imposed deadline.  The sacked court, seen as more favorable to Nawaz Sharif than the present court, could be restored by the end of this month.

General Accountability Office, “The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.” [PDF]

• “The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA region. Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address its national security goals. There have been limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes of terrorism in the FATA by providing development assistance or by addressing the FATA’s political needs. Of the over $10.5 billion that the United States has provided to Pakistan from 2002 through 2007, we identified about $5.8 billion specifically for Pakistan’s FATA and border region; about 96 percent of this funding reimbursed Pakistan for military operations in the FATA and the border region. According to Defense and State Department officials, Pakistan deployed up to 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and killed and captured hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives. In October 2007, State reported that it had determined that Pakistan was making ‘significant’ progress toward eliminating the safe haven in the FATA. However, we found broad agreement, as documented in the unclassified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), State and embassy documents, as well as among Defense, State, and other officials, including those operating in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA.”
• “We are recommending that the National Security Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other executive departments as deemed appropriate, work to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to combat the terrorist threat and close the associated safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA region.”

Daniel Korski, “Afghanistan: Europe’s forgotten war,” European Council on Foreign Relations. [PDF]

• “The international coalition should agree on a strategy led by political rather than military goals. This should include: outreach to the Taliban…regional cooperation…”
• “It will also be necessary to address the causes of Pakistan’s quest for ‘strategic depth’ – its fears of encirclement by India. Delhi’s assistance to Afghanistan has been considerable with Indian-donated Tata buses now an obvious part of Kabul’s public transportation system. India is also making important contributions to Afghan education, including rebuilding Habibia High School in Kabul, and President Karzai – who was educated in India – has visited Delhi several times. But this support is seen in Islamabad – and perhaps even more so in the Pakistani military headquarters in Rawalphindi – as part of a deliberate strategy to encircle Pakistan.”

In March, the Pakistan government dropped its last court case against Asif Zardari. Tomorrow, a Supreme Court panel will review the Pervez Musharraf-initiated law requiring elected officials to have a bachelor’s degree. They are expected to rule it unconstitutional.

Zardari, who likely does not have a bachelor’s degree, will be the greatest beneficiary of such a ruling. All legal roadblocks to his parliamentary return will soon be gone, paving his way for a run in June’s by-elections. If elected to the parliament, Zardari could replace Yousaf Raza Gillani as prime minister.  Zardari has till Monday to submit his nomination papers for the National Assembly elections, so we’ll be saved from a prolonged discussion of: “Will he run or not?”

Meanwhile, there’s no indication the government has made any accommodations for the Sharif brothers, who are presently banned from elected office due to previous convictions. But they will submit their forms anyway. By next week, we’ll see what Zardari’s political plans are and whether the Sharifs have come to an understanding with Musharraf and/or “the establishment.”

Last week, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the United States and other donor countries are “exploring ways to export electricity from Central Asia beyond Afghanistan to Pakistan and eventually India.”  And today, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson’s met with Pakistan’s Petroleum Minister Khawaja Asif to discuss ways Washington can help Islamabad’s energy-related challenges.

But Washington’s hope for a Central-South Asia energy pact could be, pun very much intended, a pipe dream.  The major reason: instability in Afghanistan.  Any gas pipeline or electricity grid connection to Pakistan would have to pass through Afghanistan.  The insurgency in its present condition makes construction impossible.  In fact, the pipeline construction could serve as a big target for insurgents.

That’s not to say work on the pipeline can’t begin.  Perhaps the long discussed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline could go through Kabul instead of Kandahar.  The post-Kabul portion could be completed if and once things settle in Afghanistan’s restive south.

But that does little for Pakistan, whose expensive and inadequate energy supplies are hitting the common man and industrialists hard.  It is emerging as a security concern.  In the immediate term, Pakistan has resorted to requesting grants of petroleum from Saudi Arabia and gas from Qatar.  In the medium term, it will likely exploit coal deposits in Sindh and could go forward with an Iran gas pipeline project, with or without India.  Pervez Musharraf has even suggested bringing China aboard, perhaps to put pressure on India.

