The Pakistan Policy Blog

All is not well between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani.  

In resisting the complete domination of Zardari, the man from Multan has signalled that he is a vertebrate.  That surprised Zardari, who for prime minister simply sought a backboneless ball of fat with a mustached face.  

Tensions between the two have metastasized so much that Zardari, according to Islamabad chatter, is considering replacing Gilani with another pir, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, presently foreign minister.  

A more deserving but less likely candidate would be Sherry Rehman.  Presently information minister, Rehman is far more diligent and intelligent than her Peoples Party peers (and pirs).  Making her PM would, however, spark further gossip regarding Zardari’s closeness to Rehman, notwithstanding its baselessness.

Qureshi is the more probable candidate to succeed Gilani should the latter’s relationship with Zardari deteriorate further.  He is certainly an upgrade.  Qureshi is more articulate and urbane than the present PM.  He exudes confidence and competence (just don’t ask him what’s the price of compressed natural gas).  And he is ambitious.  These traits put him on the radar of the ‘kingmakers’ abroad.  Then add the fact that his primary job is to deal with these parties.  

But Qureshi’s strengths are also, vis-a-vis Zardari, his weaknesses.  Zardari seeks a compliant PM, not a competent one.  His misplaced priorities have created tensions with the present PM and will likely do the same with the next.  That, combined with his neglect of governance and prioritization of power politics, will create serious trouble for him and Pakistan.  As a result, I am inclined to believe that Zardari’s presidency and the PPP-led coalition government are near the beginning of their end.

Zardari’s political opponents, in fact, seem to be mobilizing their forces for a campaign to check or remove him.  

Recent opinion articles in the Pakistani press, one of which was by an old Zardari friend, have catalogued Zardari’s failings since the February elections.  On the first anniversary of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, Today with Kamran Khan, a major Pakistani public affairs program, devoted its entire program to argue that Zardari has neither taken real steps to pursue his wife’s killers (such as lodging an FIR), nor sought to implement her agenda.  The attempts by the normally cynical Khan to paint Benazir as a genuine supporter of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry seemed fairly contrived.  

These arguments further the idea that Zardari not only killed the Bhutto political dynasty, which I believe, but that he also killed the Bhuttos (Mir Murtaza and Benazir).  There is no evidence he was involved in his wife’s murder.  But it doesn’t help Zardari that his government recently arrested critic Mumtaz Bhutto, Benazir’s uncle and eldest surving patrilineal relative.  Nor does it help that Sanam Bhutto, Benazir’s sister, seems to cry profusely every time she’s within Zardari’s proximity.

The two parallel cases being made in the public discourse against Zardari — one alleging misgovernance and the other malice — build as he becomes the locus of public and elite ire.  Zardari is the new Musharraf, but without the latter’s strengths, including army backing.  

And so Zardari’s winter of discontent will lead to a stormy spring.  Nawaz Sharif is steadedly shifting toward full-fledged opposition.  The lawyers will go on another long march in March and the PML-N will join.  Violent protests against loadshedding suggest public anger is rising, or some would like to make it seem that way.  Senate elections will take place in March.  Zardari will be expected to reduce his constitutional powers soon after, but few believe he will.  And then there’s Zardari’s relationship with the Army, which is dysfunctional at best.  Even Peoples Party workers are increasingly fed up with Zardari.  Pakistan will follow the world into a deepening recession.  Violence in the Pashtun belt will certainly intensify.  

A perfect storm is brewing, set to hit Zardari this spring.  But he can weather the onslaught.  To mitigate the political pressure against him, Zardari will need to accomodate the demands of his opposition and improve his government’s performance.  

More specifically, this would entail: restoring the presidency to its nominal status; empowering a new, competent prime minister; bringing back Iftikhar Chaudhry as chief justice; keeping the peace in Punjab with the PML-N by replacing Salmaan Taseer as governor; halting U.S. drone attacks; ending unannounced elecricity loadshedding; and making bold displays of merit-based appointments and good governance.

Above all, this government bereft of achievement, must show Pakistan it has a detailed policy agenda and political vision.  And it must begin immediately to implement it, rather than deferring and delaying as it has done for almost a year.

