The Pakistan Policy Blog

The People’s Party and Muslim League-Nawaz remain married, but separated. At the moment, they are seeing other people.

Earlier this week, Mumtaz Bhutto, the Bhutto tribe leader and estranged uncle of the late Benazir, met with Shahbaz Sharif in Lahore. Weeks before that, he had said there was no real difference between the PPP and Musharraf-allied PML(Q), Mumtaz has long been a critic of the PPP under Benazir and now Zardari.

Adding to the intrigue is the fact that he also met with Aitzaz Ahsan, who alternates between a PPP-lawyers’ movement balancing act and choosing the lawyers. At the moment, Aitzaz is on the lawyers’ corner of the ring and seems ready to tussle. He’s called for a long march on June 10 and withdrew his nomination papers for the National Assembly seat from Rawalpindi. The PML-N also is expected to join the lawyers.

Aitzaz, perhaps others in (now or previously) the PPP, and the PML(N) are preparing for a fight with Zardari and what can be seen as his faction of the PPP. Conflict is not inevitable, but it seems as if the PML(N) as well as Aitzaz are trying to match Zardari tit for tat.

Why? Because of the forthcoming 18th amendment. The federal law minister appeared on TV to discuss it a few days ago. He was on air for perhaps 10 minutes and managed to provide few details of substance. But the insinuations and Islamabad chatter fill in the holes decently.

The 18th amendment is effectively Zardari’s returning the favor to Pervez Musharraf for the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Zardari, with virtually all criminal cases against him dropped, will indemnify Musharraf for his (self-admitted) illegal acts on November 3, 2007.  Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and his stalwart colleagues will be outnumbered by judges loyal, at the moment, to Musharraf and Zardari.  Their powers will be diluted and term will be shortened.  All in the name of “reform.” [Though it seems as if the amendment will include some actual positive reforms such as strengthening the premiership and having Supreme Court appoinments approved by a parliamentary committee.]

Zardari is embracing Musharraf’s euber-allies: the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). And he’s selectively embracing the PML(Q). Manzoor Wattoo of the PML-(Q) (or J) has now joined the federal government as a science and technology adviser. It’s perhaps one way of working around the Chaudhries. Ditching Pervaiz Ellahi and Shujaat Hussain has proven problematic. They now join Hamid Nasir Chatta in meetings with Musharraf.

This arrangement works better for Musharraf & Co. A PML(Q) forward bloc formed soon after the elections. It was expected that they’d join the PML(N). But they waited patiently on the aisles, testing the waters. Their enemy was not Musharraf, but, so they say, Shaukat Aziz and the Chaudhries. Their attempts to de-Chaudhrize the PML(Q) seems to have failed after talk began of the Chaudhries pairing up with Nawaz. (The theme of the past week or so has been: ‘Two can play at that game’.) Multiple forward blocs would water down a PML(Q) already reduced down to size, leaving Musharraf with little political leverage besides the MQM.

In the midst of all this, a budget has to be proposed and by-elections will be held.  The budget, if Pakistanis are fortunate, will pass smoothly.  But the by-elections and 18th amendment will conflate.  And it seems as if Nawaz is ready to capitalize upon this.  In a recent appearance on Capital Talk, he returned to his talking points of the most recent February elections, speaking of Pakistan’s self-respect and sovereignty and the social malaise and desparation caused by economic pressures.  The 18th amendment, if the PML(N) plays it right, will be framed as a ‘minus-160 million formula’–a violation of the basis of the mandate provided by the Pakistani electorate to the present government.  Most Pakistanis in February voted against Musharraf & Co. and favored a PPP-PML(N) coalition and the judges’ restoration.

