With the plug pulled on its leading independent television news channels and power brokers Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Pervez Musharraf being relatively mum or cryptic in recent days, it would seem as if the film and television writers’ strike has made its way to Pakistan. In reality, the political drama continues. All is not so quiet on the Pakistani front.

Though the leading mouths have been less charitable since Friday than before, their travel itineraries and behind-the-scenes chatter speak louder.

Indeed, this week and the next will likely witness some significant developments in Pakistan’s political landscape.

WALKING THE WALK
John Negroponte visited Rawalpindi-Islamabad from Friday to Sunday. He spoke with Benazir Bhutto via telephone and met with Pervez Musharraf, Tariq Aziz (Musharraf’s childhood friend and national security adviser), Ashfaq Kayani (vice chief of the army), Khurshid Kasuri (previous foreign minister), and Nadeem Taj (ISI chief).

Benazir Bhutto was released from house arrest on Friday and headed to Karachi on Saturday.

Musharraf too made his way to Karachi, spending Saturday and Sunday there. Today, he flew to Riyadh and met with Saudi ruler Abdullah. He’ll head out to Makkah, to perform the umrah — the secondary, non-obligatory pilgrimage — before returning to Pakistan.

TALKING THE TALK
Discussions of the significance of the converging and non-converging itineraries have ranged from reasonable attempts at connecting the dots to blatant disinformation or speculation.

Bhutto and Negroponte

Some have pointed attention toward Negroponte’s non-meeting with Bhutto; they merely chatted on the phone on Friday. Bhutto was expected to fly from Lahore to Islamabad to meet Negroponte on Saturday. Instead, she flew to Karachi.

Negroponte certainly had time to meet with Bhutto. He was in Pakistan for 2.5 days and managed to meet Ashfaq Kayani twice, as David Rohde reports. So, did Negroponte refuse to meet with Bhutto on his own accord, or did he do so at Musharraf’s request? It remains unclear. Both theories have weight.

What is clear is that the Bush administration has yet to really embrace Bhutto — at least publicly. If there’s been any embrace, it’s been at arm’s length. White House officials speaking on the record rarely, if ever, refer to her by name; instead, they speak of “moderate elements” and “moderate forces” — i.e. Bhutto and Musharraf — that they hope can join together.

This is done, ostensibly, to assuage those who believe the U.S. seeks to prefigure Pakistan’s elections with an arranged Bhutto-Musharraf marriage. But there are other plausible explanations.

One, it’s possible that the administration doesn’t want to insinuate that a Bhutto-Musharraf partnership would be one of equals. Furthermore, it wouldn’t want to heighten Bhutto’s status should Musharraf be taken out of the equation. Washington would like to see Musharraf’s role, should he vacate the political scene, be played by someone of reasonably similar power and outlook, i.e. Ashfaq Kayani. Due to the military’s power in Pakistan and the primacy of security over all other U.S. interests there, it would like to ensure that Musharraf’s successor wears the pants in the relationship with Bhutto. Only a military person would be able to guarantee action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as the safety of Pakistan’s nukes. Bhutto’s role, therefore, can be seen as semi-cosmetic.

Secondly, it appears that the Bush administration does not yet fully trust Bhutto. Why, after all, did she need to bring in Burson-Marsteller to do her PR push? Why did she — in her pre-Pakistan return Washington lobbying drive — need to make statements in favor of giving the IAEA access to A.Q. Khan, permitting the U.S. military to act on Pakistani soil, and giving precedence to non-Kashmir issues in peace talks with India? Bhutto likely sensed the administration was not yet completely sold on her and wanted to show that she would be a greater asset than Musharraf.

The administration was likely disappointed with her breaking off talks with Musharraf, calling for the return of the deposed Supreme Court justices, and attempt to hold the Long March. Since Negroponte’s meeting with Bhutto would signal a new level of acceptance of her by the Bush administration, it’s possible that not only Musharraf, but also Negroponte did not want the meeting to occur.

Bhutto’s appearance on CNN’s Late Edition was quite telling. She seems to have been fine with Negroponte’s message to her, but it’s also clear she is being pushed toward talking with Musharraf again. Wolf Blitzer asked Bhutto if she would resume talks with Musharraf if he resigned from the army, lifted the state of emergency, and held free and fair elections. Bhutto seemed genuinely annoyed, resisted answering the question — stating “Wolf, I know where you’re taking me..” — and instead discussed the many factors that would preclude free and fair elections (e.g. interference by local nazims). Trust between Bhutto and Musharraf has deteriorated; they, in fact, seem to have descended into a strong dislike for one another resembling the perpetual Shujaat-Benazir war of words.