Below is an excerpt from my latest external piece, published at the World Policy Review.

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Asia Triangle: Pakistan’s Search for Security

Arif Rafiq | 01 Dec 2008

Pakistan’s Perpetual Precariousness

On Nov. 26, terrorists laid siege to Mumbai, making the poshest area of India’s commercial capital a war zone for several days. The attacks once again raised the specter of an Indo-Pak war. Yet, earlier in the day, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi had arrived in New Delhi to continue recently renewed peace talks with his Indian counterpart. The two South Asian states, playing to a script performed before, had in a short period of time taken two steps forward and 10 steps back.
Relations between India and Pakistan are clearly fragile and volatile. They have been so since the bloody birth of both states in August 1947. The two countries are linked by culture, history, and geography, but these very elements also contribute to their divide. 

Complete article

Mumbai is a war zone. Dozens of innocents have been butchered by cold, depraved young men.

But rather than blaming Pakistan, India must look at itself.

Earlier in the week, Indians boasted of the alleged sinking of a pirate vessel by their navy.   An Indian columnist proclaimed that the Indian navy had come of age.

Days later, U.S. officials revealed that the Indians sunk the pirated vessel — not the pirates’.

And last night, terrorists stormed the seaside Taj Hotel, coming into Mumbai via boats.

Clearly the Indian navy has not come of age.

Presumptuousness has plagued India. ‘India shining’ belied the plight of its darkened masses. Nine hundred million there live on less than $2 a day.

Incompetence has also plagued India. After failing to prevent this sophisticated attack and bungling the subsequent operations, New Delhi has magically found out the origin of the terrorists’ vessel and even their hometown!

In blaming Pakistan, Indian officials are masking their own incompetence. India’s security establishment has, much like Pakistan’s, failed to protect its citizenry. States are reluctant to acknowledge that non-state threats are purely that; it is humiliating.

The 800 pound gorilla in the room is the rising threat of homegrown Muslim militancy in India. Muslims are an underclass in India and increasingly plagued by a Hindu chauvinism that has come from the periphery to India’s center. Yesterday’s events are the natural outgrowth of Hindu fascism, which belies the spirit of Hinduism in burning Muslims alive and raping Christian nuns.

India must confront its inner demons. But it is clearly proving resistant to do so, given that elections are not too far.

Terrorism is politics of the most morally decrepit sort. It can involve religion, but only by removing its ethical constraints. It is also imprecise. As I write, a family friend and his father — both Muslim — are holed up in the Taj, uncertain of their fate.

ISLAMABAD ‘LIQUIDATES’ ITS ‘ASSETS’…

Earlier this month, David Ignatius revealed that Islamabad and Washington have a “secret deal” that permits the latter to freely take out previously off-limit insurgent leaders inside Pakistan.  The list related to Ignatius by an anonymous Pakistani source, likely Ambassador Husain Haqqani, was big stuff.  Islamabad had consented to the liquidation of its major ‘assets’ in the tribal areas and nearby: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Mullah Muhammad Omar. Presumably Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir (militants favorable to Islamabad, opposed to the U.S., and hostile to Baitullah Mehsud) were also on the list, as they have since threatened Islamabad after U.S. drone attacks in their vicinity.  Also on the list were figures who, unlike the aforementioned, have declared war on the Pakistani state: various al-Qaeda leaders and operatives as well as Mehsud.

Strangely, the report received scant coverage in the boisterous Pakistani media.  A week and a half later, a Washington Post news report reasserted the claims made in Ignatius’ column, albeit without mentioning specific approved targets.  This piece received immediate attention in Pakistan and even more days later when U.S. drones hit ‘mainland’ Pakistan for the first time.  The Peoples Party-led government played according to script; it and the Foreign Office condemned the attacks and denied the existence of a deal.

Conspicuous was the relative silence of the Pakistan Army.  In September, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani promptly and vigorously denied claims that he agreed on the USS Abraham Lincoln to U.S. ground operations inside Pakistan.  He vowed to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty “at all costs.”