The 18th amendment will be as bloated as the 17th.  It could move forward at a glacier-like speed or pass with smooth sailing.  Legal advisers from the State Department met with Musharraf’s lawyer, Attorney General Malik Qayyum.  And that could mean that the PPP, PML(Q), ANP, MQM, and JUI(F) are already on board.  That’s not to say things will be honky dory.  The 18th amendment can cost its supporters political legitimacy and even dissent within their rank and file.  One could see the Zardari-led PPP set not only against the PML(N) and the lawyers’ movement, but also elements within.  Alternatively, the PML(N) could provide tacit support to the bill if reports of Musharraf resigning after recieving legal immunity are not disinfo to make it more palatable.

As I’ve written earlier, things are very fluid.  This time around, I’ll also add that it looks like things will also get messy–in June.

WARNING: Not easy on the eyes.

M. Abdullah Yusuf is chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue. Apparently he’s resorted to exotic dancing to mitigate the national debt.

Musharraf joins him at the end, but the camera then turns away, perhaps to save us the sight.

The appointment of Salman Taseer–a Musharraf-supporter, former PPP politician, and businessman–as governor of Punjab has sparked a heated debate in Pakistan.  Many argue that this is the first firing short, or perhaps the most audible, of a battle for Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province.

But the game is more likely far more complex.  Sandwiched in between the headlines is news of the acceptance of the nomination papers of Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif.  The same election commission rejected their papers for February’s elections on grounds of previous convictions.  This time around, petitions against their eligibility were rejected by the Musharraf-appointed commission.  At the same time, the People’s Party has replaced the cabinet seats vacated by the Muslim League (Nawaz) largely with PPP ministers already in the cabinet (making them in charge of multiple ministries).

In other words, the PPP and Musharraf’s dealings with the PML(N) involve an alternating, and sometimes simultaneous, use of carrots and sticks.  Anything can happen in the coming days, weeks, and months.  But just as many see the PPP and PML(N) set on the path of confrontation, it is also possible that the PML(N) has consented to a safe exit for Musharraf around the time of the 2009 Senate elections when parliamentary numbers for the former general’s impeachment will be very much attainable.

Things are very fluid.  There’s a strong likelihood of Sharif and Zardari entering the National Assembly.  It remains to be seen whether the halls are big enough for the both of them.  But there is also possibility for the PML(N) returning to the cabinet and both parties giving their marriage a second chance.  In the midst though, the roller coaster ride, combined with increasing economic troubles, could delegitimize the democratic process and politicians.

GEO News reports of a missile attack tonight in Damadola, Bajaur Agency, where a January 2006 U.S. strike targeted al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri. BBC Urdu, citing a Taliban spokesman, states that the strike occured at approximately 8PM local time (11AM New York/Washington).

Local residents tell GEO that one home has been destroyed. According to the station, fourteen people have been killed.

Aaj Television reports that the target was Maulvi Obaidullah of the Tehreek-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM). Their correspondent also says, according to locals, Maulvi Obaidullah’s brother has been killed. Obaidullah’s fate is unclear.

Taliban spokesman Maulvi Umar told GEO that most of the casualties were local residents. The GEO correspondent also reported that the area’s mobile phone networks were having operational difficulty.

PML(N) leader Nawaz Sharif wasn’t educated at Oxford, but he’s playing politics smartly. Today, he announced that his party will submit its resignation from the federal cabinet tomorrow, though it will continue to support the government. And a few hours ago, he unexpectedly submitted his papers for the upcoming by-elections.

So what’s Sharif doing? He’s strategically distancing himself from the PPP with a measured protest against the latter’s refusal to reinstate the deposed judges in the agreed manner and time frame.

Sharif’s party can, in the coming weeks, return to the government or completely sever ties with the PPP.

His party’s resignation from the government permits the PPP to proceed on its own course vis-a-vis the judges. Absence from the government provides the PML(N) with plausible deniability should the judges be ‘restored’ but restricted.

If the public finds the PPP’s judicial ‘reforms’ palatable, then Nawaz can return to the government.

But, if they don’t, he can say that he had nothing to do with this and, despite his best efforts, the judges were not restored.

