If former Army Chief of Staff Gen. (retired) Mirza Aslam Baig is correct, parliament will soon move to repeal article 58(2)(b) of the constitution, which gives the president the broad authority to dissolve the National Assembly. But in a post-1998 Pakistan, there is a presidential power that is of greater concern to others, including Washington: that over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

After taking power in his 1999 coup, Pervez Musharraf moved immediately to establish a nuclear command and control system. He has succeeded in doing so and should be credited for this. Washington has also been discretely helpful, providing over $100 million since 2001 to help Pakistan safeguard its nuclear assets. Its helpfulness, however, could now be verging on interference.

Pakistan is in a state of political and constitutional flux. Currently, the National Command Authority (NCA) maintains ultimate control over Pakistan’s nukes. It is chaired by the president, Pervez Musharraf, a known and reasonably trustworthy entity in the eyes of Washington. At this point, there has been no indication that parliament will make changes to the NCA. But if Musharraf goes, then that power would transfer on to his successor, whoever that might be. A post-Musharraf president would likely be a nominal figure. Parliament would probably move to make the prime minister head of the NCA.

Amidst this uncertainty, Washington is seeking to develop a direct link to the NCA. The News reports that Washington wants to place a “permanent official” at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad who would have “direct access to the National Command Authority secretariat.”

The request has not been received well in Pakistan (what has?). Senior defense analyst and retired general Talat Masood, who is generally favorable to the U.S., tells The News:

“This is outright interference in Pakistan’s affairs. On what basis does the US want direct access to the NCA? Does the US have any particular fears or apprehensions? The US laws do not allow any transfer of nuclear technology or assets to Pakistan, so why should there be any such officer in the US embassy in Islamabad? There would be very grave implications if such a proposal is given serious thought by our government.”

Senior Bush administration officials have repeatedly expressed their confidence in Pakistan’s command and control system. That is clearly not the issue. Washington’s problem is not with the system, but the future of its leadership. It apparently has little faith in a president or prime minister other than Musharraf with ultimate control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Rather than cultivating a relationship with a broad spectrum of Pakistan’s civilian elites, Washington all too often skirts those it dislikes and could very well be antagonizing a future master of Pakistan’s nukes. This NCA liaison position is the Bush administration’s lazy way of getting around the more time consuming challenge of pro-actively engaging Pakistan’s politicians.