In contrast, this month his press office did not respond to the Ignatius piece (Kayani was out of the country at the time).  Inter-Services Public Relations spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas did speak with the media to deny claims made in the subsequent Post news article.  But there was no strongly worded press release or reaction from Kayani himself.

The reality is that none of the latest U.S. drone attacks could have occurred without the provision of intelligence by Pakistan’s military.  This is why the targeting seems to be more precise — in clear contrast to the Angor Ada raid that yielded no high value targets and killed mainly innocent Pakistani civilians.  In fact, most of the good U.S. intelligence on the tribal areas and al-Qaeda comes from the ISI.  And this is why Nazir and Gul Bahadur smell change in the air.

…BECAUSE IT IS FACING BANKRUPTCY?

What occurred in between now and September that would alter the perspective of the Pakistan Army leadership?  A change of heart?  No.  Too quick.  Most likely: a change in ground realities.

One, Pakistan’s economy has deteriorated. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) and possibly even aid packages have been held back to induce cooperative behavior from Islamabad.  In October, Pakistan’s outgoing Defense Secretary Kamran Rasool told a Senate committee that the country was nearing bankruptcy and could not afford a confrontation with the United States.

Two, if the above was not the single factor, then there has to have been something operational.  Perhaps the Pakistani army is coming to recognize its limitations, at least in the short term.  Presently, it is operating in Bajaur, Swat, and more recently, Mohmand. There has been some success in Bajaur and Swat, but the militants are proving to be formidable.  Only until recently have U.S. forces complemented operations in neighboring Kunar (on the flip side, Pakistani peace agreements in FATA increased attacks on the other side of the border).  Prior to that, insurgents were pouring into Pakistan from Afghanistan.  An additional American brigade will be heading to Regional Command East in January.  But it will get worse before it gets better.  South Waziristan is a long time away for the Pakistan Army.  It will host the mother of all battles in this brutal counterinsurgency.

Three, though Kayani is difficult to decipher — poker face and all — he seems to have developed a healthy, working relationship with senior U.S. and NATO commanders.  The Tripartite Commission now meets regularly and Kayani recently went to Brussels to attend a NATO summit.  Whether or not his colleagues on the other side have fully embraced his major recommendations is unclear.  But Kayani is smiling a lot more than he did in September.

It is possible that the Pakistan Army will remain extremely reluctant to share intelligence on its major ‘assets’ (e.g. Mullah Omar).  There is also the possibility that the Army has a different understanding/terms of the agreement than the civilian government.  Or, Ignatius’ list could be partially inaccurate.  After all, is it really possible to take out Mullah Omar with a missile strike or even a helicopter/ground raid in the middle of Quetta (if that’s where he is)?

Recent comments from the Pakistani civilian and military leadership seem to suggest that they are hoping for a new deal with the incoming Obama administration.  That could just be for public consumption.  Anyway, Gen. David Petraeus is said to have told them during his latest visit that the next government will not change policy toward the region.

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES: DEFEATING TRANSNATIONAL TERROR, SPURRING ETHNIC AND TRIBAL WARFARE, AND WITHERING THE PAKISTANI STATE

The expansion of the U.S. military role inside Pakistan and other parallel changes (ongoing Pakistan Army operations) have the potential to vastly change dynamics on the ground.

The Good

Eliminating or neutralizing al-Qaeda, if it is possible, has its obvious advantages for all state actors.  Rooting it out from Pakistan’s Pashtun belt is somewhat like taking gum out of one’s hair.  Peanut butter is better than a scissor.  If you have to cut, leave as much hair as possible.

The Bad

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), currently between 100,000 and 150,000 will likely grow in the coming year.  Pakistani officials have indicated the IDPs will remain in camps for at least a year.  Within that time period, they could be joined by Pakistanis from other tribal (or even settled) areas, which would double or triple the number.

The IDPs have left their property at home, which, more likely than not is destroyed.  Having lost family members who remained behind or died in transit, they are likely bitter and conflicted.

There is no reason to believe that Islamabad and others vested in its counterinsurgency have and will adequately address the issue of IDPs.  The anger of these displaced persons, particularly the youth, will fester, replacing, to some degree, the militants being killed back in Bajaur, Swat, and Mohmand.

