For the third time in recent months, military targets in Rawalpindi — the nerve center of Pakistan’s army — have been hit by militants likely affiliated with the neo-Taliban.

On September 4, two suicide bombers killed approximately 25 people in attacks on an ISI personnel bus and a market area.

On October 30, a single suicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint for the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ), in not-so-distant proximity to the residence of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Tariq Majeed, killing seven people.

Today, two suicide bombers again attacked an ISI personnel bus and a checkpoint for the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ), killing at least 30 people.

The militants have failed to penetrate the security cordon around the army’s headquarters. They are unlikely to do so. However, they will clearly continue to attack the perimeters of installations holding high-value targets as well as softer targets associated with the big guns. Attacks at checkpoints distant from Pakistan’s senior military brass are of limited utility alone; however, that perception changes when packaged with blasts that kill dozens of low-mid level personnel elsewhere in the city.

Pakistan’s security services need to improve protection measures for areas where its non-senior personnel congregate. After the multiple assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf, security has been beefed up for senior Pakistani officials. But more needs to be done for its lower ranked and non-commissioned officers. Insiders cooperating with the militants need to aggressively rooted out; their assistance has likely been essential in recent attacks on unmarked military vehicles in Swat and elsewhere.

The militants seek to demonstrate that they can battle not only on ‘their own’ turf on in the northwest, but also in Pakistan’s major cities and near the heart of the army. They have yet to impact the Pakistani military from the top down; but the army’s leadership cannot afford to be complacent about attacks that could impact them from the bottom up. That requires neither emergency rule nor a stranglehold on public assembly; it necessitates action against militant co-conspirators within Pakistan’s military-intelligence community and a comprehensive review of the security logistics for the military’s installations and personnel.