Bhutto and Musharraf

The loss of trust between Bhutto and Musharraf will continue to shape their decision making. From Musharraf’s perspective, Bhutto used him to gain re-entry into Pakistan and then started playing the politics of “agitation.” Beneath the glamorous veneer that has enamored the West, Musharraf sees a corrupt and shallow interior. Bhutto believes Musharraf is playing her (and possibly the United States) for a fool. She remains distressed with the level of commitment he’s demonstrated to the PML-Q. Bhutto fears that after election day, she’ll wake up to a Chaudhry Pervez Ellahi premiership; she would head the opposition — used as a pawn to legitimize an election she gained little from. She also doesn’t think Washington is paying the attention it needs to ensure free and fair elections. Bhutto’s demands include a reasonable ability to publicly campaign (including in the Punjab) and local governments to be frozen.

Due to U.S. pressure, Bhutto and Musharraf, however, will likely resume talks — if they haven’t already. They were in Karachi on Saturday and Sunday, stirring up speculation that they resumed negotiations. A meeting this past weekend would seem a bit premature, though their aides are definitely talking to one another.

Still, a resumption of talks isn’t a guarantee of cooperation between the two. Though Bhutto is being pulled toward Musharraf by the U.S. (as well as some of her interests — e.g. the corruption cases), she’s also being pulled away from him by the street (as well as her lack of trust in him and possibly the U.S.). As head of the People’s Party, she cannot afford to swim against the populist tide — which also resonates with many in her party. After insinuating that the charges made against the deposed justices have some basis, she backtracked and began to support their restoration to office. So the street has an influence on her. Bhutto will return to the tables more cautious than ever — ready to jump ship if and when the sun sets on Musharraf.

In the end, she will choose the course she sees as most likely guaranteeing her a return to the premiership. That’s her litmus test.

Musharraf and Nawaz

Musharraf has met with the Saudi leader Abdullah as well as the intelligence chief Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz. Highly speculative reports — likely disinformation — state that he will also meet with Nawaz Sharif, as Sharif is in Jeddah — very close to Makkah, where Musharraf will be doing umrah.

It’s highly unlikely that Musharraf will meet Nawaz. In fact, Musharraf probably wants the Saudis to keep Sharif in captivity till the elections are done. Nawaz’s return would destabilize Musharraf’s political base, the PML-Q, which he’s demonstrated strong loyalty to in recent weeks.

Nawaz claims he has rejected three meeting requests by Musharraf in recent months. Much of his political appeal nowadays stems from him being the anti-Musharraf. Bhutto, in the eyes of much of the electorate, is tainted by her talks with Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif, his tremendous flaws notwithstanding, has — in their eyes — not danced with the ‘devil’. Playing the anti-Musharraf card will be his ticket to political redemption.

If Nawaz were to meet Musharraf, it would likely be under heavy Saudi pressure. They would like to see his return to Pakistan and understand that can only occur in the near-term with Musharraf’s consent. In the end, however, reports of a Nawaz-Musharraf meeting are likely to be disinformation to discredit Sharif, put pressure on the Bhutto camp (with Musharraf saying “I got other options”), or to further distrust within the opposition.

WHAT COMES NEXT?
Musharraf hopes to return from Saudi Arabia with assurances that Nawaz Sharif will be held at bay till the completion of the January elections. On Thursday, the Supreme Court will remove the final petition blocking his re-election. Musharraf will, as early as Saturday, resign from the army and begin his civilian presidency.

Elections are scheduled for January 8, 2007. But there’s still much in the air and much that can occur in between now and then.

Approximately 3,000 political prisoners have been released. However, 200 journalists were arrested today, and it remains unlikely that the deposed Supreme Court justices and senior opposition figures such as Imran Khan will be freed; after all, he’s being tried under an anti-terror law. Some have suggested GEO News and ARY One World will resume broadcast in Pakistan, but that would only occur if they concede to governmental censorship. Also, the violence in Swat threatens not only the possibility of elections there, but throughout the NWFP as well.

There are two major questions: will elections occur under emergency rule, and will the opposition parties participate?

Musharraf has shown little willingness to lift emergency rule before the elections. At the same time, he needs the PPP’s participation in order to give the polls the requisite legitimacy. The opposition parties and Washington have made it clear that elections held under a suspended constitution are not acceptable. If he choses to hold elections under emergency rule, he will make sure to balance out the bad news with some good. He will attempt to let some steam out of the pot in a managed fashion. His resignation from the army will be one attempt toward this.

Candidate nominations for the elections will be accepted starting tomorrow, and so we’ll get a stronger sense of the opposition’s intentions soon. The opposition is split between the PML-N-dominated All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) and the PPP-dominated All Parties Conference (APC). The APDM has expressed willingness to work under the APC, but the distrust between and within the two entities remains considerable. Fazlur Rahman of the JUI-F and MMA will not boycott the elections. Furthermore, Bhutto sees her boycott of the 1985 elections as a mistake and fears repeating it.

In the end, the street might be the wild card that makes the decision for the ambivalent political forces. If their protests strengthen and grow in response to a forceful response by Musharraf, then the political opposition — particularly the PPP — will be compelled to distance themselves from him even more. And, if a threshold of violence and instability is passed, senior figures in the Pakistani Army might also decide the same.