The IDP camps do provide an opportunity to engage tribals in an environment less threatening than their home areas.  Providing IDPs with basic services, respectable amenities, literacy and job training, as well as primary and secondary education can give Islamabad a head start on the last leg of a clear, hold, build strategy for FATA.

The Ugly

Putting all of the militants in the same box, as the Ignatius article claims is being done, could result in the consolidation of militant entities.  Presently, Pakistan is being targeted by the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi, al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda-like freelancers, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and other outfits.

Now, if the Ignatius column is correct, add to the above: Mullah Omar-led Taliban, Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami Afghanistan, the Haqqani group, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur.  Note that Nazir and his fellow Wazirs are a natural rival to Mehsud.  Gul Bahadur split from the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan.  Haqqani provides Pakistani intelligence with information on Mehsud & Co.  And he is well rooted in the tribal structure in North Waziristan and neighboring areas of Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Army, in adopting the adversaries of coalition forces in Afghanistan, gains new enemies and loses old assets. Playing the militants off of one another has been a key part of of Islamabad’s strategy toward the militants.  It has not been perfect, but U.S. officials seem to have endorsed a similar approach in Afghanistan.  If the militants in Pakistan bridge their differences, induced by a one-two punch from Islamabad and Washington, then Pakistan could face a brunt of urban violence the likes of which it has never seen before.

Not only will militants pressed in the tribal areas will push deeper into the North-West Frontier Province’s settled areas, but they will also hit Pakistan’s urban centers — most important of which is Karachi, whose port brings in a majority of U.S. and NATO supplies in Afghanistan.  The potential number of civilian casualties, on venues such as M.A. Jinnah Road, which runs from the Karachi Port through the heart of Karachi to a Peshawar/Torkham-bound national highway.  Terrorists could, for example, attack oil tankers crossing through the city.  Or they could spread things out and lay IEDs anywhere along the stretch of highways N5 (Karachi-Torkham) and N25 (Karachi-Chaman).

In expanding the war theater, militants could ignite ethnic tensions, the seeds of which are already rooted in Pakistan’s soil. Altaf Hussain, the London-based head of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a party that represents a segment of Pakistanis who migranted from India and their descendants, has once again called for young men in his city to acquire arms and training to use them.  He has repeatedly warned of Talibanization in the city.  Combating a violent non-state actor with another non-state actor provides a recipe for uncontrolable urban warfare.  And while Karachi is a likely terrorist target, many fear Altaf is conflating the militant infiltration with the inflow of Pashtun migrants from war afflicted areas of Pakistan.  Altaf has called for new entrants into Karachi to register themselves, precipitating a harsh denunciation from the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP).  The ANP and MQM have had a difficult relationship over the years.  The latter’s hold on Karachi is challenged by the growth in the Pashtun population.

In recent weeks, the Pakhtunistan bogeyman has also reappeared.  Somehow posters in Pashto calling for the creation of an independent Pashtun state appeared in the NWFP.  Combine that with the opposition of the two major Muslim League factions to renaming NWFP Pakhtunkhwa (Hazaras, non-Pashtuns in the NWFP who oppose the renaming, vote for the two parties), and the current national dynamic (PPP & the rest vs. PML-N, i.e. urban Punjab) and you have a strong potential for balkanization.  [Add to that sectarian violence that has been rising in Dera Ismail Khan and continues to plague the Kurram Agency.]

Mission creep on the part of the United States could break open the levies.  Consider the recent comments of former CIA Islamabad station chief, Robert Grenier:

“… as we work out with [the Pakistanis] a rough division of labor, the U.S., I believe, ought to be taking the lead in addressing the issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”

The excerpt is from an otherwise very reasonable set of comments.  Grenier’s proposal would further dilute whatever waning influence Pakistan has in the region.  Local actors would either become loyal to the new power broker in the area, the United States, or to a third party, rendering the Pakistani state irrelevant or an enemy.