Washington has been lobbying against the IPI pipeline for years, but if it really wants to nip the project in the bud, it will probably have to find an energy solution for Pakistan not originating in Central Asia.  Gas-rich Qatar can serve as an alternative to Iran, but the Iranian option is considerably cheaper.

Transliteration and translation

If former Army Chief of Staff Gen. (retired) Mirza Aslam Baig is correct, parliament will soon move to repeal article 58(2)(b) of the constitution, which gives the president the broad authority to dissolve the National Assembly. But in a post-1998 Pakistan, there is a presidential power that is of greater concern to others, including Washington: that over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

After taking power in his 1999 coup, Pervez Musharraf moved immediately to establish a nuclear command and control system. He has succeeded in doing so and should be credited for this. Washington has also been discretely helpful, providing over $100 million since 2001 to help Pakistan safeguard its nuclear assets. Its helpfulness, however, could now be verging on interference.

Pakistan is in a state of political and constitutional flux. Currently, the National Command Authority (NCA) maintains ultimate control over Pakistan’s nukes. It is chaired by the president, Pervez Musharraf, a known and reasonably trustworthy entity in the eyes of Washington. At this point, there has been no indication that parliament will make changes to the NCA. But if Musharraf goes, then that power would transfer on to his successor, whoever that might be. A post-Musharraf president would likely be a nominal figure. Parliament would probably move to make the prime minister head of the NCA.

Amidst this uncertainty, Washington is seeking to develop a direct link to the NCA. The News reports that Washington wants to place a “permanent official” at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad who would have “direct access to the National Command Authority secretariat.”

The request has not been received well in Pakistan (what has?). Senior defense analyst and retired general Talat Masood, who is generally favorable to the U.S., tells The News:

“This is outright interference in Pakistan’s affairs. On what basis does the US want direct access to the NCA? Does the US have any particular fears or apprehensions? The US laws do not allow any transfer of nuclear technology or assets to Pakistan, so why should there be any such officer in the US embassy in Islamabad? There would be very grave implications if such a proposal is given serious thought by our government.”

Senior Bush administration officials have repeatedly expressed their confidence in Pakistan’s command and control system. That is clearly not the issue. Washington’s problem is not with the system, but the future of its leadership. It apparently has little faith in a president or prime minister other than Musharraf with ultimate control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Rather than cultivating a relationship with a broad spectrum of Pakistan’s civilian elites, Washington all too often skirts those it dislikes and could very well be antagonizing a future master of Pakistan’s nukes. This NCA liaison position is the Bush administration’s lazy way of getting around the more time consuming challenge of pro-actively engaging Pakistan’s politicians.

Pakistan’s election commission announced the schedule for by-elections for the national and provincial assemblies. The polls will be held on June 3rd.

Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif are expected to run, respectively, for a seat in the national and Punjab provincial assembly. They registered for the 2007-8 elections, but their papers were rejected due to previous convictions.

With the same courts, election commission, and legal barriers in place, one can expect an identical decision this time. Yet, their electoral rejection would seem to say that the ‘new republic’ differs little from the ‘ancien regime’. It would also complicate ties between the PPP and PML-N.

Will the Sharifs have to make some compromises in order to return to elected office? Will they have to accept the minus one formula (which restores all judges except Iftikhar Chaudhry), provide Asif Zardari assurances that the National Reconciliation Ordinance will go unmolested, or agree to keep a somewhat defanged Musharraf in power?

It’s not clear. But it is reasonable to assume that such matters have already been discussed, though not necessarily finalized, in talks between the PML-N and PPP. Still, time is running out for the Sharifs. The election commission will accept nomination papers from tomorrow till April 21. The papers will be scrutinized from April 22-28. Appeals will be accepted till May 2. Final decisions will be announced on May 9.

Expect to see some rumbling over this next week.