There’s another important influence on Sharif’s decision-making. He’s currently being sidelined by a number of parties. Many, including the Bush administration, hope for a Zardari-Musharraf coalition consisting of the PPP, ANP, PML(Q), MQM, and JUI(F).

Sharif is being pushed out toward the rightists, such as the Jamaat-i Islami. That’s something he can resist if Pakistan’s civil society and the general public backs him.

In fact, Sharif might have the last laugh. A Zardari-Musharraf marriage will not be happy. The PPP’s coalition with smaller parties excluding the PML(N) will be much shakier. All members will be tainted by their association with Musharraf and Zardari. And Zardari will become increasingly reliant upon Pakistan’s so-called establishment as well as foreign benefactors.

And so that’s why PML(N) central committee members urged Sharif to run for the National Assembly race. Ostracization will be difficult for Sharif, but might work well for him in the longer term.

If he’s permitted to run (strong chance his papers will be rejected by the Musharraf-appointed election commission), then he could pave his way toward becoming head of the opposition. Who will he be opposing? The loveless multi-party coalition led by Pervez Musharraf and Asif Zardari, whose negative ratings are extremely high.

Zardari has significantly (re)discredited himself, the PPP, and the democratic process in recent weeks. And in the past few days, he and de-facto interior minister Rehman Malik have flirted with strong-arm tactics to intimidate the media. Totally mindless. It’s one thing to politically align with Musharraf. Emulating his behavior is politically suicidal. And Sharif could be the last man standing with honor and credibility en tact.

So here we are, once again. Different city, but same story. Well, story of.

The (latest) deadline to restore the deposed judges is imminent. Today, Asif Zardari will meet Nawaz Sharif, in London, to ‘resolve’ their differences. Like the previous deadline, the present one could be similarly disregarded. Like last week, the onus to move/decide is on Sharif, not Zardari. Like last week, Zardari can afford inaction. Like last week, Sharif needs to come out with something tangible. But after last week’s charade, one can only view any agreement between the PPP and PML(N) very cynically.

The political tectonics continue to shift decidely in Zardari’s favor. He has made it clear to Sharif that he has other options. Indeed, after meeting Sharif, Zardari will visit none other than the man who put ‘don’ in London: Altaf Hussain.

As the judges’ issue stretches on, Sharif can periodically come out with guarantees from Zardari, but he will also increasingly have to strike a greater bargain.

Sharif will likely get his judges restored. But it looks like he’ll have to accept a constitutional package that essentially negates the judges’ restoration. The deposed judges will be outnumbered by pro-Musharraf judges and restricted in their powers. The court of Iftikhar Chaudhry, it seems, has come to an end.

The minus-one formula could also be revised. Chaudhry could stick around for a year or two, shackled in his chambers and effectively eliminated. But a minus-three formula could emerge, with two more Chaudhries–the additional two being from Gujrat.

Zardari could accept the Musharraf-allied PML(Q) as a coalition partner if it sheds Shujaat Hussain and Pervaiz Ellahi. The Chaudhries might put up a fight but they could also be Shaukat Aziz’d, i.e. made the scapegoats for the previous government’s failures. The new PML(Q) could form a coalition government with the PPP in Punjab and join the government in the center. Or, at the very least, it could stand there in reserve to let Sharif know he’s expendable, and be for the PPP what the JUI(F) was for Musharraf: the not-so-oppositional opposition. The PML(Q) forward bloc could also then return ‘home’ or stay in limbo to yield maximally from their ‘independence.’

Also, Sharif will probably have to accept Pervez Musharraf as president. Weeks ago, Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar described Musharraf as “cashable.” In recent days, Zardari basically repeated the same idea in somewhat more dignified terms. Seems like he’ll be around for a while.

Zardari wants to be the daddy of one large, happy family. But at some point, his political polygamy has a limit, requiring a divorce. He’s leveraged the Musharraf-Sharif rivalary to his advantage, gaining concessions from Musharraf and at the same time rehabilitating his image by holding hands with Nawaz. This balancing act will be difficult to continue.