The logic seems to be that if Islamabad has no writ in territory X, it has effectively lost sovereignty, giving a free hand to other parties to take action in the area.  That, however, serves to reify or exacerbate Islamabad’s distance from the region.  And the authority vacuum, a source of instability, can only truly be filled by Islamabad.

The loss of local assets, the weakening (at least) of the malik system, and the alienation of locals (via drone attacks), makes that impossible. FATA, in fact, could fall permanently out of the hands of Islamabad.

That, combined for the spread of violence into Pakistan’s cities (particularly Karachi) could accelerate the breakdown of the Pakistani state.  Indeed, there is the potential for a 1,001 separate wars to go on simultaneously (given the ethnic and tribal differences, the proliferation of criminal networks,  and the role of badal, or revenge, in Pashtunwali).  Like Iraq, Pakistan would witness the flight of capital abroad (Amman certainly benefited from Iraqi expats); the departure of the haves (doctors, bankers, and other professionals) to safer shores, such as Dubai, London, and Canada; and leaving the country to the have nots.  Middle class and poorer Karachiites would be left to fend off militants and criminal gangs (not entirely different from today!).  Karachi, I fear, would burn incessantly.

There is no alternative to strengthening the Pakistani state.  Pakistan must be the predominant agent on the ground; a big part of that is the requisite training and equipment (e.g. nightvision goggles, jammers, and secure radio systems).  Establishing the rule of civil law, from Karachi to Khyber, is also essential.  The use of drones should be limited.  Consider that the cost of a Hellfire missile shot from Predator/Reaper drones is roughly the same as that of building a school in a Pakistani village.  Given the danger posed to Westerners, development aid might be better routed through more expressly Pakistani entities/persons.

Finally, the fundamental contradictions in the U.S.-Pakistan partnership must be ironed out.  This requires the Pakistan Army to redouble efforts to root out al-Qaeda and other transnational takfiri terrorists.  It also requires the United States to come to terms with the fact that a great number of important Pashtun actors quite simply oppose its presence in their lands.  Washington should let them know it is ready, in a phased and conditionalized fashion, to say goodbye.

Ok, he’s not hosting Saturday Night Live, but Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will be accepting — in person  – an honorary membership of the New York City Bar Association on November 17th.  Chaudhry was given the honor in absentia in January, when he was under house arrest.

The event is free and open to the public.  It begins at 6PM and will take place at the New York City Bar Association’s headquarters at 42 West 44th Street.

The Balochistan province of Pakistan was hit by a strong earthquake this morning.  The death toll, currently at around 200, is expected to rise.  Over 15,000 are homeless.  Night temperatures in the area approach freezing.

The hardest hit city, Ziarat, was home to Quaid-e Azam in his last months.  The structure of his summer residence, according to Aaj News’ local correspondent, is in a precarious condition.

Readers in Pakistan likely have access to local organizations to which funds can be wired or offered in cash.  But for those outside of Pakistan, particularly in the United States, some reputable aid agencies include Edhi Foundation and Islamic Relief.

Prior to making a donation, please do you own due diligence about the organization.

Update:

Additional aid organizations (hat tip OPEN) -

• Hidaya Foundation
• CARE
• Mercy Corps

Sense and sanity, so it seems, are slowly infusing into the policy making and debate on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Six developments in recent weeks provide some encouragement (though each is not without its flaws):

1) The Saudi-sponsored talks between the Afghan Taliban and Karzai’s government

A smart strategy would be to:

• continue to engage the Afghan Taliban diplomatically while also weakening them militarily in a targeted fashion, thereby controlling the amount of leverage they have;
• link their joining the government and abandoning al-Qaeda to a phased Western withdrawal (perhaps replaced by peacekeepers from non-neighboring Muslim states);
• get the Afghan Taliban, via the Saudis, to commit to socio-economic development and education (including for girls);
• prevent the isolation of non-Pashtun Afghans (see below), who have bad blood with the Afghan Taliban and will feel threatened by Pashtun consolidation;
• make sure Afghanistan does not remain a bloody chessboard for power politics (the Iranians want the U.S. out but also do not want the Afghan Taliban back in power — they could end up supporting disgruntled Tajiks as spoilers)
• have Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Muslim states pay for reconstruction (after having funded radicalism abroad and megaprojects at home);

In short, the Taliban should be brought in to the larger political framework (perhaps a national unity government), formally empowering them, yet constraining them via the constitution, demilitarization, and political competition (e.g Karzai or another ‘moderate’ Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.).

