The Afghanistan Study Group of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, one of the sponsors of the Iraq Study Group, issued a report yesterday recommending several changes in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.

Who’s Behind the Report
The report was produced by a 22-member team led by retired General James Jones and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Pakistan specialists involved in the study group include Heritage Foundation Fellow Lisa Curtis, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth, former Ambassador Dennis Kux (author of an excellent study on U.S.-Pakistan relations), and former State Department analyst Marvin Weinbaum. Input was also received from senior Afghan, American, and Pakistani diplomats. The study group was funded by Malik Hassan, a wealthy Pakistani-American entrepreneur and Republican donor.

Major Points
The Jones-Pickering report features a large number of recommendations, including:

• de-linking Afghanistan and Iraq policies and funding;
• appointing a U.S. special envoy who would function as an Afghanistan czar;
• increasing and accelerating infrastructural and industrial development aid;
• improving regional cooperation for Afghan development and Pakistan-based security challenges;
• and helping Hamid Karzai with national reconciliation.

Relevance to Pakistan

New player, new dynamics
The idea of creating a special envoy who would manage all aspects of the U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is, as the report acknowledges, somewhat controversial. The new appointee would supplant the present ambassador as well other U.S. civilian and military officials. Above all, it would introduce a new player into relations between the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The envoy’s responsibilities would inevitably bleed into Pakistan as well, and it is possible that the dynamics surrounding the appointment would result in greater U.S. weightage toward perceived Afghan interests vis-a-vis Pakistan.  In other words, Pakistan might be further pressed to act in a manner more consistent with the interests of Karzai and/or the U.S. than its own.
Ending the not-so-great game?
In more general terms, the report lists “reducing antagonisms between Pakistan and Afghanistan” as a “top priority” for the United States.   At the heart of this would be an exchange of definitive Pakistani deliverance vis-a-vis the flow of militants and other security issues for “encourage[ment]” of Afghan recognition of the Durand Line.

Achieving the latter would be difficult, considering Afghanistan’s historic obstinacy on the issue. Nonetheless, it remains an imperative.  Cementing the Pak-Afghan border, at least on paper, would provide a significant paradigmatic shift in Pak-Afghan relations.  It would help allay mutual suspicion of interference and intrigue, and need not inhibit the flow of people and goods along the border.

At this point, however, it is difficult to see Washington pressing Karzai to make any definitive moves in this regard.  The Pak-Afghan border issue has largely been ignored in the Western policy discourse.  And when it comes up, the difficulty of Karzai’s political position is often used to brush it aside.
And so an interesting alternative comes in a proposal offered in a recent addition of the American Interest by former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann.  He writes:

“we must find an acceptable way to express a middle ground between the Pakistani demand for Afghan legal acknowledgement of the frontier and the inability of weak Afghan governments to compel its people to accept division. This formula makes the border essentially permanent by officially recognizing what is, after all, the real situation, but it stops short of asking for a final and formal Afghan concession to Pakistan. Acceptance of this or similar language would be a compromise by both sides.”

The essential principle would be that:

“Both sides must agree that the current frontier is not to be modified without the consent of both governments and their peoples.”

In other words, there would be a de-facto recognition of the Durand Line by both Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Neumann’s proposal has a strong short-term value, but anything short of a final status accord beyond that time period would make this band-aid measure wear off.  The Pak-Afghan border issue would remain the elephant in the room and make easy a quick reversion to mutual intrigue.  As a result, Karzai will eventually have to exercise political courage on the Pak-Afghan border issue, and Washington should help him get there.