Finally, it would be a mistake to confuse Zardari’s ascendancy for invulnerability. In fact, he could be guilty of such confusion himself. His appearance on Shahid Masood’s Meray Mutabiq has helped revert his public image to the old, negative one. In the eyes of many Pakistanis, the new Zardari has become the old Zardari again. They find an uncanny similarity between between the Musharraf, Tariq Aziz, and Malik Qayyum team and Zardari, Rehman Malik, and Farooq Naik. The response, or lack thereof, of the Pakistani public remains to be seen.

Earlier today, Nawaz Sharif briefed a PML(N) leadership meeting discussing his talks with Asif Zardari.  Sharif said that they agreed that a resolution for restoring the deposed judges will be put before parliament on May 12.

Later, Law Minister Farooq Naik of the PPP addressed the media and stated that the resolution for restoring the judges and the judicial “reform” package will come together.  As I wrote yesterday, the two parties would be holding separate press conferences about their joint agreement and one should look for differences in their narratives.  [Naik also met with Abdul

The two narratives are not contradictory.  Sharif’s is just incomplete and somewhat disingenuous.

Sharif is accurate when he says the judges will be restored via a resolution, not a constitutional package.  But, once that resolution passed, the constitutional package will be pushed through parliament.  And when Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry returns to his chambers, he’ll find his authority significantly diminished.  So Chaudhry will be restored to his November 2nd status–for a few hours or days.

On a related noted, there seems to be some significant changes emerging from the Musharraf camp.

One, leadership changes will probably be made in the PML(Q), a Pervez Musharraf-allied party.  Pitbulls (the Chaudhry cousins) will be replaced with less pugilistic politicians (e.g Hamid Nasir Chatta, Mir Zafrullah Jamali, Faisal Saleh Hayat, and Farooq Leghari). GEO News reports that Sheikh Rashid could replace Mushahid Hussain as secretary general of the PML(Q).

Two, GEO News also reports that Musharraf has informed the PPP that he’s conceded to the restoration of the judges.  He’s also discussing ‘voluntarily’ giving up his right to dissolve the National Assembly, i.e. the powers under article 58(2)(b).

Time Magazine has released its list of the 100 most influential people.  There are two Pakistanis: Ashfaq Kayani and Baitullah Mehsud.

Nawaz Sharif left his talks with Asif Zardari with a large grin on his face. And unlike Zardari, he spoke to the media. He had something he wanted to say, namely: the deposed judges will be restored by a National Assembly resolution, not a constitutional package.

If this verbal promise becomes a reality, Sharif can tell the Pakistani electorate that he fulfilled his campaign commitment to restore the judges to their November 2nd status. And it could pave the way for his (and/or his brother’s) return to electoral politics, as well as the departure of Pervez Musharraf. Nawaz’s smile was revealing, but the joy could be fleeting. Many, many questions remain.

There was and will be no joint press conference. In other words, both parties will not be standing together to re-assert their commitment to a judicial restoration and ‘reform’ plan. Sharif will speak to the press tomorrow in Lahore. Zardari’s press conference in Karachi will follow. Will this new agreement become a ‘he said, he said’ drama? Even if the two offer the same story, there remains the question of whether Zardari will follow through.

And even if he does, there are many obstacles in the way. The present Supreme Court could move to block their restoration. Or, a National Assembly resolution could be passed with a simple majority and a consensus could ‘emerge’ that such a move has no binding status, even if it is followed by an executive order.

Even if the judges are restored to their November 2nd status, how long they will remain in that condition? In other words, what will the constitutional package contain?

Sharif likely had to make some compromises in this regard. And we’ll learn of them in the coming days.

Some concessions will be more manageable than others. Sharif does not want to put himself at odds with the lawyers’ movement. It’s far easier if Zardari gets to absorb their scorn.