2) The halt of U.S. ground incursions inside Pakistan

The Predator attacks continue and have been, on the whole, a bit more precise than attacks from the summer.  The U.S. ground attack inside Pakistan, which only resulted in the killing of civilians (no apology; no Western outrage), has not been repeated.  Either the ground incursion was a one-time instrument used to pressure Rawalpindi-Islamabad to continue to act against militants (with targeted “leaks” creating the image that this was the ‘new’ policy) or the Pakistan Army’s threats to repel any foreign incursion worked to prevent future attacks.

3) The parliamentary briefing and debate in Islamabad on the war on terror

Critics rightly described the briefing as shallow, offering no new information or sense of a government strategy.  But it ended on a decent note with the passing of a reasonable 14-point resolution.  The document was vague, but broad enough to indicate that a comprehensive solution for militancy is necessary.  The problem is that the Peoples Party-led government is all too ready to pat itself on the back for its minor, cosmetic achievements.  [The worst thing about the small minded Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani (who is a nice, well-intended person) is that he doesn't know what he doesn't know and that everyone else knows it.]  The briefing should be the beginning, not the end, of regular parliamentary debate on and oversight over Pakistan’s war strategy.

4) The continuation of the Pakistan Army’s operations in Bajaur (despite Taliban calls for a ceasefire)

The Pakistani Taliban have made repeated calls for a truce in Bajaur, which have not been obliged.  It seems to indicate their growing weakness there.  The Pakistan military has not budged in Bajaur, which is seen as a test of whether it has the capacity and will to defeat militancy elsewhere.  The fight in South Waziristan, for example, will far more difficult — the battle of battles.

5) The dents made in the consensus that the U.S./NATO should be in Afghanistan for an indefinite period

Fortunately, the U.S. presidential election is almost over and a real debate on the future of the U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan can begin. Gen. David Petraeus’ review of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan has already begun and he has the political and institutional legitimacy to give both the public and policymakers some tough medicine (see below).  Diplomatic and military officials outside of the U.S. have already begun this process.  They have come to terms with the fact that foreign occupations don’t last long in Afghanistan, a nation made of quicksand.  Many NATO member states have finally looked at a map and realized the Afghanistan is a long way from the north Atlantic.  It was a strategic blunder for the United States to get itself stuck in a landlocked Central Asian state,  and antagonizing Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan.

6) Gen. Petraeus assumes leadership over U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) next week

Petraeus will immediately visit Islamabad.  By then, the new Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director Ahmed Shuja Pasha will have returned from his meetings in the United States with Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden. Petraeus is right when he says that the Pakistan-Afghanistan predicament shares some similarities with the Iraq conflict, but it is, on the whole, fairly distinct. And he is consulting with a wide variety of experts, including Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani American journalist/editor with close personal ties to the Pakistan army and author of a massive encyclopedic text on the institution.  [Nawaz, brother of the late Chief of Army Staff Gen. Asif Nawaz, also met with the current COAS Gen. Ashfaq Kayani in August.  And so he has interacted with, and has perhaps had an influence on, the two most important men in the fight to secure Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Very interesting.]

Petraeus is seen as scholar-soldier who will do what’s right for America.  His perceived success in Iraq provides him with the necessary standing to argue for a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, providing cover for the next president.

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With that said, the outlook for the region remains grim.

