i’m also wondering how much decision-making power he has vis-a-vis a restructuring of the military. our military is designed at present to fight a conventional war against india across the plains of punjab and the heights of kashmir. it is not designed to fight groups of 200-300 militants at a time practicing unconventional tactics. yes there has been training in new methods etc especially in consort with the americans but i’m wondering if we need a newer, lighter and more agile military to deal with this threat.

on the other hand, any restructuring is probably unlikely at this stage. even though i don’t think india is a threat per se, the army has to treat it as such if we’re being realistic. it took the collapse of the soviet union for the US to draw down its military. i don’t see india going anywhere any time soon.

anyways, thanks for replying. always interesting to hear your thoughts.

Swat was far less of a challenge for the Pakistani military than the tribal areas. The terrain is not as forbidding. Maulana Fazlullah’s militia is smaller and less sophisticated than Baitullah Mehsud’s. Most important, the Army itself, not the rag tag Frontier Corps, met Fazlullah’s forces swiftly starting in late November. ER served Musharraf’s goal to suppress the judiciary and the private media, though it was couched in faux-Lincolnism and false linkages between the media and terrorism.

In respect to the third issue, it’s difficult to say. Returning back to the barracks isn’t so simple. It requires attitudinal, behavior, and institutional changes. Voids must be filled by civilians. And so I think that requires coordination/cooperation. The basis for that seems present. I think difficulty would emerge, as you note, if Kayani is compelled to abandon a more gradual timeline.

In terms of making a push against mush, I think Mush ’s statements as of late suggest he’s fought one too many battles. If he’s going to be tested big time, he could back out without a fight. So I think the likelihood of Mush asking Kayani to break some knuckles for him would be low. In the event he does, Kayani would likely act in a manner that 1) maintains law and order, 2) preserves the image of his independence and apolitical status, and 3) does not add to his or the army’s burden. So I think he’d be heavily inclined to help Mush gracefully leave the scene and find a set of civilian partners to fill in the hole.

I have a couple of thoughts and would love to get your opinion on them. First, there seems to be a high correlation between the proclamation of the emergency a couple of months ago, and greater success against militants in the *settled* areas of Pakistan (swat etc), though of course it bears repeating that we are seeing failure on top failure in the unsettled areas. however, i don’t see correlation as causation. the emergency was a political measure, and greater success in swat-like areas seems to be a result of military measures. my question to you is: is the concurrence of the political and military measures a coincidence? i think it is, but i’d like to hear what you have to say.

my second thought is more of a comment than a question: i’m very glad to see AA back in the fold. BB’s shunning of AA was shameful, and i’m glad to see it rectified.

my third thought is a mixture of a comment and a question: i’ve been very impressed with kayani. i didnt know much about him other than the many news reports that accompanied his rise to COAS, but i like his emphasis on military related issues. it’s heartening to see. my question is: in your best estimate, do you think it will stay this way? put in other words, what set of political exigencies, if any, do you think it will take for him to get drawn in? my suspicion is something along the lines of musharraf directing the army to put down mass protests after an unfair election might do the trick, though i would stress such circumstances in my view are unlikely. still, if they *were* to arise, do you think he’d say no and make a push against mush?