Sharif, and to a lesser extent, Zardari, would benefit from a time gap between the restoration of the judiciary and the introduction of a constitutional package that limits its powers. Once the judiciary is restored, there are greater chances the public will be willing to accept some curbs on its power. Sharif would lose out if Abdul Hamid Dogar remains as chief justice or if Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s tenure would end this summer. Having Iftikhar as CJ for at least a year would be workable. Keeping Iftikhar around for more than a few months likely means he’ll have to let go of his suo moto powers.

Notes:

• Musharraf and Kayani: Arif Nizami, editor of The Nation, said on Live with Talat that Pervez Musharraf and Gen. Ashfaq Kayani “are not on the same page.” Imtiaz Alam differed, stating that the differences between the army and Musharraf are not strategic, but tactical. He rightly noted that Pakistan’s political trajectory could be toward a dangerous bifurcation–something which I alluded to in my previous post–in which the PPP falls into the “lap of the army” and the PML(N) is compelled to ally with the Jamaat-i Islami.
• On the same program, Najam Sethi made an interesting prediction: Musharraf will accept Iftikhar Chaudhry as chief justice. Today, Mush and Chaudhry will co-exist. Tomorrow, neither Musharraf, nor Chaudhry will be in their respective posts.

Nawaz Sharif is in a bind.

Wednesday is the last day left for the judges to be restored as promised by his party and Asif Zardari’s in their Murree Declaration.

But Zardari, as evinced in recent interviews, has veered completely off course in the final hour (he was swerving around during the past few weeks). Yesterday, Zardari made it clear he considers the Murree Declaration a “political agreement.” In Pakistan’s political culture, such an agreement has the value of toilet paper (or, perhaps more culturally appropriate: lota paani).

So Sharif has three choices: stick and compromise with Zardari, pull his ministers out of the cabinet (yet stay in the governing coalition), or totally break away from the PPP. None of these moves will seriously impact the PPP immediately. It has the backing of Pakistan’s establishment as well as foreign powers. The PML(N) can be easily replaced by the MQM and PML(Q). But Nawaz Sharif and the PML(N) will likely feel the impact quickly.

Sticking with Zardari provides no guarantees whatsoever.

Sharif could concede to the PPP’s demands (whatever they are now). Parliament could move for the judges’ restoration in a special session as early as Thursday. But that’s highly unlikely.

Zardari could provide Sharif with another vague commitment, bid for more time, and then come up with another story in a few weeks. This would publicly humiliate Sharif, if he hasn’t been already. Moreover, Sharif’s political renewal is much in part due to his uncompromising stance on the judiciary issue. If he’s seen as giving in, his political capital will suffer. This will be exacerbated if his compromises yield little of substance.

Alternatively, if the judges are restored with somewhat manageable concessions (e.g. letting Justice Chaudhry stay around till 2010), then Sharif and his ministers get to stay in the central government and, more importantly, at the helm in Punjab. This is the most palatable scenario for Sharif.

If Sharif distances himself from the PPP partially or completely, then he and much of Pakistan could be put on a path of confrontation with the establishment as well as the PPP. Sharif and his brother, Shahbaz, would likely be unable to return to electoral politics without any radical political change. Most importantly, he’ll be further pushed into the rightist camp (the Jamaat-i Islami and Tehreek-i Insaaf). And that will serve the interests of those who would like to discredit him internationally as a clean-shaven mullah. Sharif might win with much of the Pakistani street, but with the rising economic challenges, who knows if they’ll even have the stomach for another judicially-oriented fight.

With that said, Zardari’s moves are not without risk. His behavior since the murder of his wife has been praiseworthy. Those who once opposed him had since described him as a statesmanlike. Now he appears, in the eyes of many, like a typical Pakistani politician or swindling car salesman. Zardari should keep in mind that he is not and will never be a Bhutto. If he ditches the PML(N), reverts to the politics of old, and becomes prime minister this summer, he will become the perfect political punching bag for a great number of parties. Magnamity, statesmanship, and sympathy from his wife’s murder have shielded him from public scorn. Once all those wear off and he’s at the top, there will be little to shield him from a multi-directional onslaught.