1) Pakistan is heading toward bankruptcy

It will likely avoid such a fate, but economic troubles will probably further political strife.  Pakistan’s last resort, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), appears now to be its only resort.  The PPP-led government has prepared for such a scenario in advance by removing fuel subsidies.  But Pakistani consumers, facing a double whammy of more energy blackouts and higher bills, are increasingly taking to the streets to express their outrage.  The protesters are just regular Pakistanis.  Nusrat Javed, a leading Pakistani television commentator, has expressed his fear on multiple occasions that these leaderless rallies could eventually produce something near anarchy.  The so-called ‘Friends of Pakistan’ should take this in mind as such a scenario becomes even more likely if the IMF requires the removal of wheat subsidies.  The textile industry is also expected to shed tens of thousands of jobs, and that will have an impact not just on Karachi and Punjab industrial cities, but also on farmers who grow cotton and family members of migrant factory workers.  The PPP will take a big political hit if it is forced, via an IMF mandate, to lay off public sector employees (or if the same occurs after privatization).

2) The U.S. and Pakistani reliance on air power is troubling

The Pakistani military campaign in Bajaur is marked by a heavy use of airpower (F-16s and helicopter gunships).  The civilian casualties are mounting.  Aside from the moral aspect, it is strategically disastrous.  Pakistan not only needs the support of the local population, but also should be directly working to free them from the militants.  Coalition forces in Afghanistan too over rely on air power.  That, combined with heavily flawed intelligence, will lead to more dead babies and more Taliban recruits.

3) Karzai is up for re-election in 2009 and could rekindle ethnic strife

He is stuffing his cabinet with Pashtuns.  The closer he gets to rapprochement with the Taliban, the more he’ll alienate the Northern Alliance/United Front.  Afghanistan cannot revert to the ethnic warfare of the 1990s.  But Karzai is increasingly stubborn as well as indecisive.  His foreign benefactors are more inclined to slap him around via leaks to the New York Times when he complains about civilian casualties, than prod him to make sound decisions on governance.

4) Arming lashkars has dangerous mid to long term implications

The use of tribal lashkars (militias) is window dressing on what are largely operations by the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps.  But one has to consider the broader implications of arming civilian militias. Forget about the “Awakening model” because the long term viability of this arrangement is tenuous.  Post-conflict, is imperative that these individuals be disarmed, integrated into local police forces, and that their regions achieve a phased political integration into the rest of Pakistan.

5) Humanitarian assistance and civil reform plans for FATA are weak

There are over 150,000 internally displaced Pakistanis from the violence in Bajaur.  The accommodations and provisions given to them are meager.  If Pakistan is expected to “do more” militarily, then Western states need to do their part and provide immediate and sizable humanitarian assistance (financial and resources).  IDPs are a natural externality of insurgent violence; and their numbers will multiply manifold if Pakistan extends its operations into other tribal areas.  Winter is coming.   Now is the time to act.

Pakistan needs to pay greater attention to the post-conflict law and order situation.  It must be prepared to take up shop inside the tribal areas once conflict ceases.  It should institute hybrid systems that embrace the traditional, Islamic, and civil systems of authority, governance, and adjudication.

6) Consequences of ‘doing more’ not fully thought out

When pressed in the Tribal Areas, militants have sought to expand the battlefield deeper into Pakistan.  With their backs against the wall, will the militants try to hit the head point of the NATO supply lines, the multi-ethnic tinderbox known as Karachi?  Roads connecting the Karachi Port to the national highways pass through the heart of Karachi.  The potential civilian casualties are immense.  Such attacks could fuel conflict between Pashtun groups and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), whose violent leader has called on youths to arm themselves.

Furthermore, with continued violence and economic deterioration, will Pakistan’s ‘haves’, including physicians and bankers, fortify and enclose their communities, or even flee to safer shores, such as Dubai and London?

Pakistanis should resist the Iraqization of their country.  It requires not ‘doing more’ or doing less, but doing what is right for their country, as well as neighbors and friends.

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A couple other points:

1) Pakistan needs to figure a way to reshape and limit its relations with Afghanistan

Hyper engagement in Afghanistan is a strategic blunder for any foreign nation.  The Afghan tendency toward ingratitude and fickleness/intransigence/double dealing limits the utility of major involvement in that country.  India’s present engagement with Afghanistan provides an interesting model.  New Delhi rode into Kabul on the backs of the Western military presence and the Northern Alliance.  Afghans have forgotten India’s support for the Soviet occupation, which killed countless numbers of innocent Afghans.  Indian popularity is reportedly sizable, but India, of course, has the luxury of not having a border with Afghanistan.  Pakistanis should understand Afghan resentment at being a playground for neighbors and other powers.  But the Afghans themselves resort to external patronage to handle disputes with internal foes and neighbors.

2) Bagram is the new Guantanamo Bay/Abu Ghraib

Expect to hear some more stories on it.  The Western press is oblivious to the case of Aafia Siddiqui, but it definitely has Pakistanis angered.  Iftikhar Chaudhry is not being reinstated in part because he stood up against the illegal detention of Pakistanis by multiple security services.

Asif Zardari’s quest to consolidate power in Pakistan proceeds without much political opposition.

Today, he replaced the retiring Chief of Navy Admiral Afzal Tahir with Vice Admiral (now Admiral) Noman Bashir, who superseded Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Asaf Humayun.

Admiral Bashir also happens to be the brother of the Zardari-appointed foreign secretary, Salman Bashir,  who replaced Riaz Muhammad Khan in quite a controversial fashion.

Well, no big deal since this is, after all, ‘Zardari’s navy.’  Note in a recent Wall Street Journal interview, Zardari refers to the Intelligence Bureau as “my IB,” the Pakistan Air Force’s F-16s as “my F-16s,” and law enforcement as “my police.”  The ‘commission fee’ is now 100%, it seems.

Curious how Zardari managed to convert Bret Stephens from a harsh critic into a supporter of sorts in less than a month.  In September, Stephens called Zardari “a category 5 disaster.” Perhaps Zardari threatened a hug.

Note: Admiral Bashir writes in a 2000 research paper titled “Afghanistan and the ‘New Great Game’” that the Taliban “are inward rather than outward looking” and have “signalled readiness to engage constructively with the international community.”  He adds: “Keeping Afghanistan broken and destabilized suits those who do not want the Caspian/Central Asian oil and gas pipelines to take one of the shortest and economical outlets over Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea.”

Police prevented an assassination attempt on ANP Chief Asfandyar Wali Khan today in Charsadda, NWFP.

A suicide bomber was shot in the head as he tried to make his way into a gathering (hujra) at Wali Bagh led by Khan.

The bomber released the trigger upon his death, setting off the blast. At least five persons were killed.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism capabilities are improving.

Its first line of defense, local policemen and security guards, are displaying great bravery and diligence — saving the lives of others and sacrificing their own in the process.

GEO News reports that Baitullah Mehsud, the amir of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan is dead, apparently due to natural causes. Mehsud had been sick in recent days and reportedly slipped into a coma.

Pakistan’s commemorate Eid ul-Fitr today (Wednesday), marking the end of the month of Ramadan. The passing of this murderous terrorist, if true, is an Eid present of sorts for the violence plagued nation.

Expect the TTP shura council to elect a successor soon. It will, however, not be a smooth ride for the TTP, since the organization has continuously faced internal squabbling. It is possible that the TTP could elect a successor from the Mehsud tribe.

Mehsud’s death, however, will not mark the end of the TTP. Pakistan’s security forces should not take this as an opportunity to be complacent. The Pakistan military-intelligence establishment now has an opportunity to make use of potential divisions within the TTP. But while fragmenting the alliance weakens their existence as an ideological movement, it could also give birth to a wide assortment of criminal entities, further destabilizing the region.

There is no alternative to gaining the support of the local tribes, elders, wayward youth, and striking a fine balance between recognizing local autonomy and ensuring the writ of the government is present.

UPDATE: 6:12PM (New York) - BBCUrdu.com reports that a U.S. Predator drone fired two missiles at a home in North Waziristan, killing around four. Foreigners are among the dead.

UPDATE: 10:50PM (New York) - Renown Pakistani Pashtun journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai tells BBC Urdu that Mehsud’s death has not been confirmed with the Tehreek-e Taliban. Yusufzai did state that Mehsud was very ill recently, due to diabetes and heart-related afflictions.

Additionally, today’s missile strike took place in a village near Mir Ali. Yusufzai said that locals told him that the blasts were so strong they could be heard as far as Bannu and Miranshah.